Sea warfare in World War II between adversaries in Europe did not develop into a clash of battleships and battle cruisers, like the naval campaigns of WW-I.
Rather, naval confrontations in the early years of war were attacks on allied shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic Sea by German U-boats or surface raiders. The German strategy was to deny the British Isles the use of sea-lanes through which ran its vital supplies from USA, Canada and its colonies, which sustained the war effort. German ships were deployed to raid merchant ships in the Atlantic and the northern passages. The German pocket battleships, acting alone but supported by supply ships, were deployed in the far-flung waters on seek, hit and disappear missions. These pocket battleships would constantly shift their hunting grounds, and a large number of allied hunting groups were pinned down in tracing and facing them.
The battleships, Deutschland and Admiral Graf Spee, had been secretly sailed before the war began. The Deutschland operated in the North Atlantic. But she was soon recalled. Graf Spee would sink 50,000 tons of allied shipping before being hunted down in December 1939. The groups of eight disguised as merchant ships followed these pocket battleships in 1940, and together they sank 400,000 tons of shipping in different areas. They remained at large for months before being caught and sunk or recalled.
Admiral Graf Spee was a battleship of 16,000 tons displacement capable of doing 28 knots. She was built in 1933 and carried six 279-mm (11-in) main guns and eight 150 mm (6-in) secondary guns. She was fitted with surface radar — a novelty in those days and an operational superiority. With such firepower, she was a force to reckon with.
During the war, Captain Hans Langsdorff commanded Graf Spee. She operated in the southern Atlantic and Indian oceans, supported by her depot ship, the Almark, hidden away in the southern latitudes. During her raiding career, she sank nine merchant ships off the West African coast and two off the Argentinean coast.
Eight task forces were formed to hunt and destroy the Graf Spee. These hunting groups were composed of cruisers/battle cruisers mainly and also included two British aircraft carriers and one French carrier. The hunting groups were stationed along west African coast down to the Cape, and in West Indies and the Falklands. After forays in the Indian Ocean, Graf Spee headed for the eastern coast of South America in December 1939. Commodore H. Harwood in light cruiser Ajax and his squadron consisting of New-Zealand light cruiser Achilles, off Rio De Janeiro, heavy cruisers Exeter and Cumberland at the Falkland Islands patrolled the whole spread of South American Atlantic Coast.
On December 12, the Exeter and Achilles joined the Ajax. On the morning of December 13, Exeter spotted a battleship on the horizon. It was the Graf Spee, which was intercepted. An action was soon to develop with odds in favour of Graf Spee, whose armament could very well outdo the combined punch of the three cruisers.
Commodore Harwood divided the British Squadron into two formations. The two light cruisers, Ajax and Achilles, engaged the battleship from the east, and the Exeter took her on from the south. Langsdorff concentrated his 11-in armament on the Exeter and 6-in batteries on Ajax and Achilles. Aided by radar, he did a very accurate job of firing at Exeter, which was soon damaged and crippled within 40 minutes of action. With her fire control director damaged, bridge totally demolished and all officers as casualties except the Commanding Officer (Captain Bell), it left the scene with only one turret operating and its bow three feet deep in water. Graf Spee’s secondary armament aimed at the other two light cruisers was not that effective.
On the other hand, Ajax and Achilles were scoring hits on the battleship. The combined fire of both did considerable damage to Graf Spee. She had taken 15 direct hits. Her gullies and food stores were destroyed and her gunnery control tower had been damaged. Graf Spee suffered 37 killed and 50 injured, and headed for the neutral port of Montevideo (Uruguay) for repairs. Ajax, battered and much damaged by Graf Spee, shadowed the battleship as far as Uruguayan territorial limits when thereafter Graf Spee entered the port of Montevideo in the estuary of the River Plate.
After the arrival of the damaged Graf Spee, frantic diplomatic activities were set in motion to stop her leaving the harbour till a sizable allied forces could assemble at the estuary of the River Plate. The carriers Ark Royal and Renown were rushing towards the River Plate. False broadcasts and rumours of build up of allied naval forces were repeatedly being made and the world was constantly attuned towards the happenings in Montevideo. Sailing of merchant ships from Montevideo one after another at 24-hour intervals was being made to delay Graf Spee leaving the harbour, as each merchant vessel was entitled to gain a 24-hour lead time on the threatening warship under international law. This way, Graf Spee’s sailing was delayed for three days.
Langsdorff knew that he was squarely cornered inside the safety of the harbour, at the exit of which waited the mighty naval force to take his ship on. There was no choice left for Langsdorff but to surrender or to scuttle his ship. Hitler had already ordered Graf Spee to force its way out fighting with whatever resources the ship had been left with, this way at least taking some enemy ships down with her. On December 17, the Graf Spee sailed out of the harbour and after taking off the crew at the estuary of the river, the battleship was blown up. Three days after this, Langsdorff chose to shoot himself, perhaps under orders from the German High Command, which was very critical of him for not having gone down with his ship. Had he lived, he would have been a marked man to meet an ignominious end.
