The November 15 blasts outside the PIDC House in Karachi have brought the simmering unrest in Balochistan into focus. Initial investigations have revealed that there is a direct involvement of dissident Baloch groups in the blasts. The suspects hauled up in the first phase of operation also validate the investigations. Two of the suspects, who are reported to be members of the Baloch Liberation Army, confessed their involvement in the heinous crime before a judicial magistrate on December 5, 2005.
In response to this gruesome happening and the ongoing situation, Baloch politicians say that an iron-fisted operation has already begun to nip the political movement in the bud. Nawab Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti has accused the regime in power for employing high-handed tactics against his people to make them stop from organizing what he calls a ‘legitimate political struggle’. The establishment obviously denies these charges and claims that it is only the rounding-up of those anti-social and anti-state elements that are known to be involved in acts of sabotage and terrorism, causing rupture in the social life of the province. Whereas these allegations and counter-allegations are levelled by the establishment and Baloch political elites against each other, there is no denying the fact that all is not well in this resource-rich, but socially deprived province.
The province has greatly suffered because of the incongruent geo-political and administrative divisions that have taken place in the 20th century. Despite being one of the most thinly populated regions in the subcontinent, Balochistan has a diverse range of communities inhabiting its territories in a traditional manner. The British colonial administration was only content to have penetrated strategically into the heartland of the region. Knowing too well about the conflicting interests of tribes and their chieftains, the colonial masters skillfully maintained administrative tranquil for a sizable part of their rule. The trouble began after the partition when the sociological and anthropological peculiarities were ignored. The limited participation of local interest groups in the political administration and organization of their own context has created a sense of deprivation ever since.
The common man in Balochistan stands bewildered, not knowing what he has to do in order to get rid of the baggage of history that is killing him with its sheer weight. He has been roundly exploited by tribal chieftains who over the years have cobbled linkages with the establishment at the cost of the principled stand of their people
This could have been addressed only through an effective and open-ended political process which was sadly missing in most of the post-independence history. The discovery and subsequent utilization pattern of natural resources further fuelled this frustration. Sui remained a troubled area during the ‘50s when attempts to bring order failed miserably. The situation in other parts of the region was no different. The exploitation of common folks at the hands of tribal chieftains was an unending problem. To pursue their narrow objectives, the Sardars cobbled linkages with the establishment at the cost of the principled stand of their people. The ensuing political fragmentation and faction fights hardly allowed any worthwhile political force to emerge. The inter-ethnic and sub-regional dialogue could also not evolve. Northern Pukhtuns, central Balochs and coastal natives of the Makran belt could hardly reach a common ground.
The reasons for the present unrest are historical. The province has had a painful incorporation into the federation. Soon after the grant of the status as a province, Balochistan found itself in the opposition camp. The National Awami Party and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (NAP-JUI) coalition that was in power in the province as a consequence of the 1970 elections, ran into disagreements with the uncompromising federal regime under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. If one reviewed the political coalition that was then formulated, it would be revealed that it was one of the well-knit alliances that had ever evolved in Balochistan. It represented the voice of both communities — the liberal Baloch and the conservative Pathans. Since these parties were manned by seasoned leadership and accommodating party workers, the business of the province was moving smoothly. The same alliance was in charge of the provincial government in the NWFP. The then regime, claiming to be the champion of democracy among Third World nations, used the most undemocratic methods to blow apart their political opponents. Instead of fostering working relationships in the larger national interest, an environment of distrust and doubt was created. The ensuing chain of events made this aspect very clear.
The dispatch of troops was accelerated to Balochistan during the ‘70s. The president and civilian chief martial law administrator openly stated his thought regarding the attempts of secession in the province. Clandestine supply of arms and military support from the oil rich Iran was alleged by all and sundry in Balochistan in a bid to bell political cats. The unceremonious termination of the mild-mannered Governor Ghous Bux Bizenjo in February 1973 further created doubts regarding the sincerity of the federal regime. Appointment of Nawab M. Akbar Khan Bugti as governor at the crucial moment in Balochistan’s history made it evident that the regime would use all its trump cards to deal with the radical-minded political opponents. Various kinds of conspiracies were unearthed. Foreign hands were at work to bolster their own interests rather than bringing any political solution to the trouble-stricken region. Offices of the radical Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) were opened in Iraq. The front aimed to organize financial resources for the on-going resistance movement. Sources of hidden radio broadcasting devices relayed pro-resistance messages.
