February 7, 2004

Tasman Spirit, a 24-year-old single-hull, oil-tanker, owned by Polembros Company of Greece, flying a Maltese flag, was under charter of Pakistan National Shipping Corportion to carry 67,535 tons of Iranian light crude oil for Pakistan Refinery Ltd, and about 450 tons of bunker fuel.

The tanker ran aground near Karachi Port on July 27 at about 1:30pm. The spot where it was grounded was away from the centre of the port channel, so vessel did not hinder the operations of the port and it remained open for movement of ships .

Available evidences suggests that the oil tanker grounded due to its entry into the port at a time when the wind, at a speed of 40 to 45 km/hour, was playing havoc with the sea; the sea swell was up to 4 metres; the tide was receding to low which was to occur at 4:14pm; the datum at the specific section of Manora channel being 12.2 metres, suggests that Tasman Spirit, with a draft of 11.9 metres, had lost the advantage of high tide.

Despite losing the advantage of high tide, the oil tanker may still have negotiated the high swell, provided it was in the centre of the channel and had sufficient speed to negotiate the point where it had to take a turn but its bottom rested on the sharp edges of hard rocks. Such was the point where the vessel was pushed by the wind and the swell. These facts suggest that both inclemency of weather and human error may have caused the grounding.

The tanker had started leaking oil after being grounded; oil slick was visible around the ship immediately after it grounded. The grounding was only the initiation of the disaster; much worse was yet to come. The position of the grounded ship and the wind direction was such that the leaking oil, though small in quantity drifted mainly out of Manora channel in the NEE direction — towards Shireen Jinnah Colony, Sea View Apartments, Village Restaurant.

Available evidences suggest that the attempts at lighterage undertaken on and around Aug 8-10 caused deterioration of the situation and augmented the leakages since oil started to leak heavily from this time onward and a thick oil slick was visible near the tanker site and the surrounding coast was smelling foul. Tose visiting the harbour or going to Manora were observing the oil slick floating on the seawater around the oil tanker while those visiting the Clifton and Seaview areas could smell the pungent vapour and also feel it approaching the sandy beaches.

Transfer of some 25,500 tons of crude oil during the lighterage operations appears to have destabilized the heavily loaded single-hull vessel. It may be pointed out that KPT had stated on Aug 2 that the vessel was resting on its bottom with the stern slightly raised and, in this position, its stability was not much in danger. This did not appear to be a technically sound statement in that the point at which the vessel was resting could act as a fulcrum that could induce a buckling action when the stability is disturbed, for instance during lighterage.

The lighterage operations combined with severity of weather and the sea swell, had destabilized the structure since the heavy load could cause the raised portion to cave in and the crack to widen leading to the break up of the vessel.

By Aug 12 it was evident that an environmental catastrophe was in the offing. The operations to salvage the grounded oil tanker were stopped on Aug 13 following the detection of a crack in its bottom.

The magnitude and direction of the crack suggested that the breakage of Tasman Spirit would cause its Tank 2 as well as Tank 1 to rupture leading to very severe spillage. The ship did not break apart but the crack widened and the structural collapse caused a about 27,000 tons of the crude oil to gush out into the sea, leaving 14,500 tons on board. Another 3,000 tons of the crude oil spilled subsequently, thus bringing the total loss to about 30,000 tons. The salvagers were able to remove 37,000 tons of the crude oil and 440 tons of bunker fuel.

Immediate impact

Evaporation of the volatile organic compounds caused air pollution immediately after the spill of 27,000 tons, followed by the release of another 3,000 tons of the light crude which had a density of 0.856 kg/m3, viscosity of 11 cP, low energy dispersibility of 40% and high energy dispersibility of 80% by volume. It had 1.35% sulphur, and about 4% each of the C-5 to C-15 alkanes, with 57% of the oil that may form residue and 41% of volatile organic compounds VOCs. Accordingly about 12,000 tons of VOCs evaporated off and impacted living area as far as 1 to 2 km deep into Keamari Village, Shireen Jinnah Colony, and the DHA from Aug 13 to almost the first week of September.

The remaining 60% or about 18,000 tons spilled over the coastal water and Manora Channel. From Aug 14-16, the thick layer of this residue was interacting with the shoreline and the waves of the turbulent Arabian Sea, as shown in the following picture. It is estimated that at least 6,000 tons out of the residues was deposited on the beaches while the remaining 12,000 tons was oxidized and densified as a result of the wind, high amount of swell, and high dispersibility. The oxidized petroleum hydrocarbons are, it may be added, more toxic than petroleum products and the intermediate products are also carcinogenic. A small amount was also dispersed by the dispersant that was sprayed 48 hours too late on the floating oil off the coast.

