AT the start of hostilities in 1914, Great Britain and Germany were the greatest naval powers of the time. While Great Britain had invested in 27 Dreadnoughts, ships that displaced 18,000 tons and capable of 21-knot speed, carrying ten 12-inch guns as main armament and protected by 13-inch armour belt, Germany had 18 comparable battleships.
Britain had Admiral Sir John Jellico as the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet while the German Naval Fleet, known as High Seas Fleet was commanded by Admiral Ingenhol.
For 21-months, the Grand Fleet adopted a strategy of distant blockade of German ports. This was aimed at bringing out and engaging the High Seas Fleet, away from the German coast and away from the German mines and submarines. On the other hand, Germany had laid down the doctrine that HSF was to wage a hit-and-run warfare until the Grand Fleet was so weakened that the High Seas Fleet could meet it on equal terms. These two, very cautious policies kept the fleets apart till May 1916, that is when the world witnessed Armageddon.
The two fleets developed off Jutland, a peninsula in the north of Germany finally ready to engage in a full-blooded battle. This was to be the greatest naval battle of the time. Admiral Mountbatten, in his foreword to Encyclopaedia of Sea Warfare, has recorded that 259 warships of both sides took part.
At the Battle of Jutland, Jellico’s battle fleet consisted of 24 Dreadnoughts. It was divided into three squadrons of battleships, one of battlecruisers and a flotilla of destroyers under four admirals (Burney, Jerram, Sturdee and Hood). Beatty’s squadron consisted of three battle cruiser groups one Dreadnought Squadron and three flotillas of destroyers under three admirals (de-Brock, Packenham and Evan-Thomas).
Sheer’s battle fleet of 21 battleships was divided into three squadrons of Dreadnoughts and pre-Dreadnoughts and four Torpedo boat flotillas under three admirals (Belnke, Schmidt, Mauve). Hipper’s scouting battlecruiser squadron consisted of five light cruisers and eleven cruisers and three torpedo boat flotillas led by his flagship, Lutzow.
At the end of the May 1916, the High Seas Fleet commander chose to show, off Norway. On May 31, after midnight, Hipper’s battlecruisers, lightcruisers and flotilla of destroyers sailed for sea. Admiral Scheer’s main force of battleships left Jade 50 miles astern of Hippers scouting group. Having intelligence reports of these movements, the British Admiralty had ordered Grand Fleet out to sea on midday of May 30. Jellicoe led his battleships to South from Scapa Flow, and Beatty sailed his battlecruiser squadrons from the Firth of Forth. On May 31, the admiralty made an error of telling Grand Fleet Commander that the High Seas Fleet was still at Jade. This made Beatty to change course to North to join with Jellicoe’s oncoming battleships, thus losing vital time to meet the German forces on the course they already were on. But a German battlecruiser, Elbing, of Hipper’s screen was sighted by chance, which confirmed the presence of HSF out at sea. Beatty quickly swung back to West at 22 knots. At 3.30pm, Beatty and Hipper were in contact. Beatty’s ships opened fire at 15,000 yards range and Hipper returned the compliment. Three British battlecruisers (out of eight under Beatty) were sunk, but Beatty continued battle, as did Hipper in spite of considerable damage to his forces.
At 16.38hrs, the scouting forces under Goodenough reported the sighting of HSF on a bearing SE, rushing North. This would bring this force face to face with Beatty’s, who was already engaging Hipper’s battlecruisers. Beatty was now to escape from Scheer’s mightier oncoming battleships, and also to trick this force into the maw of Jellicoe’s oncoming fleet. So, he reversed his course. But due to wrong signal hoisted by his flagship ordering the reversal of the course, his squadrons followed the original course and the 5th battle squadron under Evan-Thomas fell into the range of Sheer’s battleships and received severe battering. Beatty’s strategy at this point was to lure away and keep Hipper engaged so that he could remain out of Jellicoe’s course, and thus remain unable to report the details and position of Jellicoe to Scheer.
So Beatty left the scene, leaving Evan-Thomas to face the heavy fire. Beatty was actually turning course and after 15 minutes, he was again on the scene on the other quarters of pursuing Hipper and kept him engaged. Hipper was now moving away from approaching Jellicoe. Another battle of cruisers was raging around this time when Arbuthnot’s first cruiser squadron sighted German’s second scouting group, turned in pursuit and met disaster. Arbuthnot’s flagship was sunk with all her crew on board and three British ships were heavily damaged.
