As the state inches closer to what could possibly be a definitive showdown with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, events are already beginning to unfold on other fronts. On Thursday, groups that are rivals of Mehsud fought with militants loyal to the South Waziristan warlord in Tank bazaar, resulting in the death of two fighters. The fighting was triggered by the assassination of Qari Zainuddin in D.I. Khan earlier this week, a killing that the Mehsud group has claimed responsibility for.

Meanwhile, in South Waziristan itself a series of drone strikes have targeted Mehsud strongholds and killed dozens, though it is unclear if any senior militant leader was killed. In an area as fraught with danger and complexity as South Waziristan, there are so many seemingly disparate threads to tie together that understanding the dynamics at work is no easy task. Compounding that difficulty is the fact that much of the information emanating from the Waziristan agencies is hard to verify independently given the dangers involved for reporters and journalists.

However, one of the major foreseeable difficulties is the security situation on either side of the Durand line. Dislodging the Baitullah Mehsud network in South Waziristan may lead to militants fleeing across the border to the Afghan provinces of Paktika, Khost and Paktia. Meanwhile, the impending American push against militants operating in southern Afghanistan, particularly in the province of Helmand, may cause militants to flee towards Pakistan. On the Afghan and Pakistan sides, then, a double whammy of militan-cy may be looming.

The Pakistan Army high command has been engaged in intense discussions on this very subject with its American and Afghan counterparts and assurances are believed to have been extended by all sides to mitigate the expected fallout of a serious push against the militants on several fronts at the same time. If there has ever been an occasion for the three main parties, Pakistan, the US and Afghanistan, to cooperate to the fullest extent possible this is it, and it should not be squandered.

There is another aspect that the state here must prepare more urgently for: looking after the local population that will likely exit from the Waziristan agencies if fighting starts in earnest. The military operation in Malakand division exposed the state’s inadequate preparation on this crucial aspect of any successful counter-insurgency, and a repeat must not occur. With Operation Rah-i-Rast too there was a precedent — hundreds of thousands left Bajaur Agency after the start of a military campaign there to flush out the militants — so surely the state cannot fail to prepare for a third time in a row. After three million IDPs it should be clear that counter-insurgencies are not won through the barrel of a gun alone.