A few weeks before the NAP-JUI government was dismissed, Chief Minister Attaullah Mengal had clearly warned that any attempt to dismantle an elected provincial government in the province would derail democracy in the whole country. Sadly enough, that is exactly what happened. Once out of power, the resistance movement acquired the form of insurgency. Marri and Mengal tribal territories were attacked with brute force. Some key leaders went into exile while others were executed. Thousands of protesting cadres were killed. Peaceful demonstrators were also not spared. The regime used to pick up any suspect under the draconian Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) and gave them the thrashing of the mediaeval kind. The “rebels” were lately offered open amnesty under the carrot and stick policy of the Bhutto government; but the damage had been done.
The Zia regime brought minor relief to the bleeding province. The charges against key politicians were dropped and the army operation stopped. Administrative stability was achieved. However, political suffocation remained. The weak provincial governments that followed did not prove successful in addressing the pressing issues that were of prime importance to the communities inhabiting Balochistan.
It is a commonly subscribed belief of the Baloch intelligentsia that Balochistan has always been ruled by the Centre and its appointed agents. This feeling has evolved from a range of circumstantial evidence. Ever since the dismissal of the NAP-JUI coalition in the mid ‘70s, no worthwhile representative government was ever allowed to emerge. True, there had been some short intervals where some semblance of order was restored during military governors’ rule when General Zia was in power, but the political process was set aside completely.
It is a fact that as far as Balochistan goes, the real power of decision-making rests with the Centre. In December 2005, the prime minister announced a development package for Balochistan pledging development funds to the tune of two billion rupees. Such packages and incentives have been periodically announced when regimes wished to control insurgency. In terms of choices in development, locals have been found over-awed by the Centre’s aspirations. In 2004, a massive resistance was offered by Baloch chieftains and tribes against a range of federally-managed projects and programmes. Development schemes in Gawadar, coastal highways and the most recent intention to construct a garrison in the Awaran district are some projects vehemently opposed by Baloch parties and people. If one compares the political clout and administrative independence of chief ministers in Punjab and Balochistan, the former has always been quite autonomous irrespective of party or the type of the ruling regime.
Present times are a witness to the evolution of new forms and formats of resistance movements. Some of them have remained active since many decades. The Balochistan Students Organization (BSO) is a key body representing the Baloch youth and student fraternity. The establishment has always looked at this organization with suspicion. During the extreme right-wing regime of General Zia, it was termed as a communist outfit. It was also accused of hatching conspiracies leading to a secessionist movement in the province. Much of Baloch political leadership, such as Akhtar Mengal and Dr Imdad Baloch, owes its origin to the BSO. Many political workers and mid-level activists of the main political parties, such as the Balochistan National Movement, (BNM) derived their cadres filled with BSO-trained people.???? In the absence of a violence-free forward-looking platform for student activities, the BSO soon became a quasi-underground organization. Some of its affiliates were allegedly involved in drug trafficking, terrorism and similar anti-social activities. It was also alleged that funds for such subversive pursuits came from a western neighbour of Pakistan. This could have been aimed at blocking the occasional demands for the creation of a Greater Balochistan as an autonomous region which also comprised certain areas of Iran.
A recent example of such an outfit to carry forward similar designs is the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). All guerrilla activities of sabotage and subversion in and around Balochistan are attributed to the BLA. According to the personnel of a law enforcement agency working in that region, the BLA is a fascist organization that can adopt the most inhuman of approaches to achieve its goals. Many people have been abducted in the previous ??? few months. One can find several families who are camping outside the press club of Quetta, and elsewhere, demanding to know at least the whereabouts of such people who have been abducted. Prominent among them are Dr Allah Nazar, Ali Nawaz and Akhter Nadeem. The press has carried many stories unveiling the gory treatment meted out to several activists who where released after mysterious detention.
Recently, there were indications of merging all secular-minded nationalist parties into one political entity. This shows the sign of desperation of key political leaders about several political issues. They have apparently come to the conclusion that by uniting their resources and efforts, their negotiating power shall be enhanced to a sizable extent. In response, the government can be found offering piecemeal solutions and attractive incentives to prevent the dissidents from taking part in active agitation. The announcement of financial relief, support packages to certain areas and the expansion in the number of federally controlled programmes have been cited as a sign of progress. The majority of the native people questions this claim as the goodies of such ventures hardly reach the common man.
