The military operation is bound to fail if the economy does not improve - AFP/File photo.

HERE’S a tip for the government if it wants to keep the military option on the table in the war against the militants: fix the economy.

 

Not in the poverty-breeds-terrorism-so-fix-the-economy way, but for a less direct reason: people rank their economic woes above the threat of terrorism and militancy.

 

As the battle continues in Malakand division, the state’s lumbering response to the IDPs pouring out of Swat, Buner and Lower Dir has alarmed many. There is obviously the humanitarian concern: it is wrenching to watch Pakistanis fleeing for their lives left to fend for themselves. But there is another, more strategic concern: the military option may permanently be vetoed if the state fails the Swat litmus test.

 

Winning on the battlefield at the cost of destroying the lives of hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis may add up to no possibility of political support for further military action. And that may equal to losing the war against the militants because Swat is not the epicentre of militancy, Fata is.

 

The government has certainly done itself no favours by botching the humanitarian operation. There are few excuses. The IDPs were entirely expected; after all, it was the NWFP government that asked the people to leave the area to give the army room to operate. And lessons should have been learned from the October 2005 earthquake experience, or, more generally, from the long experience of dealing with millions of Afghan refugees.

 

Connecting the dots between the failure to protect the people in Malakand and failure in the war against militancy is not very difficult. First, the army has made it clear that it will only initiate serious operations if the politicians are on board. The army, ever sensitive to public opinion, is a blunt instrument and it doesn’t want to go into an area and then hear the politicians shout from behind, ‘They’re killing Pakistanis!’

 

Second, the politicians are an opportunistic lot. For those among them who don’t have to bear the cross of running the government, the sight of hundreds of thousands of displaced people is a chance to beat the populist drum: ‘Look at what they’re doing to the people of Pakistan!’

 

Third, the government is weak and its governance record poor. Getting beaten up over a humanitarian disaster triggered by an anyway unpopular military operation may be a stretch too far — once burned by the Malakand experience, it may not be willing to risk calling for another operation elsewhere.

 

That would leave the Baitullahs, Haqqanis and Maulvi Nazirs of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan ecstatic. They would be able to go about their business of sponsoring terrorism on either side of Fata safe in the knowledge that the Pakistani state doesn’t have the stomach to take them on. And unless that battle is fought and won, militancy in Pakistan will never be defeated.

 

It is an entirely plausible scenario, but one that makes a crucial assumption: that the government’s ability to do what is necessary on the militancy front is determined purely by the results it achieves on that front.

 

The data though suggests otherwise. Even if the government’s standing is bruised by its handling of the militancy issue and the humanitarian fallout, the public appears to deem the government’s handling of the economy more important.

 

The latest survey by the International Republican Institute supports this contrary premise. Conducted in March — when the government was reeling from the political disaster in Punjab and the inept handling of the judges issue and terrorism was very much on the national radar following the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the goings-on in Swat — the survey’s results are emphatic: fully 77 per cent of respondents when asked, ‘What is the most important issue facing Pakistan?’ picked inflation, unemployment or poverty. Only 10 per cent picked terrorism as issue No 1.

 

And while only 17 per cent said they would vote for the PPP if national elections were held the following week, the response to the question, ‘What is the one thing the PPP could do that would convince you to vote for them?’ indicated a preoccupation with economic issues. Forty-four per cent said they would be won over if the government reduced inflation and unemployment. Only 11 per cent said that they would vote for the PPP if it managed to control terrorism.

 

The point isn’t that the government can ask the army to go in all guns blazing wherever it likes and not worry about the consequences or that it doesn’t have to worry about the political fallout of hundreds of thousands of displaced people. The military option must always be weighed carefully and the government must take its responsibility to protect the people more seriously, or else the government may find itself fighting for its political survival.

 

The point is that the government can shore up its standing among the people by improving its governance record on the economic front and then use the political space and goodwill created there to do what is necessary in the next phase of the war against the militants.

 

Far from being a linear issue — the military and humanitarian results of the operation in the Malakand division will determine whether the battle can be taken to the militants in Fata — there is a complex matrix of issues involved.

 

So, for example, if the performance of the state in Malakand is thus far a three out of 10, it shouldn’t think only in terms of improving that mark to, say, a six or a seven. Improving that rating — by achieving a clear military victory in a reasonable time frame, looking after the IDPs in the meantime, and quickly rebuilding the shattered areas after the fighting is over — will certainly make it easier for the state to make its case to the public for the next round in Fata.

 

Yet this is Pakistan for a reason — we wouldn’t be where we are if we managed a best-case scenario in even a single area. So at the same time as focusing on Malakand, the government can do itself a favour by also improving its economic track record.

 

There are some quick-fix opportunities even within the extremely tight fiscal space. If job creation in the current climate is difficult, job saving is a real possibility. A bailout of the sinking manufacturing sector — say, to the tune of 30 or 40 billion rupees — could save hundreds of thousands of jobs. And rather than investment in large-scale development projects, smaller projects along the lines of the Khushal Pakistan development programme offer more bang for the buck in rural and low-income urban areas.

 

A turnaround in those sectors would boost the government’s popularity and would likely have a halo effect on its anti-militancy strategy, freeing up the government to push for the vital but unpalatable and unpopular action against the militants in Fata.

 

The fact is, governance is not a compartmentalised process. A win-some-lose-some segmented approach almost guarantees failure in the big picture. The win-win scenario is where a necessary but troubled and troublesome policy in one area is offset by an improved performance in an unrelated area.

 

Final thought: if there is still any doubt about the danger to Pakistan as we know it, the response to one particular question in the IRI survey ought to put that to rest. ‘In the future, if the Taliban demand Sharia in others parts of Pakistan like Karachi, Multan, Quetta or Lahore for instance, would you support their demand?’ Fifty-six per cent replied, ‘Yes.’

 

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