On Aug 16, the oil spill, started to have its toll over the economic interest of the country and impacted the facilities located in the Manora Channel with an area of about 60 km2. The Karachi Fish Harbour, the Naval establishments, salt works, three large areas under mangrove forest cover and the villages around the shoreline of the Channel were all witness to the creeping oil slick. The Fish harbour located at the fag end of the Karachi Port towards West Wharf, and catering to the needs of around 2,300 boats having an annual catch of about 650,000 tons of fish and shrimps, started giving foul smell of the oil, and the Marine Fisheries Department issued directives to the fishermen to be careful in lighting any fire for fear that the petroleum vapour may catch fire.

Fishermen belonging to 13 coastal villages with a population of more than 0.2 million were among those directly affected by the oil spill, according to a survey conducted by the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, a non-governmental organization. Livelihood of more than 90,000 registered fishermen of Sindh was at stake as the oil slick in fishing zone led to a sharp decline in the sale of seafood in the city markets. Prices of different fish species came down by 60-70%. Owing to the low off-take, traders at fish harbour had to curtail bulk procurement which forced fishermen to fish in the coastal areas of Thatta and Badin rather than in the affected zone, and also to dispose of their catch at whatever rate offered.

Though the Karachi Fish Harbour was already polluted, the oily layer over the sea water is more hazardous and damaging to the ecology and marine life. Some of the exporters expressed their apprehensions that since the fish and shrimp breeding season was still on, most of the fingerlings, the baby fish, which normally stay near the coastline, might have been killed. The immediate effect was apprehended to be on export of crabs, which abound the Manora Channel. The processing of crabs was immediately stopped and the operations were not likely to start until laboratory tests on the marine life declared it safe.

Lessons from past oil spills, including the large spills from Torey Canyon (1967) or Amoco Cadiz (1978) or Exxon Valdez (1989), and the small ones like the tanker Tamano on Soldier’s Ledge in Casco Bay, Maine, USA that tore a 20-foot hole in a starboard tank in 1972, clearly demanded the tanker to be cordoned off with booms so that the leaking oil could be contained within an enclosed area for a subsequent skim off.

The first lesson from all such episodes is to have a contingency plan and to have a lead agency designated to handle the emergency. In the absence of such a plan the city authorities started acting in all directions without making a formal environmental assessment of impact of the oil spill. Consequently they also did not immediately know the desired mitigation and/or the remediation measures. The oil had started to leak heavily on the evening of the 13th but aerial spraying of dispersant began on the 15th which was 48 hours too late. According to IMO/UNEP Guidelines on Oil Spill Dispersant Application, 1995 edition, “Most oils can be successfully treated with dispersants in the first four to six hours of a spill.”

It may be noted that preparation of a Contingency plan to counter oil spills is a legal requirement for all nations, particularly for those on or near the traffic routes, under the 1982 UN Convention on Laws of Seas. Under the agreement, countries need to form a “Regional Plan” in coordination with other states, after their own contingency plans are finalized, to control a large oil slick that might affect more than one country or is likely to be difficult for the country to handle it independently.

A visit to the site of the casualty indicated that no lesson had been learnt and KPT that should appropriately had been the lead institution did not have an adequate number and size of booms to carry out this operation. It had to borrow a few hundred metre length of harbour booms from Port Qasim. It may be noted that each harbour that is a signatory to the Marpol Convention on oil spills and pollution, must have the booms as a necessary component of the contingency plan that is needed to respond to such situations. On Aug 20, 2x100m coastal booms for calm water, not the high-sea booms for open sea and rough weather, were placed at the entrance to the harbour. This measure was only partly effective in protecting the harbour. In the absence of an adequate size of booms the leaked oil that accumulated around the ship could not be contained and its slick had drifted both outward in the direction of the wind and into the Manora Channel.

Environmental impact

Analysis of the bottom sediment from a few points of the impacted area indicated that the dispersed oil had spread over the bottom of the sea, possibly up to the 9-metre contour line to the south of the beaches in addition to the bed of Manora Channel and Chinna Creek.

It is estimated that the impacted area is spread over about 160 km2. The toxic petroleum hydrocarbons released by spill must have degraded the active organic constituents that are responsible for primary productivity, which in the concerned area has been estimated at 1.5-1.8gC/m2 per day. Accordingly about 6-7 tons per day equivalent of primary productivity has been lost over the concerned area. Since about 12,000 tons of crude oil has been dispersed, it would need an equivalent amount of organic carbon to restore the productivity of the area. With natural forces alone it may take about 2,000 days or nearly six years to do so.

