September 21, 2003

The recent warmth in ties between India and Israel is an indication of a nexus linking the two nations sitting in the heart of the Muslim world. Pakistan would do well to somehow preempt the chance of the US making it an axis of three

ISRAELI Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to India earlier this month — the first ever by an Israeli leader — might have lasted only two days, but it spoke volumes about the strength of the relationship between Tel Aviv and New Delhi. The international community has been alerted to the evolution of a new nexus, linking the two nations sitting in the heart of the Muslim world, and possibly also drawing in the United States of America. The implications of this nexus — whether bilateral or trilateral — are enormous.

The bond between India and Israel has actually been growing for the past decade, but only now are both sides openly acknowledging it. India recognized the nascent Jewish state as far back as 1950, but did not establish diplomatic relations. Indian membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (spearheaded by Jawaharlal Nehru) made it a natural (indeed, vocal) supporter of the Palestinian cause. In international fora like the United Nations, New Delhi’s vote was regularly cast in favour of pro-Palestine resolutions.

All this changed in the early 1990s. Hopes for Middle East peace raised by the 1991 Madrid Conference and later Oslo Accords, paved the way for India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. The replacement of Congress at the helm of Indian politics and government by the Hindu nationalist BJP, was another factor in New Delhi’s change of heart towards Israel.

From the Indian perspective, Israel’s main draw was as a supplier of hi-tech military equipment and weapons. New Delhi’s traditional supplier of cheap arms — the Soviet Union — became considerably less generous after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. It also fell behind the United States in the technological race, while spare parts for its weapons became extremely costly. India needed an alternative and more effective source of arms. Israel, armed by the United States, was the ideal source.

Keen to secure revenue from arms sales, the Israelis eagerly responded to Indian requests. So much so that today India is the biggest purchaser of Israeli arms. As the Indian defence budget has increased, so Israeli enthusiasm to gain access to the lucrative Indian market has grown. In scouring Israeli wares, the Indians give preference to technology transfers that would enable them to upgrade some of their older Russian systems, and to become self-sufficient in arms production. Israeli technology was used in the production of India’s Nishant UAV, for example.

Trade in arms soon expanded into other fields — agriculture, for example, where the Israelis’ remarkable ability to make the desert bloom is testimony to their skill and technological advancement. Diamonds are another commodity that feature heavily in Indo-Israeli bilateral trade relations. Current levels of bilateral trade — approximately $1 billion per year — are set to double within the next couple of years.

On his recent India trip, Sharon was accompanied by a delegation of some 150 people, many of them representatives of arms and other Israeli industries. The size of the delegation alone was testimony to the importance of the Indian market for Israel.

Looking to the future, the Indians are particularly keen to get their hands on the Phalcon airborne early warning system and on the anti-ballistic Arrow missile. A deal was not signed on these during Sharon’s visit, but it looks as if one for the purchase of three Phalcon systems (worth approximately $1 billion) by India could be penned shortly. Should these and other projected arms transactions go ahead, Israel — already India’s second largest arms suppliers — will move ahead of Russia into first place.

Trade and technology, particularly in weapons, feature prominently in the Indo-Israeli relationship. But it would be wrong to characterize this as one simply driven by money or material concerns. There is an underlying common ideological outlook, as well as a shared strategic vision, pushing India and Israel closer together.

The natural affinity between the right-wing Zionist government ruling Israel, and the right-wing Hindu government ruling India is obvious. Both Likud and the BJP have clear doctrines and agendas that they want to implement: Israeli control over the Occupied Territories and the ‘Hindu-ization’ of India respectively. Both favour direct action to achieve their goals, and both have few qualms about using force and violating civil liberties in the process.

The most pressing domestic problems faced by Tel Aviv and New Delhi — Palestinian and Kashmiri nationalist movements respectively — are quite different. Yet by presenting both as problems of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, Israel and India have managed to come up with a common foe — one they can tackle together. This sense of facing the same Muslim extremist problem increased manifold after 9/11.

