THE ongoing counter-insurgency operation in Pakistan is based on a tenuous national consensus that may falter at any time. Ideally, military action should be decisive and swift, otherwise, the longer the operation lasts the more chances of opposition.

At the moment the Taliban forces resisting army advances in Swat are the first layer of militants that have to be dealt with. However, the true challenge to defeating this insurgency will be apparent once this initial force has been dispersed and the amorphous enemy blends with the general public. The outcome or duration of such a war, therefore, cannot be predicted which is quite contrary to the optimistic ISPR reports that emanate on a daily basis.

To counter such an insurgency two elements are of crucial relevance. First, a strong intelligence network is required whereby the existing military action can eventually morph into an operation where hostile targets are pinpointed and eliminated with minimum collateral damage. For this to be effective there has to be collaboration among the various intelligence agencies working in the region. Despite professing similar agendas of eradicating terrorism and militancy, coordination among the agencies is negligible as the duration of the conflict and its lack of results have created an atmosphere of finger-pointing and mistrust between them.

Furthermore, each province has to build up its local law-enforcement forces. Their numbers have to be increased and they have to be equipped and trained to handle any sporadic militant outbursts in their areas. The fallout of the military onslaught is bound to cross provincial boundaries in the form of terrorism and the probability is high that ad hoc militant outfits may sprout in other parts of the country while the army concentrates its efforts and resources in the NWFP and Fata. This is where a strong local law-enforcement force will be vital to contain such activity before it escalates into a Swat-type situation. In areas where military action is already under way, local security forces need to ensure that peace is maintained once the operations subside.

Another by-product of the war that could have devastating repercussions if not addressed in an appropriate manner is the case of internally displaced people or the IDPs. The exact number of refugees is uncertain. The computation of such statistics is complicated as a majority of IDPs have opted to live outside the camps generally with friends and relatives and, therefore, are unregistered. However, according to some estimates the numbers may have crossed the three million mark.

This is staggering to say the least. Pakistan has not witnessed such a mass migration of refugees in such a short period since partition. The escalation of the number of refugees coupled with mismanagement, once again, by the government could eventually manifest itself in an antagonistic and volatile environment which will indirectly advance the cause of militancy amongst the masses.

International cooperation is needed to contain this potential catastrophe. Global and local support needs to be channelled in a positive way and a coordinated support programme along the lines and scale of the 2005 earthquake relief efforts is required. Otherwise, Pakistan is well acquainted with the dynamics and repercussions of refugee camps. After so many years, the country has yet to recover from the proliferation of drugs and weapons that had manifested itself in the Afghan refugee camps after the exodus began in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It is, therefore, apparent that the core ingredient for winning this war on terror in Pakistan, at least, is unity. There has to be a unified front among the provinces, the powers at the centre, international allies, intelligence agencies, the military, and most importantly, the general public. Such unprecedented unity can only be achieved if we have a strong visionary leadership to inspire, motivate and bind the people together under the umbrella of the overarching objective of bringing peace, stability and eventual prosperity to the nation.

However, unfortunately there is a leadership vacuum in Pakistan. Our so-called leaders do not seem to realise the severity of the crisis facing the country. Prime Minister Gilani took his time to make a visit to the IDP camps which made it appear almost like an afterthought while Nawaz Sharif paid a fleeting visit which seemed to be inspired more by the possibility of gaining political mileage than any philanthropic motive. MQM chief Altaf Hussain has pontificated about the imminent threat of Talibanisation via telephone while he resides in the UK. Asfandyar Wali Khan virtually went into hiding after the attempt on his life and finally emerged during the APC. Imran Khan and Qazi Hussain Ahmad continue to blame America for this crisis, thereby, implicitly exonerating the militants for the crimes they have committed.

The nation’s leaders have to step up and consolidate national consensus in support of the war; otherwise, the recent military action may, in line with previous similar operations, wither away and be supplanted by some absurd peace deal before the desired result is achieved.

The writer is editor-in-chief of Criterion Quarterly.

mushfiq.murshed@gmail.com