The US refusal to censure Israel for its aggressive posture, and its policy of forcing ‘regime change’ in other countries have combined to create an environment in which Israel feels free to embark on a course of action which is in clear violation of all established norms

ISRAELI highhandedness in its dealings with Arabs, Palestinians in particular, has been primarily responsible for derailing the peace process. In recent times this tendency has manifested itself in a number of ways. For instance, Israel has tried to formulate its own version of the US policy of ‘regime change’ by insisting that it will not negotiate, or allow any formal Israeli interaction, with President Yasser Arafat.

For quite some time now, the Israelis have been accusing President Arafat of inciting violence against Israel, and of being “part of the problem rather than the solution”. The charge, naturally, is denied by President Arafat. Logic also suggests that a person who has been hauled up in a compound and denied all access to the outside world can hardly be responsible for inciting violence. In his present position he is not capable of even stopping Israeli violence against the Palestinian people.

In the last few weeks, Israel has openly called for the assassination of President Arafat. It is not only an incitement to commit a crime, but rather the declaration of a state to remove an elected leader of Palestinian people through violence. Although the US administration claims to be opposed to the Israeli policy of physically eliminating President Arafat, it has done little to discourage and dissuade Israel from following this course of action.

On the contrary, it appears that the US refusal to censure Israel for its aggressive posture, its recent use of veto against a resolution calling on Israel to desist from harming Arafat, and the US policy of forcing ‘regime change’ in other countries have combined to create an environment in which Israel feels free to embark on a course of action which is in clear violation of all legal norms.

The fact is that Arafat’s commitment to the Arab-Israeli peace process is too well known to be denied. His desire to open channels of communication with the US dates back to the 1970s. However, his vision of peace was based on justice for the Palestinians and a two-state solution. To bring this about he felt it necessary to establish relations with the US, since the US was the only country believed to have leverage over Israel.

In 1976 a change of US policy towards the Palestinians appeared plausible, but the process was scuttled by some prominent groups within the Carter administration. They based their arguments on the logic applied by Henry Kissinger as part of the Nixon administration. Yasser Arafat was asked to accept Security Council Resolution 242 which was not acceptable to the Palestinian people as it did not explicitly recognize their national rights, and treated the Palestinian issue as no more than a ‘refugee problem’.

On the other hand, it called on the Palestinians to declare their acceptance of Israel’s ‘right to exist within secure borders’. The US pressure continued indirectly through some Arab states. The US administration required the PLO to publicly state its acceptance of Israel’s ‘right to exist within secure borders’, as a price for the establishment of communication channels between the two.

Although President Carter appeared ready to accept Palestinian statehood, but it would still have been a great gamble for the Palestinians. What made it even harder for the Palestinians to accept this specific US demand was the fact that the US did not require Israel to commit itself to the recognition of the PLO, or to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

As such, the Palestinian National Council and all groups within the PLO framework were strongly opposed to the idea. It was seen as an effort to deprive the Palestinians of the only card that they had in their hands. Had Arafat accepted the US demand, he would have caused a major rift within the Palestinian resistance movement.

The Israeli apprehension that the opening up of PLO-US relations would not be in its best interest, and the influence exercised by the Israeli lobby over the US establishment finally resulted in Henry Kissinger giving an assurance to the Israelis that nothing would be done to jeopardize their interests.

The conditions imposed by the US were so blatantly one-sided that Arafat’s inability to abide by them was a foregone conclusion. Israel viewed it as a win-win situation: if Arafat accepted the US conditions, he would most certainly cause a rift in the PLO; if he refused to accept the terms, the desire to establish relations with the US would remain unfulfilled.

As a leader, Arafat has always been willing to take steps that sometimes has the potential of reducing his popularity, but he has consistently refrained from pursuing options which would result in conflict among the Palestinians themselves.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the US as the sole superpower and the adverse consequences of the 1991 Gulf War, the Palestinian cause faced the risk of being marginalized. However, Iraqi efforts to draw a linkage between its occupation of Kuwait and Israeli occupation of Arab lands appealed to the public opinion. The pro-West Arab governments finally convinced the US to renew efforts for launching the Arab-Israeli peace process.

