THE reality of Ajmal Kasab is a mystery that is likely to get buried in the battle of wits and nerves between Pakistan and India. While we thought we had found him through investigative reporting by foreign and Pakistani journalists in Faridkot near Okara, we are now told that such an individual never existed in Pakistan.

Some journalists had apparently met the family, talked to the villagers and dug out references to Kasab and his parents in the electoral rolls of Faridkot. But now we are told that there is no mention of the family in the electoral list. Even the president, unmoved by reported comments of the man said to be Kasab’s father, says that he has seen no evidence to prove Kasab is Pakistani.

Does this mean that the problem is solved? Yes the short-term issue is resolved. If Kasab’s family is not in Faridkot and all evidence regarding their links to the village have now gone missing, it would be difficult for any other country to prove that anyone from Pakistan was involved in the Mumbai attack. The Indians can continue to indulge in hype as much as they please but Kasab will remain a mystery.

However, are we looking at the real question which is that there has been a gradual transformation of society leading to the creation of pockets of population or youth that behave exactly like Kasab? Those involved in the Marriott blast are said to be from Lashkar-i-Jhangavi. The young man who tried to carry out a suicide attack in Wah Cantt some time ago and was caught was from Khushab and the man responsible for the post-Marriott blast at Islamabad’s Police Lines was from Rahim Yar Khan. We can all forget about Kasab but one must ask what is happening to the youth from Pakistan, and in this context ‘mainland’ Punjab, who are involved in suicide attacks within the country, perhaps even in the region?

A popular argument is that the transformation of those living an ordinary existence into individuals with an extremist bent of mind is caused by poverty. It is indeed undeniable that years of poverty compounded with poor governance have disillusioned many people who then seek an outlet through aligning themselves with various militant outfits. Given that these outfits continue to be effective in certain areas, it is apparent that people are being drawn to them. In fact, in the days before 9/11 there were about 72 militant outfits that have since regrouped and consolidated themselves in smaller numbers but with greater power and influence.

Resultantly, a lot of activities are centred in and around Punjab which was always considered socially and economically more advanced than other parts of the country such as the Frontier, Balochistan and Sindh. However, Punjab cannot be treated as a monolith. There are parts of Punjab which are very different from some others. For instance, while we talk about tribal areas in the Frontier, we barely notice that there are equally ungoverned spaces in Punjab as well, especially south Punjab. There are areas in the latter where the writ of state does not apply and where there is even an absence of documentation of land. South Punjab or areas bordering on the region (which includes Okara) are also interesting from the perspective of social transformation because these areas were once known for Sufi traditions, which continue to exist side by side with the growing influence of militant groups.

An interesting comparison can be drawn with Sindh which had almost the same culture as south Punjab but appears to be less affected by the social transformation that we see in the latter. So, poverty alone does not explain the social change. In fact, if poverty was the primary cause of religious extremism then the entire South Asian region would be ripe for extremism — be it any religion.

The story of social change in Punjab dates back to the first Afghan war during the 1980s when foreign and domestic agencies of the state encouraged the transformation of religious discourse in some areas. The process did not discontinue with the end of the Afghan war. It also nourished the larger unplanned social transformation taking place in these sub-regions. For instance, part of the problem lay in the unplanned urbanisation of the rural areas and increasing rural poverty.

The population boom has resulted in the unplanned growth of villages that no longer qualify as such and have in fact turned into small towns albeit with limited employment opportunities and little access to facilities that indicate social mobility. Local politics and bureaucratic inefficiency are the reasons behind the absence of a system of establishing town committees or giving these towns a new status i.e. development plans are still what one sees for a village. No surprise then that there should be limited health and educational facilities and hardly any new jobs being created.

Youth from the rural areas bordering these new towns get affected mainly because economic opportunities are limited due to growing rural poverty. These young men are easily targeted by militant organisations. There are large pockets in Punjab that today serve as recruiting grounds for militancy mainly because of poverty, the breakdown of the social infrastructure and the expansion of madressahs. Religious seminaries may not be militant training camps but are good for ideological transformation of helpless youth with nothing better to do than consider themselves saviours of the entire Muslim population all over the world by conforming to militancy.

These sub-regions are exceptionally unfortunate because the scions of their traditional elite tend to migrate to more affluent parts of the province or country. So, the elite, which includes the large landowners, pirs, and others have little interest in reaching out to the people. The bulk of the new capital or the middle class is either too scared to speak up or is complicit in the growth of militancy or orthodoxy which they possibly see as a tool of renegotiating political power. Meanwhile, the social discourse has been changing rapidly.

Apparently, there is no visible plan to check the social transformation that has begun to forcibly silence the bulk of the population. People are increasingly becoming scared of militant outfits. Under the circumstances, this phenomenon of a silent and gradual social transformation is far more lethal than owning or disowning Kasab.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com