WASHINGTON: The US policies and the army action in Swat could lead Pakistan to an ethnic crisis which would be difficult to control, argues Selig S. Harrison, the author of a report, ‘Pakistan: The State of the Union.’

The report, based on a six-month study of ethnic tensions in Pakistan, makes six recommendations to the US administration: 1. Support Civilian Governance, 2. Promote Demilitarisation, 3. Encourage Respect for the Constitution, 4. “Pashtunise” the War against al Qaeda, 5. Earmark US Aid for Sind and Baluchistan.

The author former Washington Post bureau chief in South Asia who also has written five books on the region, notes that to American eyes the struggle raging in Pakistan with the Taliban is about religious fanaticism.

‘But in Pakistan it is about an explosive fusion of Islamist zeal and simmering ethnic tensions that have been exacerbated by US pressures for military action against the Taliban and its al Qaeda allies.’

Mr Harrison argues that understanding the ethnic dimension of the conflict is the key to a successful strategy for separating the Taliban from al Qaeda and stabilising multiethnic Pakistan politically.

Pushing for a major military operation into the Pashtun territory, Mr Harrison says, moves Pakistan ever closer to an ethnically defined civil war, strengthening Pashtun sentiment for an independent ‘Pashtunistan’ that would embrace 41 million people in big chunks of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

‘This is one of the main reasons the army initially favored a peace deal with a Taliban offshoot in the Swat Valley and has resisted US pressure to go all out against jihadist advances into neighboring districts.’

While the Pakistan army leaders, says the author, fear the long-term dangers of a Taliban link-up with Islamist forces in the heartland of Pakistan, ‘they are more worried about what they see as the looming danger of Pashtun separatism.’

The author argues that fears of Pashtunistan led Pakistan to support jihadist surrogates in the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s and, later, to build up the Taliban.

‘Ironically, during its rule in Kabul the Taliban refused to endorse the Durand Line despite pressure from Islamabad. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also resisted, calling it ‘a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two brothers.’

How should the Obama administration proceed?
The author urges the United States to lower its military profile by ending airstrikes. He points out that by arousing a Pashtun sense of victimisation at the hands of outside forces, the conduct of the ‘war on terror’ in Fata has strengthened the jihadist groups the US seeks to defeat.

Politically, US policy should be revised to demonstrate that ‘America supports the Pashtun desire for a stronger position in relation to the government in Islamabad.’

The United States should support Pashtun demands to merge the NWFP and Fata, followed by the consolidation of those areas and Pashtun enclaves in Baluchistan and the Punjab into a single unified ‘Pashtunkhwa’ province that enjoys the autonomy envisaged in the inoperative 1973 Pakistan constitution.

In the meantime, instead of permitting Islamabad to administer the huge sums of US aid going into Fata, the Obama administration should condition the aid's continuance on most of it being dispensed in conjunction with the NWFP provincial government.

The United States should welcome any new peace initiatives by the secular Pashtun leaders of the Awami National Party designed to separate Taliban and Taliban-allied Islamist factions from al Qaeda. As in Swat, military force should be a last resort.

The author notes that on March 1, 2007, former Pakistani ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani, said at a seminar at the Pakistan Embassy, ‘I hope the Taliban and Pashtun nationalism don't merge. If that happens, we've had it, and we're on the verge of that.’