AFTER the air bombing campaign had routed the Taliban in 2001, euphoric shouts of victory resonated across the United States, the loudest coming from the White House and the Pentagon.

But these were short-lived as the characteristic Afghan resistance began. Eight years on the American servicemen and women in Afghanistan are gasping for breath because their former president, who was also their commander-in-chief, and his staff had underestimated the enemy.

Not only that, they had also committed two strategic blunders, the consequences of which are being suffered not only by their servicemen and women, but also to a much greater degree, by the Pakistani people and their servicemen. Their strategic thought was distinguished by their stunning mediocrity.

The first blunder was to allow the Taliban to escape to Pakistan. Had they secured the Durand Line crossing sites prior to initiating their air-bombing campaign, this could have been pre-empted. The second blunder was to place their main military effort in the wrong direction — Iraq, which left the main theatre, Afghanistan, undermanned. They had several years after the resurgence of the Taliban in 2002 to correct their strategy, but their obsession with Iraq blinded them to the operational requirements in Afghanistan.

Instead, they found it politically and militarily expedient to blame Pakistan for their failures, and thus started their ‘do more’ refrain that continues unabated, even though Pakistan has done far more than them, and in the process, suffered more than all the countries put together in the coalition.

In a belated move, which the current commander-in-chief and his staff hope would resurrect their campaign in Afghanistan, they appointed a new commander to ‘provide new thinking on the battlefield.’ The first manifestation of this was Operation Khanjar (Dagger), launched in the Helmand River valley by thousands of US troops in conjunction with the British troops. When the operation ended, they had suffered, what were until then, the heaviest losses in a month since 2007.

It took Gen Stanley McChrystal just one operation to conclude that ‘the situation is serious,’ and that he would need 40,000 more troops. He has thus placed the president in a serious dilemma, like President Johnson was during the Vietnam War.

The situation has been serious all these years because of the serious imbalance that has existed between the mission assigned and the resources allotted — only Gen McChrystal has found that out now. The mission assigned to the US military when it was first deployed in Afghanistan is yet to be accomplished eight years on. Why? The Pentagon needs to ponder over this.

All military planning begins after the mission is assigned. The mission is analysed against several factors, the main ones being the enemy (size, strengths, weaknesses), and the terrain (geographical features), and from these emerge the resources that would be required to accomplish the mission in the given timeframe.

The Pentagon’s appreciation of the enemy was seriously flawed. Taliban fighters are highly motivated as they are fighting for freedom from foreign occupation like the American Partisan Patriots did during the War of Independence. They are skilled, tenacious, resilient, battle-hardened, cunning, and masters of surprise and improvisation. Since time is always on the side of guerrillas, their strategy is to wear down the enemy by making them bleed from a thousand wounds. History records that almost all military defeats were caused by one factor alone —misappreciation of the enemy.

The terrain factor too had been misread. Afghanistan lends itself to successful counter-insurgency operations far more than Vietnam and Iraq, as its geography can be turned against the guerrillas to restrict their freedom of movement, and thus create a choking effect on them.

What was the mission assigned to Gen McChrystal when he was appointed to the top post in Afghanistan? He was expected to defeat the insurgency, or at least create conditions that would allow the US troops to withdraw gracefully, which his predecessors had failed to do. That the US high command are taking their time on his request for more troops, clearly suggests that he was to make do with the resources already there.

The current team at the Pentagon appears to be no different from the one that created the chaotic conditions in the first place.

Gen McChrystal’s declared priority is to secure Afghan population centres until the Afghan forces are ready to assume responsibility for the security of their country by 2013 (2014 according to the British chief of defence staff). Four to five years more? What would he do when his battlefield, which is presently confined mainly to the southern and eastern parts of the country, is extended by the Taliban to the rest of the country?

The Soviets had to contend with the whole country as the battlefield with the same number of troops that he currently has. How many more troops would he then ask for?

A defensive counter-insurgency strategy can never succeed as it leaves the initiative with the guerillas. It would prolong the agony of America’s servicemen and women in Afghanistan, give rise to uncertainties in the coalition countries, and above all, lead to loss of confidence in the Afghan people, who would then gravitate towards the Taliban. Finally, history would repeat itself when they are forced out Vietnam style.

The only way Afghan population centres can be secured and people’s support won is through an offensive strategy that aims to dominate, then defeat the insurgency. Thus, a sequence of operational movements would have to be initiated to achieve this aim within a year to make up for the lost time: first, to secure the Durand Line crossing sites to prevent the guerrillas from escaping to Pakistan; second, to isolate the area selected for the operation to prevent their escape from it; third, to secure the mountains to deny their use as sanctuaries; and finally, to force them into the valleys for taking them out by ground and air-delivered firepower.

An offensive strategy would need far more troops. The Americans went to Afghanistan to fight a war. They should plan to win it — unless they want to be known as a superpower defeated twice by guerillas. Blaming Pakistan and prodding it to ‘do more’ would not win the war for them. n

The writer is a retired brigadier.