April 4, 2004

‘For over two decades, the locals were sermonized and rewarded to help and shelter the foreign elements. Now they are being asked to do just the opposite. It will naturally take time,’ argues Azam Khan, the Political Agent of South Waziristan

SITTING under an old chinar tree in the lush-green lawns of the British-built residence of the political agent, one really wonders how would A.J. Grant, the first British political agent in South Waziristan, have felt. How would it have been back then in 1895? The place is as distant and forlorn, godforsaken as it was then, save for the sprawling camp that now surrounds the residence and the electricity that lights up the area at night surrounded by a vast expanse of darkness and the ominous-looking silhouette of mountains.

It was here in South Waziristan where the British faced some of the stiffest resistance, losing two political agents, one who couldn’t live with the humiliation of having been kidnapped and committed suicide, and one who was killed because he would stretch his legs towards the Ka’aba.

Muhammad Azam Khan is the 68th Political Agent of South Waziristan, and is in office since July, 2003. He is outspoken and an unconventional officer, so to speak — a trait that has won him both friends and foes. If one is to go by the number of death threats he has received, one would tend to think that South Waziristan has not changed. The rigours of over one hundred years has not brought any change in the religious perceptions of the people he is now administering.

He figured prominently in the operation in South Waziristan, and answered a few questions put to him by Dawn Magazine. The following are the excerpts:

Q. What specific objectives did the government achieve from the Wana operation?

A. Apart from some foreign elements killed in the operation, the main achievement perhaps has been that these elements have been weeded out from an area which they used as a base for quite a few years. They were well entrenched there, so much so that even the locals had stared fearing them. But all this is at the tactical level. As for the advantage gained at the strategic level for the government, perhaps it would be more appropriate for Islamabad to comment on that.

Q. Was there any ‘high value’ target in Wana? A. The level of resistance encountered in the operation on March 16, and the involvement of the bulletproof vehicle that escaped from the scene on deflated tyres gave rise to this perception. Subsequent info-inputs from various sources reinforced the hype so generated.

Q. Why didn’t the political administration put a hand on tribesmen harbouring Al Qaeda elements earlier?

A. The political process is a slow process, but a sure one. One has to be patient with the results unlike quick-fix solutions expected from military operations. The political system is designed in a way that the threat of use of force is more important than the actual use of force. However, the threat has to be backed up with a credible force and a perception that the will to use this force is also there. It has been slightly more than seven months since this administration took over. Once we got our bearings right, we identified the number of groups operating here along with their local harbourers.

We went for the local harbourers first, the reason being that the foreign elements could not survive without the tangible support of the local harbourers. It was like drying the swamps to ensure that those thriving in swampy waters would no longer find ready and easy abodes.

In the process, the tribes handed over nearly 60 per cent of the local harbourers. This was not as easy at it sounds. We had to work on the tribal elders, the clergy, and all this to evict people who had been part of the game for the past nearly two decades.

Q. There have been several operations in South Waziristan in the last nine months or so. The army and paramilitary forces have suffered more casualties than suspected militants put together. What does it tell you?

A. If at all true, perhaps these elements have more experience in this sort of warfare. But being a civil officer, I don’t think I am really technically competent to comment on this.

Q. Where is the problem? Is it an intelligence failure? Or was the strength and level of training of the militants under-estimated?

A. It’s not an ordinary run-of-the-mill battle. The enemy is not visible most of the time. There are many dimensions to the issue, a lot of grey areas. Some of these elements were cultivated both by the government and the clergy to fight the previous Afghan war. For 20-24 years the locals were requested, pressured, cajoled, rewarded, sermonized to help, aid and shelter these people. A whole generation has grown up since then. It’s not a uni-dimensional problem for me to give you a one-liner as a solution.

Q. How much planning went into the operation? How much intelligence was there and what was the initial input? A. The information was obviously about the presence of a number of terrorists in a certain compound. The operation was planned accordingly. As to the operational details, it’s the domain of the scouts commandant.

Q. Were you surprised by the tenacity of resistance on offer?

A. We were expecting resistance and ambushes, but frankly speaking their ferocity surprised me. We knew we were touching a beehive, but we never knew the queen bee would mind it so much. Maybe the forces touched them where it really hurt.

Q. What lessons have we learnt from the operation?

A. It is for the military planners to analyze the various operations so far, to rectify mistakes and to learn from them. It’s a new kind of war, and one learns as one goes along. But as a layman I would say that in all such operations, air cover is a huge advantage.

Q. There is a perception that the Wana operation was aimed at deflecting the international community’s increasing pressure on Pakistan regarding Dr A.Q. Khan. What do you think?

A. This question is way beyond me. If Dr Khan was in South Waziristan, perhaps I would have had something to say. But the fact remains that this operation was executed on its own merits, and had nothing to do with any outside factors.

Q. Amongst those who have been arrested, how many are locals?

A. Offhand I do not have the exact figures, but quite a few of them are foreigners.

Q. President Pervez Musharraf had announced clemency for foreign militants. Why do you think the militants have not accepted the offer?

A. Three answers come readily to mind. One, that they do not trust that the government would keep its word. Two, they do not want to be out of circulation for any amount of time. Perhaps they think they have a rendezvous with destiny and do not want to miss it under any circumstances. Three, their madness has no method to it.

Q. How do you think you can gain the trust of the militants?

A. I admit it is rather difficult to gain their trust in the prevalent scenario, but circumstances can be so engineered to leave them with no option but to trust us.

