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The complex reality of the Northern Areas
By Luv Puri exclusively for Dawn.com
Thursday, 24 Sep, 2009
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President Asif Ali Zardari signs the Gilgit-Balitistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order 2009 on September 7 in Islamabad. – APP
Over the years, Pakistan has tried to leverage the geographical advantage of the Northern Areas for its strategic and economic objectives. However, until now, the government desisted from heeding the demand for provincial status for the Northern Areas owing to a concern that it would justify future attempts by India to absorb two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir.

It is in this context that the recent political package, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order, 2009, has been criticised in various quarters in Jammu and Kashmir, including by pro-independence groups such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and pro-Pakistani groups such as the Hizbul Mujahideen and its patron, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which demands accession of the state to Pakistan.

The Nawaz Sharif-led Muslim League (PMLN) has also expressed its disapproval of the decision, adding that Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s government should have consulted the National Assembly before announcing a political package for the Northern Areas. Amanullah Khan, the leader of the JKLF, in a press statement argued that legally, the Northern Areas should be part of Jammu and Kashmir state. Incidentally, though the bulk of his following is in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, Khan himself hails from Gilgit.

The divisive opinions on the administration of the Northern Areas – and their status vis-à-vis a unified state of Jammu and Kashmir – date back to the time of Partition. On August 1, 1947, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was an unexpected visitor to Srinagar city. In sharp contrast to the instability and violence that prevailed in the rest of British India, the city was lit for state-sponsored celebrations. In response to Gandhi's query about the reason for such a festive atmosphere, he was told that the state was rejoicing the return of Gilgit Agency to Jammu and Kashmir by the British after 12 years. In 1935, the British signed a 60-year lease with Maharaja Hari Singh to take control of Gilgit. They wanted to use the frontier belt as a base to check growing Russian influence in the region. The end of British rule in India resulted in a premature termination of the lease.

Gandhi made a terse comment on August 2 that year stating it would be better if Gilglt were awarded local area autonomy to govern itself and preserve its traditional ways in order to keep the state together. The Maharaja did not take any notice of Gandhi’s words and dispatched his confidante, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, to the region to govern it. In a matter of few days, the locals rebelled and the governor was arrested. Major Scot, the head of the army unit, sided with the rebels and within a fortnight the area came under the de facto control of Pakistan on November 16, 1947.

With the marking of the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the Jammu and Kashmir regions on January 1, 1949, the area of the state under India’s control was effectively reduced to 138,992 square kilometres. The 1949 Karachi Agreement signed between Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistani government gave administrative control of the Northern Areas to Pakistan, effectively separating it from that part of the state.

The Northern Areas share borders with Afghanistan, China and the Kargil area of Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. The region has been a pivotal instrument for Pakistan's friendship with China, a relationship that has borne rich dividends and provided a foundation for ‘all weather’ Sino-Pakistani friendship.

On March 2, 1963, the two countries signed an agreement which paved the way for ceding of 2,700 square miles of the region to the Chinese. The 900 kilometre Karakoram highway, an engineering marvel, constructed by the joint efforts of the Chinese and Pakistani governments in 1982 connects the outskirts of Pakistan’s prosperous Punjab province with the Uighur-dominated Xinjiang province of China. The highway has integrated the Pakistani and Chinese economies, further strengthening the ties of friendship. It also led to closer ties between the people of the Northern Areas and the Turkic Uighur community. The success of the Karakoram Highway paved the way for the joint construction of the Gwadar port in Balochistan by Chinese and Pakistan engineers. The new port on the Arabian Sea provides western China with a sea route. The port will enable China to import raw material from Africa, which also fits the current Chinese policy to gain influence in Africa.

Given this history and economic and political implications of the Northern Areas, India’s reaction to the reform package has been along expected lines. On September 11, 2009, India lodged a protest with Pakistan over the package. In addition to summoning the Pakistan Deputy High Commissioner Rifat Masood, the external affairs ministry emphasised that the ‘entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India by virtue of its accession in 1947. The so-called Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order, 2009 is yet another cosmetic exercise intended to camouflage Pakistan’s illegal occupation.’ Pakistan in turn summoned the Indian envoy and rejected New Delhi’s objections.

