March 28, 2004

‘The non-Nato status does offer access to military equipment, but there is not a lot that is available now with what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a goodwill gesture devoid of much substance,’ stresses former US diplomat Dennis Kux

THE granting of non-Nato status to Pakistan is a goodwill gesture with little substance, says Dennis Kux, a senior US scholar and expert on Pakistan. Mr Kux, who is a former US diplomat and the author of the widely respected book on Pakistan-US relations, Disenchanted Allies, believes that being a major non-Nato ally does not even fulfil “the old Pakistan desire for security guarantee against India”.

In an interview with Dawn Magazine in Washington, Mr Kux kept referring to the US State Department’s own assessment of the deal which ties the US gesture to Pakistan’s efforts to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in the tribal area.

Since the US Secretary of State, Mr Colin Powell, announced the offer in Islamabad, the State Department has issued several statements explaining that the move “underscores Pakistan’s role in the war against terror”.

The following are excerpts from the interviewer with Mr Kux:

Q. What does the granting of a Major Non-Nato Ally mean for Pakistan?

A. It is largely symbolic. I don’t believe it is going to have a lot of practical value in terms of opening up the US arsenal to Pakistan and its military hardware. It was a goodwill gesture to pat Pakistan on the back for the help it is giving against Al Qaeda at a time when there was heavy fighting in the tribal area.

Q. Does it mean that the decision was taken after Pakistan launched the operation in South Waziristan?

A. No. This apparently was something that has been discussed for sometime internally in Washington, and the Bush administration decided that Mr Powell’s visit was a good time to announce it.

Q. So it was a well-thought-out move?

A. But the symbolism is larger than the reality. This may not have that much tangible and practical significance.

Q. Let me ask something that many in Pakistan want to know. Will the new status bring the disputed F-16 aircraft for Pakistan?

A. It makes it easier for Pakistan to get hold of excess military equipment. This is the equipment that is so designated, and there is not a lot that is available now with what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan and the demand on US forces. I still see it as a goodwill gesture devoid of much substance.

What frankly is surprising is Mr Powell’s failure to inform the Indians beforehand. This has now become a major issue, the Indians are saying how come we were not informed, particularly when Mr Powell was already there and he spoke with the Indian foreign minister over the weekend (a day before announcing the offer). The Indians are upset also because the US administration has good relations with both India and Pakistan. It was a diplomatic blunder, surprising because the secretary is a very nimble diplomat.

Q. But will it bring the F-16s?

A. I don’t think it has any impact on the F-16s. It’s simple. You consider your automobile no longer usable, so you go to the head of the line to get what is available. What is available, I don’t know.

Q. And why were the Indians not informed beforehand?

A. There are two interpretations: Don’t give India the time to veto it; and, I think, the more likely one is that they just forgot. Mr Powell had just been there. He had a very good visit to India. They (the US administration) may only have decided (to announce) this at the last minute, not when Mr Powell was in India but when he was on his way to Pakistan.

Q. But more than once the Bush administration has assured India that there is no need for it to be upset. The United States, the administration says, already has a strategic partnership with India.

A. I don’t think that is an adequate answer, from the Indian standpoint. You would say, what the hell is going on. The golden rule is, no surprises if you have a strategic agreement. This is not a good response, frankly. They (the Americans) got caught in a situation they messed up. I don’t think it was this reason. There is no reason not to inform the Indians if you have a strategic relationship with them.

Q. Did the fighting in South Waziristan influence the decision to announce it during Mr Powell’s visit?

A. May be. You see, how these things are done. Mr Powell himself said this has been thought for a while. So this has been in the mill for a while, and does require a presidential endorsement. From that stand point it has created in India a problem for the United States. We will see what happens in Pakistan. It may also create great expectations in Pakistan and then it may also create problems there.

Q. Why would the decision create problems in Pakistan?

A. When the expectations are not fulfilled and people are disappointed, it will create problems unless it is something they mean to be major, and I don’t think they do.

Q. The US decision to declare Pakistan a major ally should create a security blanket for Pakistan, signalling India to leave it alone to focus on the western border with Afghanistan. So in that sense it does answer Pakistan’s security concerns, does it not?

A. No. It does not fulfil the old Pakistan desire for security guarantee against India. This is not what it is. It is easier excess to equipment. It is a gesture.