After following a tortuous course spread over years, it resulted in autonomy rather than independence for the Palestinians. Nevertheless, the Palestinians got the opportunity to hold elections in the Israeli-occupied territories. Arafat’s election as president of the Palestinian Authority carried promise, but it remained largely unrealized. The offers of financial aid to build the infrastructure and housing schemes, the revival of Palestinian economy, and the development of industrial parks in the border areas remained suspended. Water shortage in Palestinian areas became acute, and the Israeli troops were not withdrawn, but simply ‘redeployed’. The much hated army checkposts remained in place and so did the Israeli economic blockade of Palestinian cities and towns.

The checkposts forced the Palestinians to stand in queues for hours in all kinds of weather conditions. Some elderly patients and victims of accidents even lost their lives while waiting for permission to cross the barrier. There was a particularly tragic case of a young woman being taken to a hospital for delivery. The husband who, due to urgency, had failed to stop at the checkpost, was shot dead by Israeli soldiers.

At this juncture, President Arafat appeared to be a leader who was unable to protect his people from Israeli excesses. His position was greatly compromised. The partial autonomy, which was all the Palestinians were able to secure from the peace process, did not bring about any improvement in their daily lives. The peace process remained stalled without any hope of revival. The frustration of people continued to mount. Perhaps the outbreak of second Intefada was just a matter of time, but Sharon’s visit to the Al Aqsa mosque precipitated the crisis.

The conflict between unarmed Palestinian civilians, mostly children and youngsters, and their well-armed Israeli tormentors is an unequal contest. The deaths of Palestinian civilians at the hands of an army of occupation did not cause the sort of outrage that it deserved. The Palestinian retaliations in the form of suicide bombings was in reality an admission of the fact that the Palestinians lacked a delivery system for their bombs. They were, therefore, forced to take their own lives in order to inflict damage on their adversaries. There were civilian causalities on both sides, but more so among the Palestinians.

Every time there was a suicide bombing anywhere in Israel, resulting in deaths of civilians, the Palestinian Authority would condemn the action. Arrests were also made quite frequently by the Authority. However, it was not possible for President Arafat to hand over these people to Israel. One must also realize that the Israeli soldiers who commit atrocities on Palestinian civilians are seldom arrested. The soldiers who deliberately kill children during demonstrations and are caught doing so by the cameramen are never made accountable for their actions.

While efforts for convincing the radicals to stop the attacks were on, the Israeli authorities continued to demand crackdown on Islamic Jihad, Hammas and other groups resisting Israeli repression. The Palestinian administration arrested some individuals belonging to these parties, and even succeeded in convincing them to refrain from such actions for a stipulated period of time. It tried to stop the suicide attacks as well, while calling on Israel to remove the root cause of the problem.

The Israeli policy is designed to create a wedge among the Palestinians and to foment open revolt against Arafat. When Arafat refused to launch a crackdown indiscriminately and opted for a political process, Israel started accusing him of directly sponsoring such attacks. He was accused of monopolizing power, and of tolerating corruption in his administration.

The Israeli government, moreover, demanded reforms in the Palestinian Authority. The decision to bypass Arafat further complicated the situation. In his various trips to Washington and through the visiting US and European dignitaries, Sharon tried to secure the cooperation of other parties in sidelining President Arafat.

The Bush administration joined the chorus and some leading members of the administration gave critical statements against Arafat. The European leaders, however, refused to join the effort to isolate the Palestinian president. But it appears that they, too, in their meetings with President Arafat emphasized the need for reforms and power-sharing.

