Any outbreak of violence in Afghanistan will be very difficult to bring under control as sections of the population feel alienated from the existing system of governance
IT became evident during the visit to Afghanistan that the Pushtoons, who are in majority, were not adequately included in the governance, which is dominated by the Northern Alliance and non-Taliban elements, barring a few Pushtoons who are in the Cabinet. But the Karzai government insists that it is trying to build an Afghan nation state, and ethnicity is not the guiding principle. His spokesman, Jawed Ludin, also emphasized this theme during a briefing at Gulkhana Palace where the former king, and now father of the nation, Zahir Shah, lives.
But the Americans seem to be inclined to rely mainly on the Northern Alliance, which played a significant role in routing the Taliban. They now form the bulk of the Afghan National Army, which would replace the international security force. The country’s defence apparatus is under the control of the Northern Alliance’s Tajik commander, Gen Fahim.
In the given situation any outbreak of violence in Afghanistan will be very difficult to bring under control, as despite disarmament and demobilization programme, there is a considerable stockpile of modern weapons still in possession of the militias and warlords. It will be a tricky situation as according to reports sections of the population feel alienated from the existing system of governance and rival warlords and groups easily and quickly become polarized. Due to overwhelming tribal character of the society, loyalty of the fighting force to their commanders plays a significant role.
The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme of Afghanistan’s militia forces will be completed by June 2005. But this programme is not applicable to Taliban militia, said the deputy commander of the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan, Maj-Gen Wolfgang H. Korte, while briefing us.
The first phase will demobilize 11 divisions, 13 brigades, 10 regiments and two battalions of the Afghan Militia Force by the end of June this year. Together with additional units that will be partially disarmed, the first phase will complete approximately 40 per cent (i.e. 40,000 AMF) reduction in the total militia force in Afghanistan. The second phase will demobilize an additional 20,000 troops, or 33 per cent of the remaining militia force by the end of September 2004. The third phase will demobilize the remaining 40,000 Afghan Militia Force troops by June 2005. The governments of Afghanistan, Japan and the United States, in addition to the UN Assistance Mission, made the DDR agreement. The reintegration of former combatants into Afghan civilian life is a vital part of the DDR agreement. Former soldiers whose livelihoods depended on their militias have been promised that they will be provided economic alternatives shortly after their demobilization. Units demobilized in the first phase will be provided reintegration opportunities to Afghan civilian life by the end of this month. Soldiers whose units are not entirely demobilized until the second phase will be offered reintegration opportunities immediately upon the elimination of their unit. But there was some kind of resistance to the DDR process from Afghan warlords. “Nobody wants to give up his units,” said the ISAF’s deputy commander.
To achieve the objective of bringing as many people “on board”, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have been formed that are joint civil military units deployed throughout Afghanistan. Their goal is to strengthen the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government in outlying regions through improved security and the facilitation of reconstruction and development efforts.
PRTs include continued coalition combat operations, expansion of NATO/ISAF, progress on the UN-led Bonn process, an accelerated USAID assistance programme, training and deployment of the Afghan National Army and police units, and diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours, particularly Pakistan. The first PRT was created in Gardez in December, 2002. A PRT typically consists of 70-80 personnel, including a force protection element, civil affairs teams and civilian representatives from the Afghan Ministry of Interior, US Department of State, USAID, and the US Department of Agriculture.
Its aim is to provide security support for the Bonn process activities such as the Loya Jirga, voters’ registration and the DDR programme. It will also assist in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan National Army and police units located in the provinces. The PRTs, in essence, are the platforms for inducing the Afghans who have been in the past made to switch sides on the promise of fundings.
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is coordinating a multitude of post-war reconstruction projects, ranging from capacity building to enhancing the operation of Afghanistan’s Central Bank and from the introduction of measles immunization projects in the countryside and cities to the imparting of English education. Similarly, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has pledged $500 million over two-and-a-half years for farms, power generation, roads and schools. This money will provide a crucial facelift to an almost non-existent infrastructure base, officials claimed. But some analysts were of the view that the “pledge of $15 billion investment over a 10-15 period would return Afghanistan only to where it was before the Russian invasion 23 years ago”.
In essence Afghan reconstruction heavily depends on massive external input in terms of funding and sustainable development. But political stability is the key to any substantial reconstruction initiative.
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On the third day, we visited Camp Julian in the outskirts of Kabul where the Canadian peacekeepers, mostly drawn from Quebec, impressed us. They have provided a welfare state’s facilities to their members and have taken special care that homesickness does not overtake them. From there we could see the former Afghan king’s ruined palace and a Russian outpost on high ground. As we drove to that strategically located Russian post in armoured vehicles, wearing bulletproof jackets, we could see the upcoming permanent quarters being built for the Afghan National Army. Outside the camp we saw damaged Soviet aircraft and military vehicles all around.