Q. Even if it is only for excess equipment, Pakistan can still benefit from it. After all there must be a lot of surplus equipment at the bases in Pakistan that the United States has used for operations in Afghanistan.

A. Yes. It is possible that some equipment they have been using in Pakistan — they do sometimes declare them surplus — may be given to Pakistan.

Q. But US relations with Pakistan are more than symbolic. After all, the Bush administration has often acknowledged Pakistan’s role in the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, emphasizing that Pakistan helped catch 500 Al Qaeda operatives.

A. That’s the party line. This is the way for the US administration to do something nice. They were trying to do something nice. They would not have done it otherwise.

Q. What impact will the nuclear dispute have on US-Pakistan relations?

A. This Bush administration seems to be satisfied with Pakistan’s handling of the nuclear issue. Or is it ignoring it? No, not as I read this. I think they are placing a high priority on Afghanistan and Al Qaeda than the nuclear issue. They are concerned about rolling up the network and feel they need Pakistan’s cooperation. They have accepted not having access to Dr A.Q. Khan.

Q. So you believe the United States has no access to Dr Khan?

A. I would be surprised if we did have access that he (Mr Powell) would deny it. He was pinned down on it by the press. It is possible this will become an election issue here. Because people might question whether Dr Khan’s version should be accepted.

Q. And if it becomes an election issue, what does it mean for Pakistan?

A. It could create an awkward situation for Pakistan. US-Pakistan relations have only partly coincided and where we got into trouble is in situations like that, i.e. the nuclear dispute. And I think on this nuclear issue we may well get into trouble. The Americans, the French and the Japanese, all want to stop proliferation.

If the Bush administration does not do all it could do, it will be in trouble too. And this does not necessarily mean hitting Pakistan on the head. It means working out some arrangement with the Pakistanis to prevent further proliferation, because what has happened is, my God!, far more than what Saddam Hussein did.

This is where you get into problem again; in the 1980s with Afghanistan we had conflicting interests on the nuclear issue, and parallel interests on jihad. We put jihad first. After Afghanistan, the nuclear issue popped up. And this could happen again.

In private, it should have been heart-to-heart with Pakistan and it is not clear from what Mr Powell said that it has actually happened. But it has happened on the Afghan issue. Both Afghan and the nuclear issues are important for the United States, and you run into problem when you do not level with each other, and I think both sides are guilty on this count.

Q. So you think the Americans did have a heart-to-heart talk with Pakistan on the Afghan issue?

A. That is what the action in FATA shows. The Americans believe that Pakistan has not been doing enough to control the Taliban and you had even on Sunday something on the Internet, quoting the US ambassador in Kabul that some Taliban elements are still active in Pakistan.

Pakistan would not have sent the troops and stirred the hornets’ nest in the tribal area if we had not been leaning on Pakistan. Otherwise no government could be happy doing that. It is a complicated relationship.

Q. Where do the US-Pakistan relations go from here?

A. We can work out a long-term relationship which is in US interest and which is in Pakistan’s interest as well. But you can only do this by levelling with each other. Not by sweeping up the nuclear issue under the carpet, and not by praising President Musharraf on the madressaah issue because on the ground, not much is happening.

Q. You mean, Pakistan is still not doing enough to fight terrorism and reform the madressaahs?

A. Pakistan has to understand that it is not doing the United States a favour in tackling Al Qaeda. If Pakistan does not think it is in its own interest to do so, we are kidding each other.

Q. Do you see the United States asking Pakistan to give up or cap its nuclear programme at a later stage?

A. Pakistan, first of all, should be asked to really put the clamp on leakage, because what happened, confirmed everybody’s fears. If you are an American, can you rely on what information you are getting from Pakistan? I don’t think so.

Q. But will it be right to ask Pakistan to allow access to its nuclear weapons?

A. No one is going to allow anybody access to nuclear weapons. I don’t think anybody has seriously talked about that or about signing the NPT. But tightening the nuclear regime and preventing clandestine activities, yes. And then India and Pakistan should be doing something together, such as talking to each other. If you do not, you are inevitably going to have a nuclear arms race, and this will just ratchet things up. And that does not seem to be in anyone’s interest. It’s a complicated problem, admittedly not easy to deal with, but it’s an important one.

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