It seems many Pakistanis have been enjoying forwarding text messages poking fun at President Asif Zardari because the backlash against the Cyber Crime Act (CCA) has focused largely on the FIA’s intention to crack down on indecent SMS.

But a more interesting problem — both for the authorities and the public — is emerging online thanks to the act. Once again, an official campaign threatens to undermine civil liberties while failing to achieve anything productive.

The CCA — under which people who send ‘ill-motivated’ texts and emails can face up to 14 years in prison — also claims to target organisations that have been using the Internet to disseminate propaganda and rally against Pakistan’s security forces. Many in the blogosphere interpreted this to mean that FIA would target extremist and terrorist websites, an effort that would be consistent with the broader fight against militant groups in the northwest.

The government has been gearing for a crackdown against extremism online. In the wake of the Mumbai attacks last year, when it became apparent that the terrorists had communicated using Internet phone calls routed through Houston-based servers, the Pakistan government asked the United States to shut down terrorist websites hosted by American companies. US refusal to do so at the time led to a diplomatic row.

In April, however, the US announced that in addition to jamming illegal FM radio stations in the Frontier, it would try to block extremist Pakistani websites and chat rooms, particularly those containing videos of terrorist attacks and inflammatory material. The next month, a group known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in Lahore, on a militant Turkish website run by Elif Media.

In this context, the CCA’s clause about addressing malicious online content seemed to be part of a wider effort to clamp down on terrorism. The fact that the FIA also requested Interpol’s help in identifying email addresses and websites hosted by foreign servers indicates that the authorities want to join the ongoing international drive against online extremism. Unlike the crackdown on SMS text messaging and emails, the CCA’s effort against websites appeared rational.

But days after the act came into effect, the FIA blocked a Balochi website (www.balochunity.org) for containing ‘anti-state’ material. The website promotes Baloch nationalism and demands Baloch control of the province’s resources. Although access to the website is now denied, a snapshot of Baloch Unity from last year can be viewed using an Internet archive.

While the website calls for a ‘struggle for self-determination’ it does not explicitly advocate a violent uprising. And while there are many references to ‘oppressors,’ the Pakistani state is not singled out. The website’s mission statement states that the site presents the Baloch agenda before Balochistan’s political parties to save ‘Balochistan and the Baloch nation from … usurpers’.

With this example, the CCA finds itself in murky waters. Since Sept 11, 2001, western governments have blocked innumerable terrorist websites on the basis that they promote hate speech and incite violence, which cannot be safeguarded by the democratic right to free speech. If ever a government has shut down a website that was not explicitly violent or threatening, it has been accused of censorship.

The FIA’s decision to block Baloch Unity seems more like blatant censorship than a security measure, particularly given the current political scenario in Balochistan. As such, the blocking of the website confirms the Pakistani public’s worst suspicions about the CCA: it is a tool to facilitate state censorship that will arbitrarily define ‘anti-state’ content with no transparent definitions or guidelines in place. If the government continues to block online content that is not universally perceived as violent or hateful, it will make a sham of the democratic right to free speech.

Let’s take a couple of steps back and consider the logic of the CCA. The act has already been slammed for invading citizens’ privacy, meting out disproportionate punishment, and making it easier for the state to target or frame individuals. For argument’s sake, let’s assume that the FIA genuinely intends to block extremist and terrorist websites alone. Even then, the CCA comes across badly.

A recent study by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence — an international coalition of academic institutions, including the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies — claims that net filtering cannot stem online extremism. The study points out that there is more anxiety about what might be happening online than actual Internet activity that governments can pinpoint.

As a result, ineffective or unworkable policies are put in place (case in point, the CCA). Usually, such government efforts produce a political backlash since the rhetoric on extremist websites is protected by free speech clauses (another case in point, this article).

The study also points out that online content is mobile and elusive: block a website and it will shortly reappear on a different server under a new domain name. For example, the FIA closed the website of the UK-based Hizbut Tahrir last week, but the banned group has already launched a new URL and initiated an SMS campaign to contact Pakistanis.

While static websites can be screened for offending keywords, dynamic chat rooms and forums — which comprise the bulk of extremist activity online — are nearly impossible to filter. It doesn’t help that terrorist websites are primarily populated by ‘converts’ who go online to extend ties and activities that they developed offline. Indeed, individuals probably cannot find extremist content without contacts telling them where to look. Shutting down terrorist websites will, therefore, not be effective until militant networks in the real world are eliminated.

Given the futility of net filtering, the study recommends that governments prioritise stemming terrorism in the real, rather than in the virtual world — there is no more effective use of resources than deterring the producers of extremist content.

The study also urges governments to promote media literacy and foster a culture of self-regulation by strengthening reporting mechanisms and complaint processing. That way, the collective intelligence of the public can identify ‘malicious’ websites and the legal system can analyse each example to ensure that free speech is protected without jeopardising public security. In this scenario, the government cannot be accused of conducting an online witch-hunt.

This government already has patchy democratic credentials. If it has no plans of articulating transparent parameters within which the CCA can be enforced effectively, it should repeal the act as soon as possible.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com