‘During Kayani’s final year, the jockeying will begin for his succession and deals may be offered to him or to others in the higher command by the current appointing authority [Zardari].’ –Photo by APP

Sixty-two years old today and the most recent successes we have to celebrate?
Military operations across a swathe of Pakistan that have knocked Maulana Fazlullah off his perch in Swat and taken out Baitullah Mehsud with American help in South Waziristan. And a few extra billions of dollars from the IMF to keep a teetering economy from keeling over. So we’re down a few militants and up a few billion in borrowed money. Some birthday.

Were Pakistan a person, chances are you’d do anything to avoid being in her shoes. Of course, what happened in year 62 has a history, some might argue a 61-year history, so we should at least be glad that we’ve finally begun to get some things right some of the time. Only time though will tell if what we’ve done right so far amounts to applying a Band-Aid to a cancer-stricken body or is actually the beginning of a genuine turnaround.

This much we do know: threats, all sorts of threats, to the current dispensation abound. Pakistan’s 18-month-old transition to democracy is still on shaky ground. And, ironically, the very successes the present government, i.e. Zardari, has had may have laid the ground for its own undoing in the year ahead as it navigates the fraught world of power politics here.

Shuja Nawaz’s recent post on the AfPak Channel, Foreign Policy’s new website, has zeroed in on some of the problems that lie ahead. Loosely translated, the American assistance in helping take out Baitullah will, in Shuja’s estimation, increase the pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’ against the Afghan Taliban taking refuge here and on the military to wade into South Waziristan.

But, according to Shuja, ‘The army will be reluctant to open a front against the Afghan Taliban, who have been obtaining sanctuary inside Fata while avoiding conflict with the army. It will be equally reluctant to mount a large ground offensive in South Waziristan at a time when it is still mopping up in Swat and Malakand. The infighting among TTP factions may allow the army to use local rivals to neutralise the TTP to some extent.’

Zardari caught between insistent Americans and our recalcitrant generals yet again — so far, a familiar story. But here’s the twist: ‘In November [Kayani] completes the second year of his three-year term. During his final year, the jockeying will begin for his succession and deals may be offered to him or to others in the higher command by the current appointing authority [Zardari].’

So Zardari will be faced with a potentially game-changing decision in the next few months, one that could have far-reaching implications for the democratic project: stick with Kayani or take a chance on someone else?

As Shuja notes: ‘History indicates that each time an army chief has been given an extension or ‘promoted’ to chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in addition to being army chief, or a junior officer has been elevated to the highest rank in the army, the government has faced a coup d’état in short order. Will Kayani buck history? The [recent Al Jazeera-Gallup Pakistan] poll indicates only eight per cent support military rule. But army headquarters rarely follows polls. And only rarely do they follow the dictates of the United States.’

Intrigued, I emailed Shuja. Does he know something the rest of us don’t? Is he suggesting a coup in the making when he writes that ‘Pakistani politics will be in a state of turmoil in the months ahead’? How does he see the army chief succession issue playing out?

Ever gracious, he wrote back in short order.

Shuja Nawaz: ‘A major factor in how the succession of the COAS will be determined is the overall security situation in Pakistan. In order to maintain continuity, the US and others will pressure the government to seek continuity and stability in that regard. This may open up the possibility of keeping Gen Kayani on for some time. Breaking with the three-year-tenure rule is not always a good idea, as history has shown us. It creates fissures inside the military and with governments.’

‘The other factor is the strength of the president. If he maintains his extraordinary Musharrafian powers then he may be tempted to make a choice based on his personal preferences. If those do not accord with the panel suggested by Gen Kayani, there may be the possibility of a clash there.’

‘The X-factor in all this is the prime minister. If he can find suitable allies inside the PPP and in the opposition to allow a transition back to supremacy of the parliament then a smoother transition to the new COAS may emerge. A deal on how to handle the Musharraf indictment may help the prime minister seal the arrangement with Mr Sharif and keep the COAS satisfied.’

It’s enough to give one a headache. Machinations at the top, secret ‘accommodations,’ epic power struggles and tawdry personal ambitions potentially all wrapped up around something as confounding and unpredictable as regional militancy. The more things change.

But it’s not all doom and gloom and certain damnation. In every threat there lies opportunity, and Shuja, with his deep understanding of the workings of the army high command, has a suggestion:

‘There is the possibility that the current COAS could be elevated to chairman [Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee] with enhanced powers and this might give the government a chance to reorganise the military higher command to have power distributed among regional commanders at four-star rank, appointed by the same person who appoints the chiefs. In effect this would make the army ‘coup proof’ by disbursing power.’

It is an idea that Shuja has fleshed out in his book Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within while discussing the merit of the army’s new three-regional-commands structure announced in 2007:

‘[In] a move that would allow the regional commanders greater freedom of action, they should all be four-star generals and appointed by the same authority that currently appoints the COAS and the CJCS. The political spin-off benefit of such a move would be the elimination of the all-powerful position of one person, the COAS, and the division of power among the regional commanders, while making the chairman of the JCSC the principal military advisor to the government of Pakistan … It would also eliminate the possibility of a single person effecting a coup d’état in the future, since the power of the army will be divided among three to six commanders, none of whom owes his job to the COAS or even the chairman of the JCSC.’

So Zardari may be faced with a decision that does not just hold the possibility of triggering another coup, but also perhaps the key to defanging the army high command once and for all. Does he have the nous to navigate the game of, what Shuja has dubbed, ‘Grand Tactics’ ahead?

Year 63 promises to be as nerve-racking as the 62 before it.

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