ISAF was engaged in an initiative to move all the heavy weapons out of Kabul in accordance with the Bonn Agreement and Petersburg Declaration. But the high point of our visit was our stay at Bagram Air Base located in the Parvan province, approximately 11 kilometres (7 miles) southeast of the city of Charikar and 47 kilometres (27 miles) north of Kabul. The airfield is served by a 10,000-foot runway built in 1976 and capable of serving large cargo and bomber aircraft.
Bagram Air Base played a key role during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, serving as a base of operations for troops and supplies. Aircraft based at Bagram provided close air support for Soviet and Afghan troops in the field. Americans are using the facility to extend their reach of lethal military power and heliborne capability to the far-flung areas, specially in South and South East of the country as well as in the North and North-east. Bagram also witnessed some tough battles between Taliban and Northern Alliance forces for control of the strategic facility.
American C-17 transport aircraft were arriving every few hours, and as many as 50 helicopters, including CH-47 Chinooks, AH-64 Apaches, AH-1 Cobras and UH-60 Black Hawks were visible on the taxiways. Bagram Air Base has three large hangars, a control tower and numerous support buildings. We were also shown the A/OA-10 Thunderbolt II survivable twin-engine jet aircraft, specially designed for close air support of ground forces. It has been used in Iraq and elsewhere.
As our heavily loaded programme kept on changing, we could not see some important areas and meet the common Afghan to find out what he had to say about the American presence and the human rights’ abuses. The extraordinarily courteous media managers headed by the Hawaii-based Major Stacy Bathrick skillfully manipulated our schedule so that my colleagues did not have the time to probe about Taliban prisoners and the treatment meted out to them at home.
As our schedule kept on changing due to logistical or security considerations, we could not visit the Jabal-i-Siraj Bridge and other facilities, nor could we lunch with Governor Zawar. According to a travel advisory issued by the 211th mobile Public Affairs detachment at Bagram, we were supposed to arrive at Gardez on April 21 to become “embedded media” with a unit within the 25th Infantry Division, in connection with the DOD activities. We were supposed to return back to Bagram the following day. But in the morning, we were informed that a short trip to Ghazni had been planned instead. Perhaps the plan of making us an “embedded media team” could not materialize because of paucity of time and more so due to security situation in an area much nearer to Pakistan’s western border. I got the feeling that the Americans were engaged in some operation in that area, that is why they decided to take us to Ghazni for a ride in CH-47 Chinooks, escorted by Cobras and Black Hawk helicopters. Back home, when I read a report that the Americans had built another airstrip nearer to the Pakistan border area where C-130s could land, I became more convinced about my premise.
We had a chance to fly to Ghazni, but could not visit the town or meet the people to make our own assessment. We flew for one hour 30 minutes to reach Ghazni, but stayed on the ground for little over half-an-hour, though according to our schedule we were supposed to be on the ground for four hours to visit the Ghazni PRT.
We had no chance to verify the allegations levelled by Maj Ford at Ghazni base that Taliban used a former Madressah building, now housing coalition troops, to torture and execute opponents. He could not substantiate his statement attributed to local Afghans, and replied in the negative when asked whether his men there found any corpses. Perhaps Maj Ford was too motivated to believe in what he liked to be true. He was more interested in teaching us how to eat from the emergency kit of foodstuff than to take us to the town because a visit to the city of Ghazni would have cleared the mist. But as we hardly had a chance to see from a distance a few trucks moving on the newly built strategic ring road that links Kabul with Kandahar and beyond, we were told to return to the helicopters. When we boarded the helicopter, we noticed some special services men already seated. Perhaps returning to Bagram after a mission in the vicinity. The Americans are not taking chances even on the fringe of Bagram where they have effective control and are trying to remove an unspecified number of mines buried by the combatants over decades of conflict. This was evident when we were escorted by armoured vehicle to a newly built girls school in the outskirts of Charikar. We were taken there a day before its formal opening so there were no students or teachers present. Children from the nearby villages were excited by our presence in bullet-proof jackets. But some of the old men were very sober. One of my colleague who is Pushto-speaking was asked by an elderly man as to why we were with the Americans and stressed that we should not be with them.
As the Americans were worried about their own security not very far from the base, how will they infuse confidence among the locals and provide security to the girls flocking to the school in a isolated place, which the Americans are hoping will change attitudes in the years ahead? I believe that the Afghans should be left alone to develop their own political dispensation based on their religo-cultural ethos rather than forcing them to adopt the western political system which is not suited to that environment as yet. The sooner they leave that country the better, as it will help build a more enduring relationship based on mutual trust, perhaps.
