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The Magazine

December 14, 2003




Pakistan does not matter



By Shamim-ur-Rahman


‘With the exception of a few, Pakistan does not really matter to us. It is a distant neighbour. We are more concerned with India which is a bigger neighbour. Pakistan is not a factor in our policies; India is,’ says Bangladesh’s Enayetullah Khan

RENOWNED Bangladeshi political figure and journalist Enayetullah Khan, who is editor of the famous Holiday weekly, says General Pervez Musharraf’s admission of 1971 atrocities in the erstwhile East Pakistan, during his recent visit to that country, has helped in healing some historical scars.

Mr Khan, who was talking to the Dawn Magazine recently in Dhaka, maintains that soon after the independence of Bangladesh, “we were so busy with ourselves that Pakistan became a forgotten country, except the emotional aspect of it ... with the exception of a few, Pakistan does not really matter. It is a distant neighbour. We are more concerned with India.”

The following are the excerpts from the interview:

Q. You were in the thick of things in those troubled times. How do you look at those events now?

A. In 1971, on March 14, I had returned from Karachi where I had personally witnessed the tension and the mood prevailing at the time. I felt the West Pakistanis had only two options; either to leave Bangladesh because the entire people had turned against them and they could not find a collaborator to unsettle the movement, as was done by Ayub, or to go for mass terrorism. They opted for the latter, and tried to muzzle the voice of the people through genocide. But that actually hastened things.

Although on the Left, and in the Awami League, there were strong pro-independence lobbies, but Sheikh Mujeebur Rahman, I think, had kept his options open till then. I saw no reason for him to surrender, leaving the entire people at the mercy of the rulers.

While India played its cards well, and the Bengali movement did make use of the Indian support, soon after independence, the internal force in the form of guerrillas and military commanders shrugged off the Indian domination.

Q. On March 7, 1971, when Sheikh Mujeeb was to deliver a speech at the Paltan maidan, people in West Pakistan feared the worst. What was it like in Dhaka at the time?

A. Actually, he made a very clever and politically ingenuous statement. He did talk of independence when he said, ‘... this struggle is the struggle for freedom, for independence...’ But he also said, “Joye Bangla, Joye Punjab, Joye Pakistan”. So he was clearly keeping his options open. And I don’t blame him because he was a constitutional leader and a constitutional leader does make compromises. He wanted to become the prime minister, and should have been. I think Bhutto was the key figure in all this. In the tussle he perhaps saw the end of his two major rivals, Sheikh Mujeeb and the Pakistan Army.

Q. On a wider plank, what was the root cause behind the whole movement?

A. The economic disparity was one of the causes. But at a later stage when Ayub Khan was tottering, he made a lot of concessions to the Eastern wing. I think Yahya Khan is the most misunderstood person. He was the only one who had even called Sheikh Mujeeb the prime minister of Pakistan. And then he went to Larkana where all the hawks had assembled, and he had to retract from his earlier statement. Bhutto had been cultivating the military when he was just a minister.

Secondly, I think the entire union was too absurd. Culturally we could have made adjustments, but it was not possible to stay together. Pakistan became an Islamic state later. In 1971 it was not an Islamic state. It was a secular state. It was a non-Islamic state. So all these things, and the glorious part the people had played in 1971, contributed to the situation.

I think principally Pakistan’s bourgeoisie, military bureaucratic elite did not want to transfer assets to Bangladesh. That was the crux of the problem. Yahya had virtually agreed in January, when he was going to China and while going to Dhaka from Karachi, saying he was going to see the future prime minister. He virtually agreed to everything, excepting currency, flag and foreign policy. But I think the army and Bhutto, who knew that he could never become prime minister if Sheikh Mujeeb was there, played his cards.

Q. How deep was the Indian involvement in the initial stage?

A. The Indian involvement was there, but it transcends beyond the Indian involvement. Lots of people say that the CIA had killed Sheikh Mujeeb. At a certain point he was immensely unpopular. Nobody even shed a drop of tear when he was killed. Only the killing of his family created some of the middle class sensitivity. Even though I had very strong anti-Mujeeb and anti-Awami League sentiments, I was shocked to see the cruel jubilation among the people on his murder.

