AS the dust begins to settle after an article in The New Yorker questioned the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and suggested that the US is negotiating a possible role for Americans in protecting the Pakistani arsenal in the event of a crisis, some observations are in order. First, the article itself. Aside from the highly questionable suggestions of a direct American role in securing Pakistan’s arsenal — which when parsed, defy logic or even a semblance of common sense — there is little in the 7,000-word piece that is new. Clearly, there continues to be some concern about the internal security of Pakistan and over reports of growing religiosity in some corners of the army. But these concerns, echoed in Seymour Hersh’s article, should not automatically be brushed aside just because they are voiced primarily from outside the country. The eroding writ of a state which is a nuclear power is unsettling, period. Arguing that growing militancy is one thing and the safety of the country’s nuclear programme quite another can miss the point: the two issues cannot and should not be allowed to coexist.

Furthermore, the Pakistan Army must remain vigilant about the possibility of extremists having penetrated its ranks, at whatever level of seniority, because that is inimical to the long-term security of the country. The army’s primary asset is its professionalism and as the custodian of the country’s territorial security, anything that detracts from that duty is unwelcome, and potentially dangerous.

The second issue is the nuclear command structure. In this regard, the government’s decision to formally enact the National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007 is a welcome development. Unbeknown to many, the existing nuclear command structure, put in place by Gen Musharraf (retd) in February 2000, does not have full legal cover because it was created under an administrative order. Gen Musharraf belatedly attempted to change this in December 2007, but the matter got embroiled in the illegality of the emergency he declared a month earlier. In July this year, the Supreme Court finally decided that all the ordinances promulgated by then-president Musharraf during that period needed to be tabled in parliament or else would expire.

This included the ordinance that purported to give the National Command Authority legal cover. While enactment by parliament of that ordinance will not change anything on the ground — the nuclear command structure is already in place and functioning — it will send a positive signal to the world that Pakistan takes its responsibilities as a nuclear power seriously. Parliament must now play its part and ensure that the bill is passed at the earliest.