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The need for generosity in victory
By Irfan Husain
Wednesday, 20 May, 2009
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Sri Lankan troops celebrate their victory, but maintaining peace will be the hardest fight of all - Reuters photo.

ALTHOUGH long expected, the end of the LTTE came with brutal finality when Prabahkran, the shadowy leader of the terrorist organisation, was gunned down while trying to escape in an ambulance. After sending hundreds of his fighters on suicide missions over the years, it was unthinkable that he would have surrendered to the Sri Lankan army. But when the end came, he found himself unable to swallow one of the cyanide pills that he handed out routinely to his followers.

Fortunately, the bloodbath widely feared did not take place, and most civilians were evacuated, traumatised and starving. It is estimated that 7,000 Tamils died in the fighting between January and May, but most fell due to the LTTE’s refusal to let them go. Many of those who tried to escape were gunned down by the Tamil Tigers who were determined to use them as human shields right till the bitter end.

While the international community tried to stop the fighting to allow the civilians to leave the battle zone, the reality is that even if the army had stopped its advance, innocent Tamils would still have been held by the LTTE. Another fact we often forget is that no victorious army stops to allow its enemy to reform and rearm. Those civilians who have escaped the hell the Tigers had created for them at least have a reasonable chance of putting their lives together again.

The true victims in this long, bitter struggle are the Tamils who were virtual prisoners of Prabahkran and his gang of thugs. For years, they could not leave the de facto Tamil state in the north and the east of the island. They were forced at gunpoint to contribute cash and children to the LTTE cause. Boys as young as 12 were used as cannon fodder and thousands of Tamils living abroad were blackmailed to donate to LTTE enforcers; any refusal to do so led to reprisals aimed at relatives back home.

While the Tamil Tigers have been universally condemned for their ruthless acts of terrorism over the years, the underlying causes that led to the civil war often get overlooked. Highly intelligent and generally better educated than the majority Sinhalese, the Tamils were favoured by the British during the colonial era. When the majority gained power, the Tamil found themselves being marginalised through state policy. Resentment built up until the civil war began in 1982. Before and since, Prabahkran eliminated all voices of peaceful Tamil dissent. Over the years, he used political assassination as a tool, and Rajiv Gandhi was one of his many victims.

Gradually, the top leadership of the LTTE became more and more cut off from reality as it ruled over one-fourth of the island as a virtual fiefdom. After 9/11, the distinction between national struggles and outright terrorism was no longer accepted. Quickly, the Tamil Tigers were declared a terrorist organisation, and funds became harder to raise abroad.

Perhaps Prabhakran’s biggest mistake came in 2005 when he enforced the boycott of the presidential elections at gunpoint, thereby handing over victory to his nemesis, Mahinda Rajapakse, by the narrowest of margins. Had he allowed the Tamils to vote, in all probability Ranil Wickramsinghe would have won. ‘Ranil,’ as he is popularly known, had signed a ceasefire while prime minister, and wanted a negotiated settlement. This is one of the ifs and buts of history, but it is probable that had the results of the 2005 elections been different, we might well have had an autonomous Tamil homeland by now.

Even as the endgame was being played out, many people were asking ‘What next?’ I have been visiting Sri Lanka regularly over the last decade, and I have found very little animosity for Tamils among the majority Sinhalese. While there is an understandable amount of triumphalism in the air currently, one can only hope this is not reflected in official policy. Should the government be incapable of being generous in victory, there is a very real danger that the conflict will continue, with Tamil guerrillas taking the fight underground. Only a greater degree of autonomy will satisfy Tamil aspirations. Unfortunately, the situation in the Eastern Province, liberated from the LTTE in 2006, does not inspire confidence. A controversial election has enabled the government to put a stooge into the office of chief minister, and there are daily reports of violence.

It is here that the international community needs to put pressure on the Rajapakse government. Transparent elections need to be held in the north as soon as possible, and funds for recovery and reconstruction should be placed at the disposal of the elected provincial government. While it is tempting for Colombo to tinker with the process to ensure victory for a compliant leadership, it would be foolhardy to go down that path. I can imagine the anger and despair among the Tamils; it would take very little to ignite the fuse and cause yet another round of violence.

Non-LTTE Tamil leaders need to be consulted to set up a framework for autonomy in the north and the east. The government needs to reach out, and refrain from giving in to the temptation of further humiliating the Tamils. This can best be done by opening the gates of the resettlement centres where Tamils fleeing the fighting have been held. Even if there is a risk that some LTTE cadres might escape, this is a risk worth taking. Both Tamils and the international community would be reassured of government intentions by this one simple act.

Despite acts of perhaps inevitable brutality, the Sri Lankan army and government deserve credit for ending this long drawn-out civil war. No war is ever pretty, and civil wars are particularly vicious. But there is a lesson here for all states fighting insurgencies: given political will and a coherent policy, even the most efficient and ruthless rebels can be defeated. But the difference between a mere military victory, and a political settlement that effectively addresses the causes of a civil war, lies in generosity and wisdom. We will have to wait and see if Mahinda Rajapakse possesses these qualities.

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