Now that the state is fighting in the Malakand division and preparing to enter the lair of Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan it may seem academic to ask, who are we fighting and why?

After all, everyone seems to agree that Maulana Fazlullah and Baitullah are bad — the politicians, the army, the Americans, the locals, the general population, everyone it seems except for the guys who are fighting in the armies of those two militant leaders.

Case closed, it would appear; even if it takes long, messy years to defeat those and other warlords and militants dotting this benighted land, at least the battle lines have been clearly drawn.

Or is it? Gen Asad Durrani (retd), a former ISI chief and an urbane, dignified general if ever I have met one, writing in The News on Wednesday used a term — ‘rogue groups’ — and argued that they ‘have to be fought down, possibly piecemeal and in the right order. (Bajaur followed by Mohmand, and now Malakand.)’

Durrani is nobody’s fool and he is right about the strategy. But he made a revealing statement in parentheses, perhaps one that goes to the heart of the question about who we are fighting and why: ‘rogue groups’ (always to be expected in this game).’

‘This game.’ I cannot and would not presume to suggest what the general had in mind. But, perhaps inadvertently, in those parsimonious words Durrani summed up the view of many who are looking at this phase of the counter-insurgency in Pakistan with a degree of scepticism: that what we are witnessing is the state going after the bad Taliban, the out-of-control rogues who have forgotten their place in the scheme of things and challenged the state, while the good Taliban, that imperfect catch-all for the still-useful non-state actors, continue to be shielded.

In this complex story, there are many starting points and various threads to debate. But, stripped of real-world complexity and reduced to a simplified, readily graspable level, two opposite hypotheses about the rise of militancy in Pakistan continue to dominate the debate.

One hypothesis begins with 9/11 and the subsequent arrival of American troops in this region. Essentially the argument is that were it not for the American presence in Afghanistan and its occupation of that country, militancy in this region would never have grown to the level it has. The obvious corollary: until and unless the Americans leave, militancy can never be defeated.

The other hypothesis begins with the use of non-state actors to pursue national security goals determined by the security establishment. Trace that policy and the evolution of the groups involved, the argument goes, and you will see that the trajectory was wrong from the beginning, that it was inevitable the militants would turn inwards and attack Pakistan itself, that the state had created a threat against itself which it was not willing, and perhaps not equipped, to understand.

Testing either of those hypotheses is well-nigh impossible. We can’t very well create alternative histories; we can’t work through what would have happened if 9/11 hadn’t occurred and the Americans hadn’t arrived in the region. Too many variables are involved; too much has occurred that could not have been predicted.

For starters, the Americans have committed so many mistakes in Afghanistan that it’s impossible to say what would have happened if they had got it ‘right.’ They were too focused on pursuing Al Qaeda, they put too few troops on the ground, they got distracted by Iraq, they missed a trick by not inviting the Taliban to the Bonn conference, they were too reliant on the warlords, they didn’t understand the ethnic make-up of the country, they were in a nation-building situation but ideologically opposed to the very idea — the list of errors is endless and grave.

On the other side, from a pure security point of view, perhaps at some point in history there were some genuine ‘benefits’ derived from our non-state actors vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. We live in a rough neighbourhood and for all our sins it’s difficult to realistically paint us as the perennial devils and our neighbours as angelic do-gooders. We saw an opportunity — the use of sub-conventional military methods to pursue certain security aims — we took it, as would anyone else, and we made good use of it.

But then we didn’t realise when enough was enough, when the policy’s sell-by date had expired and the security environment had changed. What once was a proud medal pinned on us and gained the grudging respect of the others involved in ‘this game’ had now become a millstone around our necks. The tail had begun to wag the dog. When exactly that occurred is debatable, but 9/11 and the subsequent years definitively exposed it.

Here in June 2009, the only question going forward ought to be, how do we get out of the mess we are in? Yet, we can’t begin to answer that in any remotely or meaningfully successful way if we are still engaged in a debate about something as fundamental as what lies at the heart of the instability here: the American presence or stand-alone militancy?

Perhaps though the lesson in this for the other key players, the US, India and Afghanistan, is, for purposes of policy, to treat it as a mixture of both: their regional security interests are fuelling the instability here and it is also being perpetuated by the wrong-headed analysis of the Pakistan security establishment.

So, rather than getting bogged down in a chicken-and-egg debate, rather than trying to apportion blame, if the goal is to reduce instability, there are some things that could be done.

Recognise that we are not going to leave Afghanistan to its own devices. Forget the hare-brained ideas of using Afghanistan as a springboard to plant the flag of Islam in Central Asia or for ‘strategic depth’ to attack or bleed India.

We won’t leave Afghanistan alone because we can’t: we share a lengthy border; there is a large Pakhtun population on both sides of the border; and Afghanistan is landlocked and so will always be in someone’s sphere of influence — if not ours, then Central Asia’s or Iran’s or even India’s to a degree.

The American presence in Afghanistan is fuelling a suspicion here: are they and others out to re-orient Afghanistan’s security interests at our expense? Provide some quantifiable and qualitative reassurances that they are not and Pakistan may be more likely to cooperate.

And for the war being fought inside Pakistan, for the army to commit more resources to the fight, India will need to reposition some of its military assets to reduce the threat they pose to Pakistan. The army responds to capabilities, not intentions.

The obvious question is, why should others do something to help us out when there is no guarantee we will abandon our good Taliban/bad Taliban strategy? What’s in it for them?

It’s a tough question, no doubt. But think of it this way: if our security establishment is wrong it’s because it is stuck in a siege mentality. Reduce the threats it perceives, and it may begin to see the light. Besides, it’s not like anything else has worked the past eight years.

cyril.a@gmail.com