Genuine and sincere political leaders are an asset to society, and must be valued accordingly. If the establishment supports the constitutionally valid political activities that favour consensus building, it shall be a great service to Balochistan and the country.
The exploitation of masses only happens when the state apparatus is weak. This nation has already experienced centrifugal tendencies which became disastrous due to rigid behaviour of the rulers of the past. If the present government intends to make a difference in Balochistan, it will have to adopt radical measures to ensure peace and stability in the province. Extra-judicial activities must come to an end. Empowerment of elected institutions at the provincial and local levels must be ensured. And above all, attempts to bring the disgruntled elements to the dialogue table must be initiated without delay. This will prove meaningful only when a worthwhile agenda of all the issues pertinent to the province are brought for an open debate.
BLA: myth or reality?
On more than one occasion, sleuths working for the establishment have claimed to have rounded up agents and saboteurs of the BLA. Despite the fact that the federal government and its allied agencies appear to be convinced about the existence and anti-state designs of the BLA, the Baloch leadership has questioned the validity of such an outfit. For example, Akhter Mengal — a former chief minister of Balochistan — has demanded that all the details about the BLA, its organization and sources of funding should be disclosed. He and his colleagues have alleged that the loyalists belonging to the existing political parties or regional influential people are picked up by unknown agencies and tagged as BLA activists. However, the incidents of destruction and sabotage are still on the rise. On December 5, unknown saboteurs blew up a railway track outside Quetta. Gas pipelines are often broken as a routine thing. Such unending acts of sabotage clearly point out that those responsible for these acts are not just a naive lot of political workers.
A member of a law enforcement agency, who has served in the region in the recent past, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the BLA is a reality. It is led in an informal manner by well-known tribal leaders with separatist tendencies. It is a hodgepodge of trained saboteurs, dacoits and soft supporters who lend a hand of assistance to safeguard their own interests. Noted clansmen that are keenly active in BLA operations include the Bugtis, the Mengals, the Mazaris and the Jakhrani. A dangerous trend which is emerging is that many members of local law enforcement departments have become sympathetic to BLA objectives. Apart from that, the BLA’s influential people have been able to get their henchmen inducted into such departments/agencies. These agencies have been acting to protect some vital installations in the region, mainly gas supply lines/devices.
There is no denying the fact that the BLA is a well-organized unit and has managed to blow up more than 47 vital infrastructural targets in the last four years. Few years back, a 24-dia??? line was blown up at the border of Balochistan and Punjab that disrupted the gas supply to a vast area of Punjab. To spread terror and attempts to break the morale of paramilitary troops, the BLA encourages its members to attack their personnel. It has been reported that cash awards are given to those who manage to kill or maim any personnel of law enforcing agencies. The BLA has a strong network of supplies including arms and ammunition. On certain occasions, they have spot superiority in terms of combat capability and assault???.
Not all BLA sympathizers agree with its modus operandi. There is a common consensus on the issues of under development, deprivation and the colonization of resources and opportunities by outsiders. However, terror tactics are applied under the tutelage of the Sardars. Most of the lower rank people oppose it. Since common folks are supposed to strictly follow the orders of the Sardar and the tribal code, the are left with no choice but to carry out violent missions. — Noman Ahmed and M. Younus Khan
The November 15 blasts outside the PIDC House in Karachi have brought the simmering unrest in Balochistan into focus. Initial investigations have revealed that there is a direct involvement of dissident Baloch groups in the blasts. The suspects hauled up in the first phase of operation also validate the investigations. Two of the suspects, who are reported to be members of the Baloch Liberation Army, confessed their involvement in the heinous crime before a judicial magistrate on December 5, 2005.
It is a commonly subscribed belief of the Baloch intelligentsia that Balochistan has always been ruled by the Centre and its appointed agents. This feeling has evolved from a range of circumstantial evidence. Ever since the dismissal of the NAP-JUI coalition in the mid ‘70s, no worthwhile representative government was ever allowed to emerge. True, there had been some short intervals where some semblance of order was restored during military governors’ rule when General Zia was in power, but the political process was set aside completely.