Q. Why do you think he could not deliver?

A. We must recognize the fact that Bangladesh was born during the height of the Cold War era, and the Soviet Union became the principal factor here. First India, then India-Soviet Union and then the Soviet Union alone. But I think Sheikh Mujeeb was an unwilling client and a prisoner of the situation, and I think the problems of post-71 period, arms and also the typical Awami League mentality of proprietorship of the struggle, and Sheikh Mujeeb’s own feeling of blankness in that period, put him in that situation.

Q. How do you compare the situation now when you compare it with that period?

A. There have been a lot of changes under Ziaur Rahman. He was very dynamic, practical, modern and pragmatic. So things started changing, but then he was also assassinated. Then came Ershad’s bloodless coup, but it was well arranged. He came announcing that he was going to stage a coup. It was announced before that the military must have a role.

When the election came, there was strong Awami League sentiment here which had nothing to do with Pakistan. It was a manifestation of the latent anti-India sentiments. In Pakistan, cultism can work, but it is something alien to Bangladesh because we have learnt to be egalitarian. Personality cult just does not work here.

Q. What is the acrimony like now towards Pakistan?

A. With the exception of a few groups, Pakistan does not really matter to us. It is a distant neighbour. We are more concerned with India which is a bigger neighbour. Except for the very old generation, there is no pro-Pakistan feeling, and, hence, there is no anti-Pakistan factor. In short, Pakistan is not a factor in our policies; India is.

Q. Not even in the context of regional security?

A. We have a certain level of cooperation with Pakistan on that count, but we have it with China as well.

Q. What about mutual cooperation?

A. General Pervez Musharraf’s admission of 1971 atrocities has helped. He said it twice during his last visit, at the talks as well as at the banquet. So that has really helped. At least he made no excuses. But our focus is on ties with India. If anything, I think we can have some level of economic relations. We were so busy with ourselves at the time of liberation that Pakistan became a forgotten country, except the emotional aspect of it, and it has remained that way ever since.

Q. There are a lot of problems between India and Bangladesh — over water linkages and allegations of terrorist training camps. What would you say on that?

A. These have been there for a long time. India has always been talking about it. I think that on water linking, they are trying to make it an internal issue. They say they are going to divert the surplus water in the north and the northeast to the deficit areas. That’s OK. They can do with their share, but they cannot do it with the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. They have still gone ahead with this and, naturally, we have protested.

In the last one year, India’s anti-Bangladesh stance has diluted a little. During the Iraq war, they were raising accusing fingers at you and us, saying it was time to take action. But at the end of the Iraq war, India’s polemics have come down.

Q. What conclusion would you like to draw from the 1971 events and what message you would like to give to the people of Pakistan?

A. I have been very pleased to hear that in Pakistan a number of people, including those in the assemblies, are now talking about their failure as a nation. I remember that in 1997 when one of our lady delegates to writers’ conference demanded public apology, several Pakistan delegates came up to her and apologized, saying they had little idea of what had actually happened, and now felt sorry about that. So that emotive aspect is gone. I think there should be more business-like relations.

Secondly, we all feel very bad about Pakistan’s plight with all kinds of violence, sectarian and otherwise, happening there. In the post-Afghanistan world, Pakistan has apparently come out very well and we hope things would continue like that. Also when Pakistan exploded the bomb, there was a certain sense of relief here in Bangladesh.

In Pakistan military remains a factor whether we like it or not. But I think Gen Musharraf has done pretty well. At least he gives Pakistan a more modern and more contemporary look than Ziaul Haq had done.

Q. On a parting note, what has happened to the Biharis living in the camps? Have they accepted the reality?

A. I think some of them, the younger ones, have accepted the reality and they are very useful to our society in terms of their economic input. Some of them have got their passports and they would rather like to be here rather than go away. I think the government should try to address this particular issue. If they want to remain here, they should be rehabilitated because life in the camps is pathetic.



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