August 22, 2004

Despite the fact that politicians coming out of the PML’s fold have had the opportunity to rule Pakistan more than any other political party, there is something that does not seem to be right about the League

IF everything goes according to the schedule and the political engineering manual is followed, by the time these lines are published, Shaukat Aziz would have taken his seat in the National Assembly and would have been elected leader of the house. If that happens, he will be the 10th prime minister belonging to the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the party he joined before the elections of the present Senate some two years back.

Of all his predecessors, only Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, whom he will be replacing, would have been a prime minister who completed his ‘tenure’, which was pre-decided to last only for 45 days or so — a period allotted to him to serve as the stopgap PM till Shaukat Aziz got elected to the National Assembly.

The eight other Muslim League prime ministers could not finish their tenure. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated, while Khawaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, I.I. Chundrigar, Mohammad Khan Junejo, Nawaz Sharif and Zafarullah Khan Jamali were removed or forced to resign.

Quite similar is the case of prime ministers belonging to other parties. Except for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who himself opted for an early dissolution of his assembly and went for polls in March 1977, and was then overthrown by martial law in July, no other PM belonging to any party could complete his tenure. Suhrawardy, Feroz Khan Noon and Benazir Bhutto, historically, sailed in the same boat. But when it comes to prime ministers belonging to the Muslim League, the situation becomes a tad different, as the party has invariably enjoyed the reputation of being pro-establishment. More often than not, its governments were installed, not as much on merit as on the consideration of the establishment, employing discretionary powers of the appointing authority or the arbitrary rules ensuring their formation.

The question that springs to mind is: Why were then all PMs belonging to the Muslim League removed, at times, along with their assemblies? An appraisal of the dynamics of the establishment-ML relationship may help understand this issue. For this, one would first need to see how the establishment in Pakistan was constituted, what it stands for, and what significance the ML has in its eyes.

When Pakistan came into being, its journey as a democratic country was hampered right in the beginning. As a result of the partition, because of the constitutional modalities through which the country was realized and absence of a socially advanced class that could have claimed power for establishing democratic ways of dispensation, the bureaucracy intervened to take control of the new country. As a functionary in the colonial rule, it was considered qualified to control society. At bureaucracy’s behest, state formation was preferred to nation formation, and as the state was presumed to be under external threat, the military was brought into the power structure in the beginning of the 1950s. Consequently, a military-bureaucracy oligarchy, or the establishment, came to hold the reins of power, relegating the politicians to, at best, perform a supportive role.

Over the years, however, the balance has shifted within the establishment. Ever since General Ziaul Haq’s rule, the balance has tilted from the bureaucracy to the military. Today, though the bureaucracy still plays a crucial part in the administration of the state, its role in the process of decision making has been reduced. In addition to this, the military has also brought in some technocrats in a supporting role. Working with the technocrats seems to have been perceived as a better choice than relying on the bureaucrats who have an aura of permanence about them and hence expect a permanent role. Technocrats, on the other hand, may be hired on tenure to tenure basis and can be relieved of their responsibilities if and when desired.

To a control-oriented establishment, politics and political process are an anathema, a bete noire, for they tend to destabilize the status quo at a given point of time. Politics energizes people, creates consciousness and generates demands. Once rights are aggregated, there emerges the need for channels to transmit them to the state. Political parties do this, hence they are discouraged in authoritarian states.

For the major part of Pakistan’s history, political process was curtailed. Either there have been martial laws or controlled democracies. But as Pakistan, with its cultural and ethnic diversity and its segmented society, is a difficult country to govern through central diktat, some allowance for politics is inevitable.

This reason compels the establishment to create space for politics to the extent that it can find political recruits to serve as intermediaries between itself and society’s variegated segments. The parliamentary system was disliked by General Ayub Khan, General Ziaul Haq, and General Musharraf is not fond of it either, for it can bring about a legislature with voices louder than what is wanted to be heard. Non-party elections were preferred by Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq, for parties are anyway stronger than individuals and can have a nuisance value for actual power holders. But the experiment of non-party elections also caused frustration. In the first place, in such elections, party members could also contest as independent candidates, and being elected, could reaffirm their party affiliation. Moreover, even the candidates without party backgrounds could not avoid forming a party once they were in the assembly. Those legislators who were absorbed in the cabinets or were rewarded through other means, constituted the treasury benches while the left-overs could form the opposition. According to Herbert Feldman, Ayub’s 1962 assembly, elected on a non-party basis, got divided in its very first session. Almost the same happened with Zia’s 1985 assembly. Given these experiences, the establishment was compelled to have a party of its own.