Atal Behari Vajpayee and Ariel Sharon were among the first world leaders to endorse the ‘war against terror’ enunciated by George Bush. And they did not stop there: both wasted no time in characterizing the Kashmiri and Palestinian militancy they were tackling as part of the same ‘war against terror’. Their motives in doing so were obvious: to camouflage the real causes of Kashmiri and Palestinian armed resistance (oppression, occupation, injustice), to win international sympathy, and to secure a green light for further repressive measures. Both have been remarkably successful in implementing this strategy.

Little wonder, then, that terrorism was one of the key themes during Sharon’s visit to India. Prime Minister Vajpayee, welcoming his Israeli guests, spoke of the joint need to tackle global terrorism. “It is a menace that particularly targets democratic societies which have to fashion a global and comprehensive response to tackle it,” he remarked. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Joseph Lapid offered the Indians training and technology to help deal with the problem.

Intelligence cooperation between India and Israel actually predates both 9/11 and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Widely chronicled, it was taking place in the days when Indira Gandhi was the prime minister of India.

To cite just one example, Israelis made several ‘tourist’ trips to Kashmir to advise the Indians on counter-insurgency tactics. After 9/11 and the identification of a common Islamic militant foe, this kind of cooperation is becoming both more open and more extensive.

But India envisages a relationship with Israel which goes far beyond expanding bilateral trade and intelligence cooperation. The extent of Indian ambitions with regard to Israel became clear in May, following Indian National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra’s address to the highly influential American Jewish Committee in Washington. Mishra postulated not just expanded cooperation between India and Israel, but between these two countries and the United States, too. In effect, he proposed an India-Israel-United States axis to — so he claimed — tackle global terrorism.

The justification for this ‘axis of three’ is simple. All three face problems of ‘Islamic terrorism and militancy’. The United States cannot tackle this global menace alone: it needs partners. India and Israel are the only non-Muslim countries in a vast territory stretching across North Africa to the Far East.

Many of the Muslim countries in that area (Algeria, the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, etc) are allegedly actual or potential sources of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. India and Israel are natural strategic partners for the US in the fight against terrorism: as democratic, non-Islamic countries they can form a bulwark against what they perceive as the expanding sea of extremism.

“India, the US and Israel have some fundamental similarities,” Brajesh Mishra told his Jewish American audience, “We are all democracies, sharing a vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal opportunity. Stronger India-US relations and India-Israel relations have a natural logic.” He went on to say they should form a “viable alliance against terrorism ... which would have the political will and moral authority to take bold decisions in cases of extreme terrorist provocation.”

The Israelis are equally keen to see such a trilateral axis emerge. During the India visit, Deputy Israeli Prime Minister Lapid claimed that an “unwritten and abstract axis” had already been created, and that the Americans supported its development.

‘Terrorism’ is an important factor in the postulated axis of three, but, from the Indian and Israeli perspectives, there are other more pressing motives. To begin with, for New Delhi there is the undisputed reality that the US is now the world’s sole superpower and — under the leadership of President Bush — is quite prepared to flex its superpower muscle. India would like to be in the camp of ‘with us’ nations. Furthermore, Israel has long been a beneficiary of US superpower backing and largess: India would like to enjoy at least some of the same privileges.

The even more immediate Indo-Israeli motive is arms. The expanding bilateral trade between India and Israel, especially in the field of military technology, is strongly dependent on the United States. The reason is that much of Israel’s military technology originated in the US: Washington’s clearance is therefore required for Tel Aviv to be able to sell it on to New Delhi. A lucrative deal to sell Israeli Phalcon systems to China fell through because Washington blocked it. It has given the go-ahead for the sale of Phalcons to India, but not yet for the sale of the anti-ballistic Arrow missiles. The chances of American clearance for arms and technology transfers would increase greatly if the US was joined with India and Israel in a military axis.

So far, the Americans are denying any suggestion of a US-Israel-India axis. Christina Rocca, US Under-Secretary of State for South Asia, categorically stated in an interview with Outlook India: “There is no axis as such. The US has a good relationship with India, and has a good relationship with Israel. We are always happy when friends make friends with each other. But there is no axis.”

