A HISTORIAN can even change the past. Nothing can define the study of the history of Pakistan’s creation in better words. For Indian (nationalists) historians, Pakistan is just an aberration that needs to be rectified. On the other hand, their several Pakistani counterparts have come up to put a strong case for Pakistan’s establishment. The purpose of this article is to probe the difference of opinions among Pakistani historians with regard to the factors attributed to the creation of Pakistan.
Some historians trace the ‘origin’ of Pakistan from the times of the Indus valley civilization. Led by Ahmed Hasan Dani, these historians depend on archaeological evidence to impart essential distinctiveness to the north-western regions of India (present-day Pakistan) and its historical and geographic contiguity even during the ancient times.
Following the lead, Aitzaz Ahsan vaguely tried to put across similar views in his book Indus saga and the creation of Pakistan. There are others, often satirized as Arya samajists, who may not agree with such an idea but still insist on owning the Indus valley civilization as it would enrich our cultural heritage even if such a link is not in consonance with the much trumpeted, the Two-Nation Theory. For them, it is a matter of pride to be heirs to a spectacular ancient civilization.
The Marxists viewed the origin of Pakistan with their ideologically-tinged binoculars. They made use of peculiar phraseology in their writings such as ‘the old feudal system’, ‘emergence of the Indian bourgeoisie’, ‘India as a periphery’, ‘the imperialist policy of divide and rule’, and so on. In this contextual framework, Pakistan emerged as a corollary of imperialist policies that laid down the basis for an indigenous bourgeoisie class to emerge in India and placed the Hindus and the Muslims against each other. The post-colonial Marxist theorists, notably Hamza Alvi, made invaluable contributions to the study of state structure inherited by Pakistan and lately modified it to cater to the needs of post-colonial state in the dynamics of global politics in favour of neo-imperialist powers. Among the Marxists, there were pro-Pakistan men as well for whom the establishment of Pakistan was a welcome event, as it freed the exploited peasantry and proletariat from the indigenous Indian (mostly Hindu) bourgeoisie and capitalist class.
However, the dominant view point, recognized as patriotic and standardized by the state machinery through curriculum, media and patronage (in terms of medals, certificates for workers of Pakistan movement and other such schemes) is that of the Two-Nation Theory. It starts from the Muslim invasion in 712 under Muhammad Bin Qasim and sets out to differentiate the Hindus and the Muslims as distinct nations with differences in their religion, culture, traditions, language, appearance and even eating habits. This historical doctrine was mainly construed by I.H. Qureshi and S.M. Ikram — two eminent men of letters. The political realization of the theory had already been made possible by the poetic activism of Allama Iqbal and ceaseless efforts of the Quaid-i-Azam, rallying the Muslims around a just cause, vital to the future benefits of the Indian Muslims. So the historians belonging to this school of thought were concerned about fostering a national spirit and sense of unity in the post-independence period of nation-building. The ideological construct of this theory, which had successfully culminated in the recognition of distinctive statehood, was, however, built on fragile arguments. The theorists conveniently skipped the period of harmonious co-existence of 1,000 years between the Hindus and the Muslims.
Al-Baruni is considered the first proponent of the Two-Nation Theory for making the Muslims and the Indus distinct in so many ways. Then comes Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who prophesized the divisions between the two communities and the idea was then picked up by Muslim nationalist leaders. This is despite the fact that there is a “deafening silent period” of 1,000 years between the first and the second proponent of the Two-Nation Theory, and also that Sir Syed went back on his initial statement and instead emphasized the unity of the Hindus and the Muslims.
It can be inferred that no single viewpoint in itself provides a satisfactory or rational explanation for the creation of Pakistan. Different viewpoints need to be assorted together to conceive a more logical and comprehensible picture of historical forces at work. In my view, Pakistan’s inevitability is neither as old as the Indus valley civilization theorists would make us believe, nor has it been the handiwork of imperialist designs; nor is it historically tenable to show the Muslims and the Hindus perpetually crossing swords during the course of history.
Pakistan is an outcome of changes that India underwent after the British occupation. The state structure established, policies adopted, impersonal law system introduced and the new social-cultural make-up of India, put the Muslims in an inconvenient and uncomfortable position of competition with the Hindus.
It is hoped that the historians of Pakistan (and India) would help adopt a bipartisan approach towards the study of history to make an objective assessment of a political reality that defines the fate of one-fourth of humanity living in South Asia.