Pakistan has had at least four types of political parties. First of all, there have been parties functioning on a regional basis, aspiring to provincial autonomy. The Awami League, the National Awami Party, the National Democratic Party, the Pakistan National Party, the Jamhoori Watan Party and the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement are some of their examples.

Secondly, there have been religio-political parties like the Jamat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan etc, having their roots in the most conservative stratum of society.

Then there have been populist parties like the PPP and the Awami League. All these parties were formed independently without the involvement of the establishment even though some of them, at one stage or another, were co-opted into power for some time. By and large, these parties are not trusted.

The fourth type of parties comprise those created by the establishment itself. The Republican Party, established in 1955, is one such example. The Convention Muslim League of Ayub Khan, the Muslim Leagues of Muhammad Khan Junejo, Nawaz Sharif and the one in office at present are the other examples. Under Nawaz Sharif, the Muslim League had emerged stronger enough to claim an independent status. He was not only removed from office but his party was also broken into two parts. One part survives as the PML(N) while the other was designated as PML(Q), which, after merging with other league groups of Hamid Nasir Chattha, Ijazul Haq, Manzoor Wattoo and Pir Pagara was recognized by the Election Commission of Pakistan as the PML. Pir Pagara, afterwards, dissociated from the PML on the issue of the nomination of its office bearers in Sindh.

It is hard to trace the lineage of today’s PML with the Muslim League the Quaid-i-Azam had left. The initial splits in the ML took place soon after independence, but a mainstream ML remained on the scene till the 1958 martial law, which banned all political parties and disqualified a number of politicians including some of the major League leaders like Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Sardar Shaukat Hayat. In 1962, when the ban on political parties was lifted, a section of the Muslim League named as the Convention Muslim League was organized to be led by Ayub Khan. The Leaguers who opposed Ayub Khan, restored the League through its council and their group came to be known as the Council Muslim League. Thereafter, so many splits within the league groups have taken place and different groups have also merged with each other so many times that today it is difficult to identify the PML as a permanent party with a continuous existence. It is now more of a nomenclature, which is attributed to a constellation of individuals, all claiming to be Leaguers with most of them ready to work with, or, for the establishment.

So, what is it that compels the establishment to prefer the Muslim League to other parties?

The first aspect is its nomenclature. As the Muslim League was the founder party of the country, its name carries respect that is employed to attract allegiance of the people in the name of patriotism. Secondly, the perceptions that the state has been fostering all along in the domains of economy, foreign policy, national security etc have found their best adherents and advocates in the Muslim League.

How, then, can one define the Muslim League and how is it different from other political parties?

Though a parliamentary form of government has never been adopted in the country in the true sense, the elections to successive assemblies had to be held on the basis of territorial constituencies. In a society which is segmented by class, ethnicity, clan and biradaries differences, with the material basis of national unity quite weak and the political process being stopped every now and then, it is inevitable that the localized elite exercise substantial power in their respective areas and regions. The landlords, the tribal elders, and the urban elite and the nouveau riche have commanded significant influence in their respective domains. At the time of elections, they aspire to hop onto the bandwagon leading to the power corridors. At times, they also join the populist parties when they receive the vibes that they would get into power. More often, particularly when the populist parties are marginalized, they prefer the Muslim League. A better way to do this is to have separate factions, which can benefit more when persuaded to merge into a larger League and while claiming government posts. However, what the League actually gets is at best the proximity to power and not the power itself. But the proximity itself is not less beneficial as it entitles its members to receive official patronage.

In courting the Muslim League, the establishment has its own considerations. Among the entire constellation of loyal Leaguers only the most pliable are considered for the slot of prime minister. But herein lies the actual paradox. While the prime minister is chosen on the strength of his weaknesses, he is expected to deliver as much as the establishment wants. Prime ministers generally fail to deliver and hence are shown the door. If a prime minister starts to deliver, he also becomes powerful or assumes himself to have attained power. This, too, provides reason for his expulsion. This is what happened with Junejo and Nawaz Sharif.

If the prime minister remains weak and does not deliver, he is condemned as a failure and is given the boot. This was the case with Nazimuddin and more recently, Zafarullah Jamali. So, what does the future hold for Muslim League premiers?

If the essential contradiction of the system remains as such with the establishment dominating the state and the genuine political and democratic process still prevented, the game of the musical chairs will continue. There are, for certain, Muslim Leaguers who honestly believe that by joining the system they will transform it and would be able to restore democracy. But it should not be forgotten that this has been done time and again without yielding a sustainable democracy in the country.

A good way will be to refer back to the views and the vision of the Quaid-i-Azam, who had categorically rejected the involvement of extra-political forces in politics. The correction of the situation as it stands today also lies in the very fact as to how politics and state craft in Pakistan can be brought to represent the will of its people rather than the dictates of the powers that be.

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