IF ever there was a time that the US has appeared to ‘get’ Pakistan’s approach to regional security, this may be it.

Adm Mike Mullen has made two telling statements at a hearing of the US Senate Committee on Armed Services this week. First, Adm Mullen has accurately summarised Pakistan’s approach by stating that our strategy for dealing with militancy is affected by the ‘principal’ and ‘existential’ threat from India, though the army is seriously concerned about the threat of militancy and is addressing the problem to an extent. Setting aside the issue of apportioning blame for the mess of militancy for a minute and taking a hard look at the overall security environment of this region, Adm Mullen’s frank call for ‘realism’ is the right one. Pakistan has serious and legitimate interests to defend vis-à-vis India.

First and foremost, with or without Pakistani-sponsored or -encouraged jihad in Kashmir, the Kashmir issue is very much alive and it needs to be resolved. Denying or downplaying the dissatisfaction in Indian-administered Kashmir will not change that fact. Other serious issues include the fair use of the two countries’ dwindling water supplies, Indian ‘interference’ inside Pakistan, its expanding interests in Afghanistan and the lingering suspicion that the Indian political class remains in thrall to hawkish elements who are opposed to the normalisation of ties with Pakistan. Until and unless these issues are resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both countries, India will loom large in Pakistan’s ‘threat perception’. It is not a threat on the part of Pakistan to demand to be released from those concerns before it can fully turn its attention to defeating militancy inside Pakistan and in the region generally. Nor does it mean that Pakistan can demand, or is demanding, that the Pak-India and militancy issues be addressed sequentially. It just means that long-term peace in the region will only be possible if Pakistan and India can resolve their differences.

Second, Adm Mullen has correctly pointed out that there is real uncertainty in Afghanistan and Pakistan over whether the Americans remain committed to the region. Part of that uncertainty, which breeds fear and perhaps causes the Pakistani and Afghan governments to baulk at full cooperation with the US, is created by the way the US has defined its goal in the region i.e. eliminating safe havens for Al Qaeda. Suppose the Americans do achieve that goal, will that mean cutting and running like they did two decades ago? Notwithstanding long-term aid commitments, the US needs to do more to reassure Pakistan and Afghanistan of its commitment to the region.