Q. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been saying that Pakistan has not done enough. Do you think the operation would help control attacks on the US forces in Afghan areas close to South Waziristan?

A. It would not be appropriate for a political agent to comment on what the president of an independent country has said. But the fact remains that since we started with the political process and took along a major portion of the tribal people with us, attacks on US forces in the area you mentioned have been reduced to a considerable extent. It is far easier for such elements to operate from inside Afghanistan, where the government seems restricted to the capital, and the forces to their bases. Here, we have a time-tested administrative system with its paraphernalia of collective and territorial responsibilities, etc.

Q. Foreign militants appear to have strong support among conservative tribesmen. What do you think are the reasons for this?

A. This is not an overnight problem. Over the last more than two decades, the locals have developed social, economic and religious relations with the foreign elements, as they were encouraged to do by the governments of the time. Now one fine morning, another foreigner launches itself into Afghanistan to fight the war on terror. The situation has changed. It will naturally take time to convince the tribes through the political process by weaning them away from foreign militants, by getting the sanction of the local clergy to encourage them to go after the wanted people. I think we are winning this battle. Support for the militants is on the decline. It will require a combination of economic, social and moral pressure to turn the tables on the militants. It is a slow process and may take a couple of years.

Q. Wana tribesmen blame the administration for not laying hands on the five most wanted locals who are accused of harbouring foreign militants. What do you say?

A. In the tribal areas, it is an indirect form of administration and that is why the concept of collective responsibility is there, particularly in South Waziristan where there is no levy force. It is all about one man being responsible for the whole tribe, and the whole tribe responsible for the action of their own clansmen.

The administration does not go after individual criminals. It contacts the tribe and somehow brings them around to go after the criminal and hand him over. It is my conviction that if the political process is allowed, those who are still at large would also be apprehended.

Q. In view of the resistance offered by a sub-clan of the Zalikhel tribe, do you think the political system has failed, and that the government needs to seriously look at the whole administrative system?

A. The political system revolves around the maliki system. The efficiency of this system depends upon the individual competence of the officer who is the political agent. In broader terms, the system is strong if the institution of maliks is strong and effective. Previously, maliks used to be genuine representatives of their respective tribes, and that helped. With the passage of time and due to various factors, the centre of power has undergone a re-alignment. In most cases, if the government holds a dialogue with the maliks, they fail to respond because of lack of an inherent capacity to respond. The system works, but it needs to be adapted to the needs of the 21st century.

Q. Why did the government choose to use military force when it could have achieved used the traditional means of working through the political institution?

A. I have been here for nine months and all this while we have been endeavouring to encourage tribal elders to play their role to avoid bloodshed and resolve the issue of foreign militants and their local harbourers through dialogue. There has been several jirgas and the tribes even agreed to raise lashkars to get those wanted by us. It would have been a different situation if we had to deal only with the tribes. But the presence of foreign militants here has dynamics of its own.

These foreign militants have been living in this part of the region for years and are, therefore, so well entrenched that it is like the tail wagging the dog. The concept of panah (shelter) has its own meaning in a tribal setup. The foreign militants seemed to have taken over their hosts psychologically, and it became necessary to use force.

Q. What are the post-operation plans?

A. In the long run, the area needs a lot of patience, a lot of development work, and a lot of reforms.

Q. With all your background of dealing with the tribes, what in your view is the right way of going about this business of reforms?

A. For any system to be effective, it should not be an imported one. Unlike the reforms in settled areas, reforms in the tribal areas should be gradual and in a direction which builds upon the strength of the existing system and does away with its weaknesses.

To be specific, we need reforms which give a system of check and balance on the powers of the political agent without weakening the writ of the state. Certain provisions of the Frontier Crimes Regulations need to be made appealable to a special bench of the superior judiciary constituted especially for the tribal areas.

We have seen court cases, specially civil ones in the districts, take an awful amount of time which borders on the scandalous. Jirgas in the tribal areas are far more effective and cheaper in the delivery of justice, but to improve the quality of justice, we may have an elected judicial council on a two-year term. Political agents should be bound to nominate jirga members from this council and the decisions of the jirga should be appealable in superior courts. This is a kind of jury system that you have in the US. This would help eliminate corrupt and inefficient elements gradually through a democratic process.

At present, development and distribution of funds is wholly at the disposal and discretion of the political agent with no checks on his arbitrary powers. We may have an elected development council on a tribal basis, unlike the geographic basis in the settled districts, on a two-year term to identify and monitor the execution of developmental schemes in the territorial jurisdiction of the respective tribes. However, the distribution of funds amongst tribes should be left with the political agent to ensure that tribes receive funds in direct proportion to the level of cooperation with the government. Once funds are allocated to a particular tribe, it would be the discretion of the development council to decide on how best to spend the amount.

Q. Where are Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri? The Western media says they are hiding in your part of the backyard?

A. I really have no idea where they are. I have not seen any intelligence which can corroborate the claim of the Western media.

Q. One last question. There is a perception that the operation in Kaloosha failed to achieve its objectives. History shows that when such things happen, those at the helm invariably look for scapegoats. Do you fear such consequences?

A. I don’t know what to say. One thing that we have learnt from history is that we never learn from history. I did not go for the typical bureaucratic approach of sweeping the dirt under the rug. If our men can die in open combat in the national interest, becoming a scapegoat is too small a sacrifice to pay.

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