Loss of productivity over the impacted area has quite likely affected the potential yield of demersal fish estimated at 5.8 g/m2, i e, about 3 to 4 times the value for primary productivity in terms of carbon. The fish catch in the impacted area has been found to be about 11 tons per day or about 4,000 tons per year. It is estimated that the loss of demersal fish for this area spread over 6 years would be a tremendous quantity of over 24,000 tons.

The oil spill clean up scenario had, like the attempts at containment, no direction mainly because there was no “Contingency Plan”. No lesson was learnt from the literature that already existed and concerned organizations like the KPT and the City Government were simply unprepared to deal with emergency situation or to adopt the desired mitigation and remediation measures to restore the beaches. They acted according to the advice of the salvagers.

Beach-cleaning operation mobilizing an army of workers and digging the beach was started with heavy mechanical equipment although there was still some crude left in Tasman Spirit and more spills were expected. The removal of debris and sand polluted with oily sludge was removed under the supervision of the foreign team which had been provided the labour and transportation equipment. Oil-soaked sand and debris were removed with spades and bare hands and the same were dumped initially at a site designated by DHA and finally transported to a so-called landfill location at Surjani/Jam Chakro solid waste dump site of the City Government some 30km from the beach. Some 3,400 plastic bags containing about 1 to 1.2 m3 of the material were dumped at this site after treatment with lime.

The main problem with the aftermath of oil spill was in fact restoration of about 200 metre wide and 11.5km long beach that was polluted with an estimated 6,000 tons of light crude oil. Part of this oil had penetrated down to depths of 6ft and 8 ft at places of high impact and had also deposited on boulders which presented an ugly sight. Restoration of part of the beach was effected by bioremediation technique that is similar to the one adopted in the case of the spill from Exxon Validez in Alaska. Oil-digesting micro-organisms isolated from the site and modified by genetic engineering, using gamma radiation technology at the NIBGE, Faisalabad, were used to deal with oil spill and to reduce the environmental damage done to the beach. It is hoped that the genetically modified organisms which are notorious for their unpredictable behaviour do not damage the environment in like manner.

The above account of the disaster and its impact suggests that deficiencies in management, human factor, and structural failure besides the severity of the weather were all operative in the case of spill. The structural failure was due to single hull but Tasman Spirit could, according to the Convention in vogue, continue with its single hull until 2006. Break up of the vessel caused during lighterage operations was nevertheless due to human factors while the inefficient handling to contain the spill was due to lack of preparedness for the disaster.

Tasman Sea oil spill has unequivocally demonstrated the need for Pakistan to have a Contingency Plan to face the disasters arising out of oil spills, since it directly and indirectly faces a flow of about 80% of the oil from the Gulf through its Exclusive Economic Zone. Contingency plan to counter oil spills is a legal requirement for all nations, particularly for those on or near the traffic routes, under the 1982 UN Convention on Laws of Seas. A plan prepared by the Maritime Security Agency in the year 2000, with some 27 stakeholders who have to be activated in case of any serious oil spill needs to be revived.

Pakistan, according to this plan, needs $5 million for purchase of equipment, $20 million for a pollution control vessel and $10 million for training of personnel and procurement of chemicals like dispersants etc. However, the plan is not operational in the country since it was argued that it is futile to remain in preparedness for an event that is least likely to occur.

Likewise the international conventions under the Law of the Seas concerning movement of oil tankers, cleaning of ship bilges and cycling of ballast tanks by a large number of merchant vessels and oil tankers that pose a serious threat to our own seas, have not been signed. In contrast our ports and concerned agencies are inadequately equipped to deal with any aspect of the catastrophe, much less to control oil spills in the area.

Pakistan may have benefited greatly if it was a signatory to Marpol Conventions, particularly that on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. It is claimed that in case Pakistan was a member of the Fund, it would have received compensation of approximately $291 million to meet costs for clean-up operations; for measures to prevent damages due to pollution, and for damages to private bodies and individuals as a result of the oil spill. It may be reminded that the country does not have its own relevant compensation legislation. In view of these inadequacies, the only recourse would be to go for litigation which is sure to be lengthy and is not likely to carry any guarantee that the compensation would be paid or those needing it would be adequately compensated. That being the case the American P&I Club has arranged for the removal of the shipwreck, which has already begun and has offered KPT to pay about $2 million for services and facilities provided by it for salvage operations. Pakistan has thus been a loser all the way just for its inadequacies.

The writer is a former director-general, Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research

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