The appointment of Mahmood Abbas was deemed to be a step in the right direction. He was given enough authority to deal with the day-to-day running of the administration. The powers of the president, however, remained contested in the area of security. That he was unable to consolidate his position can be attributed to a number of factors.

The circumstances in which he came to power seemed to create the impression that he was imposed from outside, thereby depriving him of credibility. Israel also undermined his position by continuing its policy of assassinations of Palestinian leaders, construction of the wall to isolate occupied territories, its refusal to free all Palestinian prisoners, further expansion of existing Jewish settlements and the encirclement of President Arafat’s Muqata.

Considering the heavy odds against him, Mahmood Abbas put up a brave effort to overcome problems in a balanced and rational manner. He, too, tried to avoid taking onesided actions which would have undermined Palestinian consensus. The US inability to reign in Israel added to the complexity of Abbas’ task. US pressure on Israel to be more accommodative would have certainly strengthened his position.

The fact that Abbas was seen by most Palestinians as being propped up by the US and Israel in order to replace President Arafat also did not help to secure his position.

The events of the last few months have amply demonstrated that President Arafat still holds the confidence of his people in spite of the spate of criticism by the US and Israel. If anything, it has consolidated his position. It needs to be clearly understood that no government or administration is without problems. But they need to be addressed by the people themselves, rather than outside forces. It is highly counterproductive when outsiders are seen to be interfering in sensitive issues like reforming a government.

It can be taken as a sign of utter frustration that having failed to undermine the position of President Arafat, Israel is now talking about his assassination. By surrounding his compound and refusing to allow him to function effectively, Israel made it impossible for him to stop the suicide attacks.

Also by keeping Marwan Barghouti in jail, Israel is making it very difficult for a genuine Palestinian leadership to emerge. Barghouti’s popularity among the Palestinian people and his bold approach are assets which can prove to be crucial for the future of peace in the region.

Israel believes that by preventing the growth of genuine leadership among Palestinians, and by sidelining President Arafat, it will be able to impose people of its own choice on the Palestinians. Knowing the Palestinian temperament, it appears unlikely that they would succumb to these pressure tactics.

The Palestinian leadership of today has been selected through a long process and has established its credibility by offering sacrifices. The fate of Mahmood Abbas establishes this point. Although he had many positive traits, but his rise to power was seen by many as an effort to sideline President Arafat. This sealed his political future.

There is also the realization among the Israelis that President Arafat is advancing in age, and if the Palestinians are unable to find a proper leadership, they would be overtaken by chaos and conflict. This would prevent them from politically sustaining their struggle for liberation. Israel, being militarily stronger, expects to take advantage of such a situation. If history has a lesson for us, it is that chaos does not help anyone. Several examples can be quoted to bring out the fallacy of this expectation.

The roadmap to peace and security in the Middle East proposed by the Bush administration suffers from many drawbacks. Without the creation of a viable, sovereign Palestinian state there can be no peace in the Middle East. The roadmap envisages the creation of a Palestinian state by 2005, provided the Palestinians take steps like eliminating Hammas and Islamic Jihad.

Even if the Palestinian leadership could perform according to the criteria set by the US, there is no guarantee that the Bush administration will get re-elected in 2004. In fact, there are reports to suggest that Bush’s re-election might be difficult. The creation of a Palestinian state does not appear to be on the agenda of the Democrats. With Israel openly working against the possibility and the US unable to pressure Israel, there seems to be no way out.

There is no mechanism to force the Israeli government to stop its fence-building and expansion of Jewish settlements. The Palestinian state will not have the resources to absorb all the Palestinians wanting to return from the Diaspora. Israeli refusal to allow Palestinians the right to return could cause tremendous problems.

In spite of all these shortcomings, this is the only proposal on the table right now. The international community needs to either come up with something better or use the present framework with due modifications. In either case, Israel will have to be pressurized to play a positive role.

It is also in the interest of the US, the European Union, Russia and China to have peace in the region. They can help the peace process by convincing Israel that further intransigence will only result in its isolation.