The American hesitation stems from its dependence on Pakistani support in the ‘war against terror’. This, however, is no guarantee of long-term American rejection of an axis with India and Israel. If history is anything to go by, US friendship with Pakistan has been notoriously fickle.

So what of the future? Will the Indo-Israeli relationship continue to grow at the same speed as it has over the past decade? This development might appear assured, but in fact there are significant obstacles to closer cooperation.

The first, as seen, is the US which can veto arms and technology transfers. The fact that Washington virtually bulldozed Pakistan into cooperating in the ‘war against terror’, while it turned down voluntary Indian offers of assistance, speaks volumes about the relative importance of these two countries (at least for now) to the US. America is not about to jeopardize its ‘special relationship’ with Islamabad by making too many concessions (including arms sale clearances) to New Delhi.

The second problem is internal: not all Indians share their government’s enthusiasm for closer ties with Israel. There are significant elements, notably on the left and among India’s vast Muslim community, who strongly oppose Indo-Israeli cooperation because of their support for the Palestinian cause. Sharon’s recent visit to India was partially marred by demonstrations by these anti-Israel groups. Ahmed Bukhari, the Imam of the Jama Masjid in New Delhi, told crowds of protesters: “Unless Israeli brutalities against the Palestinians end, we will continue to oppose any Israeli leader’s visit to India.”

India cannot abandon the Palestinians and jump wholeheartedly on the Israeli bandwagon not just because of its past history, but also because of pragmatic, material interests. Tens of thousands of Indian expatriate workers are employed in the Arab world, notably in the Gulf region. Too close an association with Tel Aviv would endanger their position — and the vast income they send back home.

India is also dependent on Arab countries for much of its oil. Hence Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement, on the eve of Ariel Sharon’s visit, that expanding ties with Israel did not mean that New Delhi had diluted its support for the Palestinian cause.

From the Israeli perspective, there are serious concerns about New Delhi’s growing proximity to Iran. President Khatami preceded Ariel Sharon with a visit to India earlier in the year. During that trip, the two countries signed a document laying out a roadmap for a closer strategic partnership. Tel Aviv views such an alliance with great alarm: it sees Tehran as ‘the epicentre of terrorism’. For the Indians, however, Iran represents another lucrative and useful bilateral relationship that should be strengthened.

In sum, Indo-Israeli relations will continue to improve, but the speed will be checked by strong national considerations on both sides.

Regardless of what it means to the two countries, in our context it is important to see what will be the impact of all this on Pakistan. President Pervez Musharraf expressed concern about Sharon’s visit to India and about the growing relationship between Israel and India. In a press interview he said, “The India-Israel nexus carries a lot of danger and we are very concerned about it.” It is not difficult to fathom why: any improvement in India’s military capability will only increase the edge it already enjoys over Pakistan in conventional arms. The Phalcon system, for example, would greatly bolster Indian defence capabilities, and even allow them to monitor and decode Pakistani radio transmissions.

Pakistan’s options to counter the threat posed by Indo-Israeli proximity are limited. It can appeal to the Americans to block arms and technology transfers by Tel Aviv. It can bolster its nuclear arsenal to make up for its conventional arms deficit. And it can take the wind out of the Indian sails by itself developing closer relations with Israel. It would be no exaggeration to say that over the past few months Pakistan has attempted all three — in particular, the third.

President Musharraf dropped the bombshell of Pakistan possibly recognizing Israel during his recent trip to the US. The motivation for this was a desire to cultivate American support as much as to sabotage Indo-Israeli friendship. Tel Aviv responded enthusiastically to the presidential overture, but so far domestic opposition has prevented any further development. Even if Islamabad does go ahead and recognize Israel, this is unlikely to curtail the growing — and lucrative — bilateral trade between Israel and India.

In short, the president was quite right to feel alarmed. He, and the rest of Pakistan, can only hope that the United States does check further arms transfers, and that the axis of two does not become an axis of three.

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