A PARLIAMENTARY committee, deliberating issues of national security, recently called for a review of the country’s foreign policy. It may be assumed that its members were thinking primarily of Pakistan’s relations with the United States and only secondarily of those with the major European and Asian powers.

A few weeks ago I heard three well-informed persons debate this issue on a private television channel. One of them said we had to do America’s bidding in combating the Taliban because we were taking its money. Another participant maintained that since the Americans needed our assistance, we should be asking them to do things for us instead of meeting their demands. The third gentleman presented what he thought was the Pakistan Army’s real stance.

The generals, according to him, believed that we must keep the Taliban alive and well, because we were going to need them to go to Afghanistan, after America’s departure from the scene, to restore our influence in that country. They want to create the appearance [for the American officials’ benefit] that we are moving against the Taliban but actually do so only very selectively and sparingly.

The Taliban, on their part, have their own designs regardless of any plans the army may have for them. Let us take the case of their occupation and control of Swat. The more common version of events has it that the army went in to throw the Taliban out of Swat but, having failed in this mission, returned to its base. According to another version, it did not put up a fight at all because it approves of the Taliban and their mission. Either way it seems likely that far from being the army’s instrument, the Taliban will attempt to use the army for their own ends.

What does all of this mean for any review of Pakistani policy towards the United States? Pakistan could openly say that it cannot be America’s ally in the war against terror in so far as it relates to the Taliban, and that it is willing to forego the assistance it receives from that country. The American response is likely to be that in that event the United States will employ its own means to exterminate the Taliban residing or hiding in the tribal areas and other places in Pakistan. Actually the Americans are already doing so, being aware of the Pakistan Army’s ambivalence towards the Taliban.

The present government in Pakistan is not strong enough to openly depart from an established stance in its relationship with the United States. It will probably continue to look for safety in ambivalence and inaction.
 There are no calls for a review of Pakistan’s policy towards China, Iran and Saudi Arabia. President Zardari has been visiting these countries and at the end of each visit he has told us that relations with the country being visited have been further strengthened. Relations between Pakistan and India remain moderately tense and that is how the two countries intend to keep them.

There is undoubtedly need for a review of certain domestic policies. Pakistan faces extremely grave problems. Some of them relate to shortages of basic necessities such as water, gas and electricity. It will take time and sustained action to alleviate them. There is the breakdown of law and order, some of which the Taliban have created as noted above. The gravest of the crises confronting the country is the current insurrection in Balochistan.

Some of Pakistan’s problems may be complex and the ways of resolving them difficult to figure out. But there is nothing complicated about the disaffection and unrest in Balochistan. They are as old as Pakistan itself. Balochistan is the largest and also the most neglected of its provinces. It has suffered deprivation all along in that its mineral resources have been exploited and taken out for the benefit of others; its gas fields have provided fuel to furnaces and kitchens all over the country. Any compensation it gets has never reached its people. They remain unspeakably poor.

Baloch grievances are known to all politicians and politically aware persons in Pakistan and even external observers. It is agreed at all hands that these grievances are valid, and that they should be removed. Yet they remain unmet. The Baloch feel that they have never had the opportunity to take charge of their affairs. Their governance, including the public services, business and industry (such as they were), was dominated by outsiders. They want to be self-governing and have control of their territory and resources.Recently they have been concerned that economic opportunities that open up in Gwadar, the deep-sea port on their shoreline that has recently become operational, will be appropriated by non-Baloch outsiders.

The Baloch grievances are well understood. Yet successive governments have been appointing commissions, committees and delegations to visit the province. Talk to its estranged politicians, look into their complaints and demands, and report back. A number of reports, including recommendations, have been submitted over the years. One may assume that they gather dust in government archives. We do know that no action has ever been taken to implement their findings and recommendations.

The Baloch, even more than the Sindhis and the Pakhtuns, have been demanding ‘full’ provincial autonomy for many years. It is not only the Baloch ‘nationalists’ but all shades of politicians who make this demand. It has become even louder and shriller since the kidnapping and murder of three Baloch nationalist leaders a few weeks ago. It is being alleged that some agents of the central government were somehow involved in that crime.

It is noteworthy that no Pakistani politician of any consequence fails to applaud the idea of provincial autonomy. President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani have endorsed it in their addresses to the nation more than once. Soon after coming to power they declared that, as a first step towards provincial autonomy, they would move a constitutional amendment to abolish the concurrent list (federal and provincial) of powers and functions placed in the 1973 Constitution. But they have done no such thing. Nor have they made any other move to implement provincial autonomy.

The insurrection in Balochistan poses a serious threat to this country’s very survival. The present government’s utter indifference to this state of affairs is hard to understand.   The writer, professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, is currently a visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics. anwars@lahoreschool.edu.pk