The fact is, no policy making can be divorced from the basic facts about the region. As per the 1931 census, with an area of 218,780 square kilometres, Jammu and Kashmir state was the largest of the 565 princely states of India: Jammu occupied an area of 32,067 sq kms; Kashmir spread across 22,165 sq kms; and the frontier district of Ladakh and Gilgit covered 164,604.86 sq kms.

Notwithstanding the demand of pro-independence groups to amalgamate the Northern Areas with Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, the fact remains that a considerable section in the Northern Areas strongly resents any such association. It fears that the region’s unique history, culture and miniscule population will be swamped by other groups of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the region prefers a provincial status within Pakistan.

Residents of the Northern Areas argue that the distinct identity of the region will be protected in a fully empowered provincial set-up, more so than as an administrative division of Jammu and Kashmir. Ethnically and linguistically, the area is different from Pothwari-speaking, Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir; it is a Shina- and Balti-speaking tract. Ladakh region on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir is the only point of association for the people of Northern Areas with the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Purik, the language spoken in the Kargil area of Ladakh, is closer to Balti.

Since 2003, Pakistan and India have tried to incorporate the complexities of the Jammu and Kashmir issue in their respective policy making exercises. In 2004, General Pervez Musharraf emphasised that the state was regionally and culturally diverse, and not a single monolithic entity. He identified the five regions: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh in India and Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas in Pakistan. He also stressed the need to work out a solution keeping the reality of diversity in mind.

In the same year, then president Musharraf, in a statement to Reuters, elaborated his idea of diversity and stated that it was time to take notice of the cultural diversity existing within the Muslim community of the state as well. He mentioned that there might be varying political aspirations within the community. The president stated that the sentiment for independence was limited to Kashmir Valley and identified Muslim communities on the south of Pir Panchal, which divides Kashmir from the Jammu region. These Muslims, along with the ones in the Pakistan-administered portion of the state, according to him, outnumber Kashmiri-speaking Muslims.

Since assuming power in 2008, the Pakistan Peoples Party-led (PPP) government expressed strong reservations with the policies of the military dictator, but on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, the PPP and PMLN expressed the desire to carry the dialogue forward.

The popular demand for provincial status for the Northern Areas offers important lessons for the multiple stakeholders of Jammu and Kashmir and the political leadership that intends to maintain the state as one entity. If a diverse entity called Jammu and Kashmir has to stay together, the political leadership on both sides of the Jammu and Kashmir region has to facilitate the struggle for a process of political and economic devolution. The people of the Northern Areas need to be assured by those who demand a unified state that the distinct political and social identity of the region will be ensured in any future political and administrative model envisaged within Jammu and Kashmir.

The present centralised democratic structure in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir is a source of perennial instability between the three regions of the state, namely Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. The system is an invitation to constant regional, ethnic and religious bickering on policy issues. The range of diversity is certainly less within Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. However, the post-1990 phase has opened up space for new political players in the region with the assertion of Jat and Rajput leadership in southern Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. This is in sharp contrast to the earlier political monopoly of Sudans and Abbasi caste groups from the central Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Also, the geographical distance between Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, and the Mirpur division makes a strong case for decentralisation.

It is unlikely that India and Pakistan will agree on the final solution to the Jammu and Kashmir issue. However, policy makers should realise that if the trouble-torn region is to be maintained as a single entity, a process of decentralisation that entails empowering the multiple stakeholders is a necessity. If Gandhi could foresee the complex reality of the state six-decades ago, the experience of nationbuilding in South Asia in the post-colonial era certainly calls for a more thoughtful approach.

The author is a Fulbright fellow at New York University. He previously reported for The Hindu, an Indian daily, in Jammu.
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