May 03, 2008

REPORTS about a truce between Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistan government and then about its possible collapse show that there remain some stumbling blocks in the peace negotiations. Under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, TTP commands a large force of hard core supporters in the tribal areas. The question arises: will Islamabad’s new effort of engaging local Taliban help stabilise the situation and restore peace in South Waziristan and the NWFP?

Similar efforts made in 2005 and 2006 had failed. The outcome of the abortive attempt was expensive as around 100,000 armymen were then sent to these areas to impose writ of the state and liquidate Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries from where cross-border attacks against the Nato and Afghan forces were taking place. This time, the end-result may be more costly.

As a gesture of good intentions, Baitullah had ordered his followers to cease attacks but in return expected an end to the military operation and enforcement of sharia in areas allegedly under his control. Mehsud’s spokesman, Maulvi Umar, on April 28 accused the government of not honouring its pledge in respect of withdrawal of troops from tribal areas and announced the suspension of peace talks.

TTP is believed to be involved in the kidnapping of Pakistan’s ambassador to Kabul Mr. Tariq Azizuddin. Around 100 Pakistani military, paramilitary and government officials are believed to be in the custody of Taliban. There are apprehensions that Baitullah may use the peace accord, if formally concluded, to expand TTP influence and operations beyond Fata and the NWFP to create conditions for enforcing sharia in the whole of Pakistan?

Baitullah Mehsud is already accused of, by the Federal Interior Ministry, his involvement in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27 and is believed to be the brain behind numerous suicide attacks in different parts of the country. What is not unlikely is that having reached an accord with Islamabad and having achieved freedom to move about, the Taliban may think in terms of imposing their way of life on some towns or villages as they did in Afghanistan. Maybe, the government is treading a dangerous path by providing space and legitimacy to Taliban.

Both the Karzai regime and the United States have expressed their concerns on Islamabad’s efforts to have peace talks with Taliban who may later, having consolidated their position, pose serious security threat not only to Pakistan, but also to Afghanistan.

Maulvi Umar has blamed the United States and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan for wrecking the peace efforts between TTP and the government and threatened to resume its attacks on security forces if any action against their organisation was taken.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who escaped an attempt on his life during a military parade in Kabul on April 27, told The New York Times in an interview that, “if the deal is with those who are hardcore terrorists … and … bent upon causing damage to Pakistan and Afghanistan, then that’s wrong.” The United States seems to be in a paradoxical position about its stance towards the peace negotiations. Richard Boucher has, however, tactically endorsed Islamabad’s move to seek peace with Taliban.

What is the difference between the Taliban of Pakistan and that of Afghanistan? Do they hold same perceptions about the US-led war on terror, enforcement of sharia and imposing their way of life? One should expect so. When the reach of Afghan Taliban in carrying out attacks against the coalition forces and the Karzai regime is far and wide, one can also expect coordination between the two groups who are, in a sense, two faces of the same coin.

The recent change in policies of Islamabad vis-à-vis TTP is the outcome of two main reasons. First, the Awami National Party (ANP) led government in the NWFP wants to make sure that it enforces peace in the disturbed regions of Fata and the NWFP. After having failed to get the required results from the use of lethal power, the ANP must have persuaded the new regime in Islamabad to opt for ‘soft power’ so as to neutralise the hardliners and co-opt those members of TTP who favoure peaceful struggle. Second, the ruling coalition thinks that it cannot fight on several fronts at a time. It already confronts issues such as the restoration of judiciary, soaring food prices and an acute power crisis. In view of the surge of anti-Americanism and popular belief that the policies of Musharraf had encouraged religious militancy, there was need for a serious review of what has been happening so far in Fata and the stance adopted towards TTP by the previous government.

The release of Maulana Sufi Mohammad and the lifting of siege of Mahsud territory in South Waziristan were the concessions given by the government to enable TTP respond positively. Predictably, Baitullah Mehsud gave a positive response to government’s gestures by ordering his cadre to stop attacking security forces in the region. It is yet to be seen for how long the truce will last despite an early setback in peace negotiations. Of course, the NWFP and the federal government would like to establish the writ of the state by bringing Fata into the mainstream of Pakistani society. But TTP would insist to introduce Islamic order in areas under its influence.

The price which Baitullah Mehsud wants Islamabad to pay for ceasefire is a de facto recognition of TTP as a force to reckon and give it a free hand to set up its own autonomous units (within the state) in selected tribal areas. After all, Islamabad had looked the other way in cases where the concept of state within a state took a practical shape in different parts of the country. A senior Pakistan government official accused TTP of resorting to pressure tactics by demanding release of some militants who are detained on the charges of terrorist activities.

There are contradictions in the policies of the establishment in dealing with ethnic and religious militants. While in Balochistan, nationalist groups are denied a space, such a policy is not pursued in other parts of Pakistan and in Fata. If this is the price which Pakistan will have to pay by following a ‘soft’ approach in dealing with TPP, its ramifications may be quite serious.

The writer teaches at the department of international relations, University of Karachi.

E-mail: amoonis@hotmail.com