On August 5 when a US drone fired a missile at a house in South Waziristan, my source in the Taliban-infested area informed me that TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud had been killed instantly.

The missile strike took out its prized target but also set off rumours — some that he had been killed and others, attributed mainly to the Taliban, that he had not been eliminated — until his successor was announced.

However, there were others who were worried about the Taliban phenomenon with regard to the growing differences among the jihadists. Who would replace Baitullah? What would be their future course of action? There were many contenders: Qari Hussain, Hakimullah, Maulana Waliur Rehman, Noor Saeed, Azmatullah and Raees Khan.

The choice was really hard for the Taliban. Tribal affinities and the Salafi factor were at the centre of post-Baitullah power politics in Waziristan, which prevented the 43-member Taliban shura from naming a new chief. The delay also showed that Baitullah had never nominated a successor.

The top three contenders Hakimullah, Qari Hussain and Azam Tariq belong to the Balolzai branch of the Mehsud tribe, whereas Maulana Waliur Rehman, Azmatullah and Noor Saeed come from the Manzai branch. Historically, the Manzai sub-tribe has been in the forefront of power politics in Mehsud territory and has provided both manpower and leadership to the Taliban.

The Manzai finally lost to the Balolzai when it came to the TTP succession. Hakimullah sidelined the rest and the Taliban shura was left with no option but to choose between him and Maulana Waliur Rehman. They crowned Hakimullah, while Maulana Waliur Rehman was made ameer of South Waziristan. Azam Tariq was nominated as spokesman.

Will it be possible for the TTP to sustain its mainstream leadership in Waziristan? Or will the Salafi school stake its claim? The influence of the militant Ashaat Tauheed wa Sunnah (Panj Piri), JUI-F and the outlawed Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan is also a factor.

The Taliban have deep-rooted differences: Faqir Mohammad, TTP chief in Bajaur, had earlier announced that Hakimullah would be the new leader whereas NWFP MP Mufti Kifayatullah of the JUI-F told the media that Maulana Waliur Rehman had been nominated TTP chief.

The Taliban in Khyber Agency, Bajaur, Orakzai and Swat are influenced by the Salafi (Panj Piri) school of thought. In Orakzai Agency, where the Taliban have challenged Shia militants on their turf, the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has swelled the ranks of the TTP giving it a sectarian overtone, which is why Azam Tariq, with clear affiliations to the sectarian outfit, has been appointed as TTP’s central spokesman. The Salafi movement has overshadowed the Taliban from Swat to Orakzai except for Waziristan where the JUI-F is still calling the shots.

What is the picture that emerges?

Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir had, in March 2009, formed a 13-member council called Shura-i-Ittihadul Mujahideen. The shura received a death-blow on August 15 when 17 associates of Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur were gunned down in the Mehsud-dominated Salae Roghae area of the Ladha sub-division. The Nazir group later demanded that the Baitullah group hand over eight men, including Uzbeks and Mehsuds, to it for their complicity. Thus the Shura-i-Ittihadul Mujahideen fell apart.

Room to breathe for the Hakimullah-led TTP has considerably lessened with the presence of the Abdullah group in the Mehsud area, Turkistan Bitani in the FR Tank area, Maulvi Nazir in the Wazir-dominated area and Hafiz Gul Bahadar in North Waziristan.

Another predicament for the TTP is a new government strategy. As the NWFP governor announced in June that a tribal jirga had failed to deliver, the political administration pressed tribal elders to form lashkars against the Taliban. The political administration with the help of intelligence agencies picked up tribesmen from as far off as Karachi using the collective responsibility clause of the FCR to tell them ‘either you are with us or against us’.

They were also told they could either financially support the raising of a lashkar or participate in one and that, in keeping with tribal custom, a third party would take responsibility for the ‘damage’. The government already has links with the Abdullah Mehsud group — comprising mainly the Shamenkhel tribe and aided by the Balolzai Mehsud — in this regard. An official, seeking anonymity, said that the groundwork for the lashkars had been laid and that the two main ones would start their onslaught after Eid — one mobilised in the vicinity of the border town of Makin which is a Baitullah stronghold and the other near Kotkai, both in South Waziristan.

Both are important. Kotkai is the gateway to South Waziristan from the eastern side. Makin is important as in its north is the Razmak fort with heavy military deployment. It seems that this time the lashkar will work as it did in the Wazir-dominated area of South Waziristan under the leadership of Maulvi Nazir to flush out Uzbeks in March 2007.

From the Tiarza fort side, towards the south of the tribal agency, the already strained relations of the Nazir group with the TTP might prove of great help in checking the trickle of the TTP men towards the southern parts. The heavy military presence in Wana, Shakkai and Tannai fort will further choke the Taliban. As per the new strategy, the TTP may find it difficult to slug it out. Nevertheless it is the ordinary folk of Waziristan who will suffer most.

The writer is a Peshawar-based journalist.

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