The speed with which the displaced people are returning to their homes is no doubt most gratifying. —Reuters Photo

INFORMATION about the government’s post-operation strategy in Malakand Division is quite sketchy. There is not enough reason to believe that the difficulties in establishing peace and order there are being addressed or are even realised.

The speed with which the displaced people are returning to their homes is no doubt most gratifying. The credit goes more to them than to the authorities.

On the one hand this reveals their determination to take the task of rebuilding their homes and means of living into their own hands. On the other hand it shows how dissatisfied with their temporary abodes they must have been to seize the first opportunity to abandon them.

Official sources claim that the displaced people are going back home according to a proper plan and that all their needs are being taken care of. One should like to hope that this indeed is the case. Past experience generates doubts about the state functionaries’ capacity for doing the right job at the right time. It is necessary to ensure that no displaced family is left out of the relief and rehabilitation scheme and that those dispensing relief packages, especially cash grants, have stopped taking a cut. In this regard families that are not headed by adult males, who can muscle their way through, need special attention. Such precautions are necessary in all situations involving displacement but are more essential in the present case. The reason is that most of the people concerned are already nursing a grievance that had the military action been taken earlier, or even if the intent to do so had been made clear, they might not have been obliged to desert their homes and hearths. Any lapse or deficiency in the rehabilitation operation will add to public discontent.

One hopes notice has already been taken of some disquieting reports about the displaced people’s state of mind. Many of them are said to have added a new item to their baggage – firearms. Nothing surprising if the residents of Buner or Dir do so. But this is something not in keeping with a normal Swati’s character. The implication is that either his faith in the state’s power to protect him has been irreparably dented or that he has decided to settle scores with his tormentors with his own hands. Neither probability should allow complacency among the decision-makers.

The matter acquires a more serious dimension in view of reports that some incidents of reprisal have already taken place. Worse, some of the revenge killings are attributed to those least expected to indulge in such grisly atrocities even if they do not consider themselves responsible for preventing them. It is possible that stories like this are being concocted or exaggerated by anti-state elements. In any case the administration and the security forces must act firmly to check reprisals and help the people to abjure such inhuman tendencies and inclinations.

Action to prevent reprisals is necessary not only because such acts cannot be tolerated in any civilised society but also because they are likely to trigger costly feuds between elements sharing their traditional habitats. This is one of the easiest ways to breed terrorists.

Far more important is the question regarding the future of the elements, whether known as Taliban or otherwise, that had challenged the state and subjected a large section of the population to brutal excesses. There are rumours that another ‘peace deal’ is to be signed with them. In support of this view non-targeting of the militants’ leaders is mentioned.

This impression is not effaced by the arrest of Maulana Sufi Mohammad, who had made himself irrelevant by bowing to the militants, and attacks on the hideout of Mangal Bagh, a smaller try by any account. The militants’ high command is believed to be intact. This whole thesis could have been scripted by the Taliban’s godfathers in Pakistan (in the establishment, in political parties and in the media) because it is impossible to believe that the armed forces will fritter away the advantage they have gained after considerable sacrifices by their officers and men.

In any case, what can be the substance of a peace deal with the militants? They are unlikely to accept the colonial formula – that they will be masters in the tribal belt but will not interfere in the ‘settled’ districts. Their lifestyle has changed, their ambitions are soaring high and they consider themselves to be at an advantage against the Pakistan government. Besides, the impossibility of keeping them off the ‘settled’ districts is obvious; many among their associates and followers belong to these areas. Thus any plan to confine the militants to the tribal belt will not only be based on a flawed assessment it will also be impossible to implement.

True, matters cannot be left hanging and the effort at establishing law and order must enjoy public support. The key issue, however, is identification of forces that support peace. The population of the conflict-ravaged zone is not likely to back a government-militant accord as it will again put them at double jeopardy. Thus a compact for peace must be negotiated with the Malakand population which should have firm guarantees of a security cover. Only a compact like this will deter the militants from crossing the limits.

Further, what is to be done about the issue of the justice system and possibilities of integrating the tribal belt into the settled areas? The official thinking seems to be to persist with the Nizam-i-Adl. This may have become unavoidable but it will be wrong and dangerous to give up fundamental rights, especially of women, children and non-Muslim citizens, without an effort to protect them. It is also said that the vested interest in the establishment is trying to get away with cosmetic changes in the FCR. Again one hopes that the decision-makers will be able to avoid the booby traps laid by the traditional middlemen in the tribal zone.

A safe way out may be to concentrate on rehabilitation of the displaced people and revive the forums and channels of state-people interaction and take policy decisions only after matters have been thoroughly debated in parliament and outside.