It’s been more than three decades since the Dhaka debacle shook the very foundation of Pakistan. The scars caused by the cataclysmic events of December 1971 have not yet been healed. Can today, with the benefit of hindsight, things be rectified to any extent?
WHY is it necessary to recall the traumatic events of 1971? It is because the far-reaching consequences of the great tragedy raise questions which the bewildered nation needs to answer. There is no wisdom in brushing aside the verdict of history which continues to cast its gloomy shadows on the political firmament of Pakistan.
Whenever there is a challenging situation in the country and conflicts assume an unmanageable proportion, many people tend to identify it with the tragedy of former East Pakistan. In that state of mind, cynicism replaces rational thinking. The exasperated people do not see the vast difference that exists between the East Pakistan of the ‘70s and the Pakistan of today. Their analogy is based on wrong premises.
Today’s Pakistan is a compact country — accessible from one end to another. Despite the diversity that is found because of geographical locations and varying cultural traits rooted in their history, the people in general share the same aspirations. And more importantly, they are not separated by a huge land mass of a foreign country with which we have had a long history of hostility.
But this does not mean that we have to be complacent about it. The ongoing trouble in South Waziristan, the unrest brewing in Balochistan and parts of the NWFP and the uneasy calm prevailing in Sindh should be an eye-opener for all of us. It is here that the year 1971 becomes relevant.
What happened in East Pakistan in 1971 was indeed the culmination of a litany of wrongdoings in matters of policy decisions by the successive governments of the country. True, the politicians did not behave responsibly in their conduct. In fact, there was a serious dearth of mature, experienced politicians. There were reasons for this dearth. Unlike the Indian National Congress which had its roots in the masses and had played an active role in creating an awareness among the people at all levels, the Muslim League was guided mainly by an irrepressible urge for freedom. Their perceived and imagined threat from the majority community after the departure of the British rulers had united them. For instance, the Muslims of UP and Bihar knew that their provinces would never form part of Pakistan by any stretch of imagination. Still they remained undeterred. It is another matter that they had to pay a heavy price for their determined struggle for a cause.
Our recorded history tells us that Muslim Bengal enthusiastically supported the Pakistan movement. Although Muslim leaders like H.S. Suhrawardy, A.K. Fazlul Haq and many others were willingly accepted by the majority community and commanded immense respect in their areas, they cast their lot with the Muslim League. They did not believe in communal politics, but decided to join the Pakistan movement with full vigour. Perhaps they thought that the united strength of the Muslims of India would force the British to accelerate the pace of their exit from the subcontinent. It was not accidental that Mr Fazlul Haq moved the famous Lahore resolution. On that occasion he was indeed representing the combined voice and strength of the entire Muslim Bengal.
It was, however, unfortunate that the top leadership of the Muslim League did not trust the genuine leaders of Muslim Bengal. Their loyalty always remained in doubt. On the other hand, those who had little contact with the people were brought to the forefront of the movement. This eventually initiated a process of alienation.
Besides this, there were several other factors that broadened the gulf between the people living in the two wings of Pakistan. The elitist rulers of West Pakistan never realized that the Bengalis with their distinct language, culture and history could not be subdued or coerced into accepting oppressive decisions. They could be brought within the fold of Pakistan only through the implementation of the universal principles of federalism. These principles were completely ignored by the rulers at the political or administrative levels. On many occasions, a polite request by the chief minister of East Pakistan for financial sanction for a project used to be summarily dismissed by a section officer sitting in Rawalpindi. The helpless chief executive of the province had to swallow the humiliation.
In the early days, Pakistan did not have many resources. Jute, which was lovingly called “golden fibre”, was the only exportable commodity. The Bengali politicians and economists always complained that the revenues earned by the eastern wing were being used mainly for the development of the western wing. This may not be wholly correct. But it is a fact that no major development project was undertaken in East Pakistan for several decades. A federal minister from East Pakistan often deplored the apathy shown by his cabinet colleagues towards the plans and programmes of the eastern wing. The frown that appeared on the face of Field Marshal Ayub Khan clearly indicated that he is in no mood to have any discussion on such subjects.
There are reports to suggest that the federal government had quietly sent messages to the Bengali leaders to secede. This suggestion was spurned by the Bengali politicians on the ground that they were the majority component of the population and as such they had no desire to withdraw from the federation. The question arises whether the federating units have the right to secede from the federation, or whether the federation has the right to expel a federating unit. Although sometimes such a measure may be desirable, theoretically it is inconsistent with the concept of federalism. Nevertheless, the very fact that this issue was being discussed at the highest level shows the unhelpful attitude of the federal government towards one of its major units.
A secret unsigned document was also in circulation suggesting that the two parts of Pakistan could not stay together. Among the architects of this theory were top bureaucrats of the federal government. For the successful functioning of a federation it is necessary that decision making on any subject excepting the central one is done entirely by the federating units. A federation cannot work smoothly if two divergent systems are allowed to operate in the country. East Pakistan had abolished the zamindari system a long time back, but it continues to operate even today in the present Pakistan. In fact, the system not only operates here with a vengeance, it has gained more strength through its questionable institutions like jirgas, private jails, beradari, clans and tribalism. All these factors negate the very essence of federalism.
Beginning with the language movement which claimed several lives, the Bengalis gradually became convinced that the rulers were not prepared to appreciate their feelings and were determined not to share power with them. This was evident from the policies adopted by the federal government in political and administrative matters. Civilian officers from East Pakistan were seldom promoted to the rank of secretaries, despite their proven efficiency. Financial sanctions were blocked on various pretexts. Genuine grievances were ignored and it almost appeared as if East Pakistan was not part of Pakistan.
It was General Yahya Khan alone who made certain positive moves for bridging the ever widening gulf between the two wings. He announced rapid promotions of Bengali officers to pacify them. He shifted the headquarters of several autonomous organizations to Dhaka. It was decided that the sessions of the National Assembly will be held in the two wings by rotation. And finally it was he who declared at Dhaka airport after the first free and fair elections of 1970 in the country that the Awami League chief Sheikh Mujibur Rahman will head the new government. He did not say it in so many words. But when he was asked whether he would meet Mujib, he candidly replied, “It is not easy to meet the future prime minister of Pakistan.”
The indefinite postponement of the National Assembly session convinced the Bengalis that the federal government would never allow them any share in the government. The midnight of March 25, 1971 sealed the fate of united Pakistan. What happened on December 16 was the culmination of a desperate struggle of a frustrated, disillusioned people.
It is time that instead of putting a thick blanket on the events of 1971 and distorting history, we take courage to face the realities and admit our follies.
It’s been more than three decades since the Dhaka debacle shook the very foundation of Pakistan. The scars caused by the cataclysmic events of December 1971 have not yet been healed. Can today, with the benefit of hindsight, things be rectified to any extent? 
