February 14, 2009

REFLECTING public sentiment, the media continues to have strong reservations in regard to the army’s dismal record of providing solutions to issues that involve political matters and the belief, not unjustified, that Pakistan is suffering the militant phenomenon because of the patronage these groups have been receiving over time, directly and indirectly, from elements in the establishment.

Nevertheless, the pejorative is unfair because military action invariably implies the use of violent force and it is naive to presume that the militants, who are terrorising and using civilian populations as hostage, will be defeated without considerable casualties. Indeed, the extra caution being taken to avoid civilian casualties is probably motivated by the army’s desire to protect its troops from the kind of morale-sapping media criticism that it endured during the Islamabad Lal Masjid operation in 2007 when it rightly discounted calls for safe passage to the hostile and aggressive militants within the seminary.

On that occasion, partisanship had unfortunately overtaken national security considerations when the requirement was for the opposite, because the Fourth Estate, already the fourth dimension of modern warfare, is also a major instrument for effective counter-insurgency. Perhaps our media might reflect that its peers in other countries lend unqualified support to their armed forces, even for actions that are patently questionable and unethical; and the army, for its part, might realise that such support is extended willingly to those of its counterparts that do not carry the baggage of martial law and governance failures.

Although the Swat situation represents a chance for the army to turn its political failure into success through efficient deployment of its professional capabilities, some debatable tactics and unclear strategic direction give rise to concern that events in this theatre may not unfold in the desired manner.

Two of the tactical areas are linked directly with the Americans. First are the drone attacks, directed noticeably at targets that threaten US/Nato in Afghanistan. Are these targets the same groups that are also running rampant in Swat? Perhaps not, because the Fata-based militants have so far responded to US intrusion by launching suicide attacks against high-profile government and defence targets they perceive as supportive of American interests.

The perpetrators of the mayhem in Swat, on the other hand, appear to have no agenda other than dismantling the established social structure within the country. Recalling that their demands are but an echo of what the TNSM insurgency attempted in 1994, it is possible that the militant activity flows from not one homogenous organism but from separate groupings with diverse approaches to the objective of establishing a Sharia-based society.

The other area concerning the Americans is their proposal to raise and arm “Lashkars” that will take on the militants. A recent ISPR statement, calling for “more cooperation from civilians in Swat,” indicates the army is giving serious attention to the plan, but this is a disastrous concept that should be set aside without delay. “Razakars” did not succeed in East Pakistan, the Russians did not rely on armed civilians in Afghanistan or Chechnya, the Indian army has not resorted to this in Kashmir, even the Americans themselves have not done so in Iraq or Afghanistan. Dealing with insurgents is the job of the state; arming civilians to do this would turn an insurgency into a civil war.

In 1586-89, when there was resistance in Kashmir to Mughal rule, the authorities banned all weaponry. The imperial soldiers searched every house where they thought they might find weapons, even confiscating long kitchen knives and by 1589 there was not a weapon left in private hands in the Valley. The anti-insurgency action succeeded because there was complete unity of objective between the commanders and the troops and, at the higher level, shared vision between the political and military command of the threat posed by the insurgency.

Similar synergy at the strategic and tactical levels is not visible in the present crisis. While the president says the objective of the militants is to destroy the Pakistan state, the prime minister believes the militancy is a reaction to the drone attacks.

This divergence of views not only leads to ineffective strategic planning, it also has negative effect on the motivation of the troops, as reflected by the unacceptably high level of desertions and surrender to militants being reported in the press.Perhaps these conflicting perceptions emanate from the assumptions, based on flawed analyses, that led the policy planners many years ago to believe the militant groups would (i) always be controllable and (ii) change their ideology in tandem with the changing foreign policy demands of the state.

What was not factored in was the possibility that the militants might gain independence of action through financial independence. According to the UN, Afghanistan exports more than $4 billion worth of opium each year and most of this flows out of Fata and the NWFP. This sum of money, more than 30 per cent of NWFP’s GDP, is doubtless a powerful catalyst for funding anti-state activity, both criminal and ideological. Where there are drugs, the CIA is usually not far behind, with its history of protecting the major cartels and using their funding as a cover to finance covert operations; in the case of Swat, its geographical proximity to Iran and China and the availability of zealot Sunni militants may be too tempting for the agency to ignore.

When viewed in the context of the Israeli precision attacks resulting from highly accurate intelligence input and the Indian success in infiltrating a domestic terrorist group with serving armed forces officers at its nexus, the quality of the intelligence available to the army would appear to be inadequate. In the conduct of the Swat campaign, it remains unclear whether the military has been able to identity and cut off the militants’ source of heavy weaponry and supply lines, the training camps and those who train them in the use of firearms and tactics, indeed even what is the number of militants they are up against. General Musharraf had on several occasions stated categorically that the militants were not more than “a few hundred” in number but clearly he was either misinformed or was misinforming the people.

It is understandable that much of the available information will remain classified in view of the likely involvement of the extra-territorial forces that are certainly at play — those promoting a proxy sectarian war; those such as India wishing to destabilise Pakistan; those wishing to see the Americans and Nato defeated in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in the absence of clear strategic direction, the army, going by the book, makes cumbersome progress by firing long distance salvos for “clearing” settlements in the expectation that the civilians will vacate the local theatre of operations and the militants stand and fight. This is not happening, nor is it likely to. From the time of Hannibal, guerilla tactics have either defeated or sapped the will of standing armies and the situation in Swat is no different, where many of the militant commanders will have received training in this type of warfare for use against the Soviets.Consequently, it will be useful to rethink the tactic of “clearing areas” of militants, when the need is for simultaneous restoration of the writ and credibility of the state in the recaptured areas. To be fair, without the support of the NWFP government, which has abdicated its responsibility in this regard, the Army cannot by itself be expected to undertake the task of restoring political, economic and social normalcy in the cleared areas.

The federal government, which appears to be pre-occupied in other matters, may like to give the Swat imbroglio its urgent attention. Strong support is needed to comfort the displaced population that the destruction of schools, imposition of parallel justice based on narrow religious views will neither be tolerated nor allowed to go unpunished. There can be no negotiation or compromise with the militants. This is a fight to the finish and the state must win it convincingly.