THE 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan is a watershed in the history of the subcontinent. The plan represented the final attempt by the British for a united India. Its failure made the bifurcation of the country inevitable.
The Cabinet Mission Plan was presented by the British government in an attempt to resolve the political and constitutional problem of India. The two main parties of the country, the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League, were offering different solutions to the country’s problems. Whereas the Congress stood for a free, united India, the Muslim League wanted a separate homeland for Muslims. “Quit India” and “Divide and quit” sum up the stance of the Congress and the Muslim League respectively.
The Cabinet Mission Plan sought to strike a compromise between the positions of the two parties. The plan proposed a loose federation to be called the Union of India. The union or central government would control only three departments — foreign affairs, defence and communications. The union would consist of three units or groups. Group A would comprise Hindu majority provinces; Group B would consist of western Muslim majority provinces; and Group C would be made up of eastern Muslim majority provinces. Residuary powers would be vested in the provinces. The plan provided that any province could call for reconsideration of the constitution after 10 years.
Thus the Cabinet Mission Plan sought to divide India into two autonomous regions on the basis of religion and authorized each unit to quit the federation after a specific period. Ostensibly, the plan ruled out Muslim demand for Pakistan. The reason given by the mission was that such a demand was not practicable. According to the mission, there was no justification for including non-Muslim majority regions of Punjab and Bengal in Pakistan. And in case those regions were not included in Pakistan, the proposed Muslim state would be too small and weak to remain independent. Despite this, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League accepted the plan. A close look at the plan and the related political events would reveal that Jinnah’s acceptance of the constitutional scheme was occasioned by at least three factors.
In the first place, when the plan was presented to the Congress, it tried to get the mission’s assurance that in the event the Congress accepted the plan while the Muslim League rejected it, power would be transferred to the Congress. Such an assurance would have given the Congress carte blanche in dealing with the Muslims. The mission, however, gave the assurance. As the plan fell short of Muslim demand for a separate state, the Congress was certain the Muslim League would reject it, thus prompting the British to hand over power to the Congress. Jinnah decided that the Muslim League should accept the constitutional scheme.
In the second place, the Congress had unleashed the propaganda that the partition of India was a British scheme and that Jinnah and the Muslim League were being used by them to execute that scheme. The propaganda was entirely baseless as the demand for Pakistan was occasioned by an increasing sense of insecurity among Muslims over trampling of their political, social and economic rights. It was that sense of insecurity that had initially translated itself into the demand for separate electorate. To dub these demands a brainchild of the British was to shut eyes to the facts.
However, the strongest reason for Jinnah to accept the plan was that he being a constitutional expert he saw in it seeds for Pakistan.
The Muslim League’s acceptance of the plan took the Congress by surprise. The party did not believe that Jinnah would accept the plan, and thus power would be transferred to it. However, Jinnah’s astute move threw cold water on their plans. Now the ball was in their court. But a weak centre and strong units were not acceptable to the Congress. What the party wanted was a strong centre and weak units as demanded by the Nehru Report.
Congress leadership therefore started to have its own interpretations of the Cabinet Plan, which were completely at variance with its spirit. Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, maintained that the groupings as provided in the plan were not compulsory and vowed to establish a strong centre at the expense of provincial autonomy.
The Cabinet Plan had two parts: the constitutional scheme outlined in the preceding paragraphs and the provisions relating to the setting up of an interim government to run the affairs of the country until a new constitution was drawn up. The Congress accepted the constitutional scheme but only with its own interpretation of the compulsory grouping clause, which, as already mentioned, was a clear departure from the very spirit of the plan. The party also initially refused to join the proposed interim government.
Later, upon the viceroy’s persuasion, the Muslim League also joined the interim set-up. The Congress got the important departments of defence and interior, while the Muslim League got the equally important portfolio of finance. From the very outset it became clear that the two parties could not get along together. There was no unity in their cabinet and the two parties used their power to settle scores against each other. Liaquat Ali Khan in particular as finance minister shot down every Congress proposal and presented a budget which heavily taxed big industrialists, who were the Congress’ financers. This convinced both the British and the Congress that there couldn’t be a smooth power sharing between the latter and the Muslim League.
Meanwhile, there was a change of guards in India as the British government. appointed Lord Mountbatten as the new viceroy. Soon after Mountbatten’s arrival, the Cabinet Plan was discarded and the stage was set for the partition of India, which was formally spelt out in the 3rd June 1947 plan.
