May 10, 2008

EVEN by the dismal standards of intelligence and logical consistency that Pakistanis have come to expect of their leaders, the devolution of power to local governments introduced by the Musharraf regime as the centrepiece of its reforms ranks as one of our greater acts of folly.

On the one hand the pathetic optimism of the consultants and advisers who thought that a hundred or so elected governments and decentralisation of all important functions would lead to improvements demonstrates how little international benefactors understand the problems of countries like Pakistan.

On the other hand, informed opinion within Pakistan saw through the devolution plan and realised that it was a remorselessly cynical ploy to subvert both provincial autonomy and what remained of the integrity and ethos of Pakistan’s higher bureaucracy and thus concentrate all power in the hands of the military ruler and his servants. The devolution plan fits in well as yet another chapter in Pakistan’s historical dialectic of heedlessness and cynicism.

Handing over the running of districts and administrative subunits to elected local representatives might have looked good on paper and no doubt makes a lot of sense in Toronto or New York City. In Pakistan, however, the devolution of power meant that thousands of semi-literate elected officials steeped in local rivalries and led by local notables came to exercise direct control over the civil service, the police and other important departments.

They proceeded to fill local administrative posts with their favourites and cronies, victimise and oppress their local opponents, and ignore many of the provisions of the new local government laws which might as well have been downloaded off the internet. The absence of financial controls, the arbitrary and selective implementation of local government laws, the politicisation of the local governments by the ruling party combined with the multiplication and demoralisation of the area administration made a mockery of the plan’s pretensions.

This was perhaps inevitable given the real motives of the reformers. The “Revolution through Devolution” was aimed at reducing the power and influence of the higher bureaucracy, especially its DMG component, and weakening the provincial and national level politicians and parties.

By striking deals at the local level and cultivating a crop of “grassroots” lackeys dependent on a military-dominated centre for funding and survival, Musharraf hoped, like Ayub and Zia before him, to concentrate power in his own hands and craft the appearance of public legitimacy. However, even the Musharraf regime’s apologists and protégés were constrained to admit that the devolution plan was a strategic disaster though it might also have been a tactical success in some selected areas of the country.

The new coalition government which took power after the February 2008 elections has real public support and is a legitimate, democratic dispensation. It is also not enamoured of the devolution plan. From some quarters demands are being raised for the abolition of the plan and a restoration of the pre-2001 system. Others are calling for its modification and rationalisation. Whether the ruling coalition chooses to roll back or roll out the devolution plan several imperatives ought to be borne in mind.

The restoration of the pre-devolution system has a certain logic on its side. This stems in part from the familiarity of the PML-N and PPP with the earlier system and its perceived efficiency. In the context of the food crisis, for instance, the new government must certainly wish that it had at its disposal the deputy commissioner and executive magistrates to enforce price controls and check hoarding. The devolution of power to local governments is also tainted by its identification, like Ayub’s basic democracies and Zia’s local bodies, with military interventionism.

The new government is doubtless aware that many of the existing local governments were party to the harassment and obstruction of the opposition parties between 2001 and 2007. The role these local governments played in trying to successfully rig the 2008 elections on behalf of the then ruling coalition does not endear them to the new government either. That they failed to deliver an outcome favourable to the former government does not recommend the local governments on the count of efficiency and indicates that in spite of eight years of consistent efforts to atomise Pakistani politics national and provincial parties remain resilient.

The elected local governments also serve to undermine the importance of the national and provincial elected representatives. These elected local governments have dozens if not hundreds of councillors and representatives and are thus unwieldy and difficult to manage. Given the severity of national crises such as food and power shortages and deteriorating law and order it would be easier for the new government to implement its agenda through a few hundred strategically deployed civil servants than through a chaotic mass of tens of thousands of local politicians.

Moreover, the sheer haste with which devolution was implemented has meant that the system, even within its own framework, was not practicable and many of the safeguards could not be adhered to. That the PML-N government in Punjab has frozen the accounts of the local governments on the ground that the financial controls were never applied properly is an indication of the ease with which the system can be neutralised.

Retaining the local government system with modifications also has some merit. For instance, if the district magistracy could be restored and police could be taken away from the local governments the result might be a limited and more sustainable version of local popular sovereignty. The numerical strength of the elected councils can also be safely reduced by more than half while elections to the position of nazim can be made direct and openly party-based. This variant of devolution can then also be applied to the cantonment areas and Islamabad, which were spared the local government reforms of 2001. Indeed, Islamabad is perhaps the only part of the country where the present devolution plan could have been successfully implemented given the capital’s highly educated population and lack of entrenched local caste and kinship rivalries. Cities could have popularly elected mayors and small boards of elected members for health, education, sanitation, roads, local taxes, finance, development and complaints against the administration/municipal services. The municipal development authorities, in turn, could be made to answer directly to the mayor and city council and require their approval for initiating development schemes.

The problem with the option of restoring the pre-2001 system is that while it was undoubtedly more functional than the one introduced by the devolution plan, it was also in a state of decay. This was due to highly arbitrary personnel management and the politicisation of the bureaucratic institutions by the provincial and national politicians. In order to make the earlier system perform with tolerable efficiency the national and provincial politicians will have to restrain their whimsicality and perhaps entrust the transfer, promotion and discipline of the higher bureaucracy to autonomous apolitical committees of eminent citizens.

Tinkering with the existing system poses problems of its own.

First, the local governments, regardless of their formal structure, are likely to end up in conflict with the provincial and national politicians. Given that the local governments depend on handouts from the centre that are routed through the provinces they are likely to be paralysed and manhandled by the higher tiers.

Second, the relationship of the elected local governments with the area administration, especially its civil service and police component, will be fraught with potential for antagonism given that the local politicians will make illegal and arbitrary demands. Managing this relationship will require reserves of patience and enlightened self-interest that neither the bureaucrats nor the politicians have evidenced in the past.

Third, local governments in this part of the world are neither able nor willing to raise taxes from their own constituents in order to pay for municipal services. Without self-taxation, self government will remain an empty slogan and citizens are unlikely to take much interest in local politics beyond the minimum required to secure their personal interests.

As is so often the case in governance there are no inherently positive options, only relatively better or worse alternatives that require continuous exertion and considerable insight to operate. On balance, perhaps, it would be better to revert to the earlier system and strive to make it more operative, efficient, and autonomous. That said, the post-2001 administrative system is not sustainable and, unless substantially reformed, would impede the efforts of the new government to deal with the multiple crises inherited from its predecessor.

The writer is a faculty member of the department of history of the Quaid-i-Azam University and author of “An Inquiry into the Culture of Power of the Subcontinent.”

E-mail: niazone@yahoo.com