The problem with Balochistan being a national security issue is that neither the political government in Islamabad nor GHQ in Rawalpindi seems keen on looking for a political option. —Reuters/File Photo

WITH the start of military operations in Swat and Waziristan and an increase in suicide attacks across the country, some other pressing concerns seem to have slipped to the periphery of the radar screen in the last six months. The Balochistan issue is a case in point.

Unfortunately, the region is a political no man’s land. The dictionary definition of ‘no man’s land’ is unoccupied land separating two opposing forces. This means that since opposing forces are unable to deliver anything concrete in terms of a viable policy for Balochistan, the situation there makes it analogous to a geographical no man’s land.

For years the state has been unable to properly develop the region, which state functionaries argue is not the fault of the federal government but that of tribal leaders and provincial politicians. The state has always been iniquitous in taking development to peripheral regions. And the division between the mainland and the periphery is not something based on geographical terminology but on concentration of power.

Resultantly, the main stakeholders do not necessarily bother about areas that do not appear on their radar screen due to a lack of interest. Besides Balochistan, another example of an abandoned area is the Thar region of Sindh, where the dire situation of people suffering from famine is hardly ever noticed. I remember the days of famine in Ethiopia, which was sufficiently projected on national television and radio. What did not receive any attention at all at the time was a crippling famine in Thar. Even now the water shortage and widespread hunger in that area is not being adequately reported by the national media.

Referring to the Balochistan issue, the problem right now from the state’s perspective is that powerful stakeholders do not want to see it as anything other than a national security issue. The reported evidence of New Delhi funding some Baloch nationalists or Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s links with the militants’ leadership is excuse enough for Islamabad to pick up hundreds of Baloch people and not bat an eyelid because it is a matter of national security.

The bigger problem with ‘national security’ in Pakistan is that the military seems to have sole ownership of policymaking related to such issues. Political solutions, as was obvious from the fate of negotiations with Baloch leaders conducted by Messrs Mushahid Hussain and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, do not necessarily have to be implemented.

The perspective of the ‘deep state’ is that these forces, which apparently have links with India and Afghanistan, are tribal and coercive and can only be dealt with by force. Before Gen Pervez Musharraf’s time the state played ball with the same actors. The fundamental shift that took place over the last decade was that the deep state thought of exploiting regional resources on its own without paying higher costs to the local regional partners.

Not that the policy of malleable local partners was abandoned. In fact, the state went on to replace people who played tough with those that could do the job in a less costly way. Thus Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed and replaced by another tribal leader, who was provided weapons and allowed concessions in line with the old system. Such an approach basically means that the deep state does not allow for long-term investment in the socio-political and socio-economic development of the region.

Islamabad never tried to befriend the Baloch middle class that occupies the political no man’s land between the Pakistani state and the Baloch tribal leaders. For instance, instead of giving this educated middle class a stake in provincial development, especially real estate, land was given to the chief minister for distribution amongst his cronies.

The problem with Balochistan being a national security issue is that neither the political government in Islamabad nor GHQ in Rawalpindi seems keen on looking for a political option. One could even argue that the option for a political solution – which could be brought about by using the services of Asif Ali Zardari, who has close links with many of the Baloch sardars – is lost due to the perceived internal battle between the military and the president.

There is no concrete plan for the region on the other side of the divide as well. Those that want to ‘liberate’ the Baloch people from the shackles of Islamabad’s domination do not have a constructive plan either beyond creating mayhem or killing innocent people in the province.

The people of a federating unit have a right to choose their destiny. Considering John Stuart Mill’s principle of the state being for the greater happiness of the people, if the people of Balochistan want to go their own way they have a right to. The problem, however, is that the leadership of the separatist movement seems clueless about building a consensus for their struggle amongst the other ethnic communities of the province. Balochistan today has a multi-ethnic population and killing ethnic minorities is not a sustainable option if the separatist leadership wants to go beyond extorting the right price from Islamabad.

The Baloch nationalists do not have dominant control over the region like the Bengalis did in former East Pakistan, for a favourable military/guerrilla initiative. At best they can disrupt normal life and divide people even further. The fact which does not get fully reported in the national media today is the number of Hazaras and settlers getting killed in Balochistan. The dissident leadership probably does not appreciate that such aimless killing does not create sympathy for their political cause, nor will it benefit them during the process of negotiating transfer of assets (if we were to imagine that they manage to succeed in making a separate state).

They also do not exhibit any clear-cut political and socio-economic plan beyond extorting rent from global players for resources inside Balochistan. Even if they succeed in attaining their objective, they might not do better than the sheikhs of the Gulf states. This means seeking rent for natural resources, the price of which will in any case be determined by the international market and external pressures.

Sadly, the majority of the population in Balochistan continues to suffer between two extremes. The only solution for the Balochistan issue lies in following the political path, which might not happen in the foreseeable future.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com