Pakistan may not like the Karzai-led administration, but it has to ensure stability inside Afghanistan, as bitter past experience has shown that Pakistan shares the fallout of instability with the Afghan people


UNLIKE Pakistan’s relationship with China — enduring friendship — or with India — enduring hostility — its relations with Afghanistan have always been subject to great flux. This is a reflection not of shifting goals — Pakistan’s ambitions with regard to Afghanistan have remained pretty constant — but of changing realities in each country, and especially in Afghanistan.

The fluctuating nature of Pak-Afghan relations has been clearly demonstrated over the past few weeks. Anyone witnessing President Hamid Karzai’s successful visit to Islamabad earlier in the year could be forgiven for thinking relations between the two were warm and getting better. But the mob assault on the Pakistan embassy in Kabul, preceded and followed by some volatile remarks by Karzai, should come as an effective eye-opener.

A crowd of some five hindered chanted anti-Pakistan slogans and threw stones, destroying many cars and windows in the embassy and smashing furniture. The Pakistani ambassador was, in fact, forced to close the mission.

In order to understand how this sharp deterioration in relations took place, one has to understand the overall context of Pak-Afghan relations. For much of what is happening inside Afghanistan today — and, hence, between Pakistan and Afghanistan — has its roots deep in history.

Periods of good Pak-Afghan relations have generally been outweighed by periods of strain and hostility. This dates back to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. For many years, Afghan rulers had a problem accepting the new state. Indeed, Afghanistan was the only country to block Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations. Afghan hostility had much to do with Pukhthunistan — the so-called state comprising all Pukhtuns. While some Pukhthuns in Afghanistan wanted to see such a state come into being, others simply wanted all Pukhtun territory to be incorporated into Afghanistan.

Irredentist claims by Kabul were fuelled by the long-standing border dispute between the two countries. True to their tradition of poor boundary demarcations, the Durand Line designated by the British as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was not recognized by the former. Indeed, it still isn’t. Lack of agreement on a common border has, in turn, led to border clashes, with each side claiming its territory has been violated by the other. All attempts to resolve this issue, and clarify the border, have so far failed.

As Afghanistan’s internal troubles grew — coups, the rise of the communists, the Soviet invasion — irredentist claims on Pakistani territory became less of a priority for Kabul. On the contrary, relations between anti-Soviet Afghans and Islamabad blossomed as the former supported the Afghan jihad.

From Islamabad’s perspective, Afghanistan has always been seen as a source of security, a strategic buffer between Pakistan and the northern Russian bear. Of course, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 totally put paid to that strategy. It was one reason — others being concern that Pakistan could be next, and the not-inconsiderable incentive of American military and financial assistance — why General Zia chose to place Pakistan in the frontline in the jihad to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s strategic-buffer ambitions for Afghanistan have always been dependent on the presence of a friendly government in Kabul. This is also important for the realization of Pakistan’s economic goals. Afghanistan lies between Pakistan and the oil and natural resource wealth of Central Asia and the Caucasus. As land-locked countries, they need to get their oil and gas out through their neighbours. Pipelines running from Central Asia through Afghanistan and then Pakistan present a great economic opportunity for Islamabad. But it can only take advantage of this if — in addition to a pro-Pakistan government — there is stability in Afghanistan.

History has shown that instability in Afghanistan has a knock-on, negative effect on Pakistan. The anti-Soviet jihad and subsequent civil war in Afghanistan had an enormously detrimental impact on Pakistan.

In addition to playing host to hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees — at one point the figure went beyond three million — Pakistan has had to cope with the ‘drug and Kalashnikov culture’ that they spread with them. The militarization of elements of Pakistani society — e.g. violent sectarian and ethnic groups — has much to do with the Afghan presence.

It will be clear by now that all Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan — be it security, stability or economic gain — necessitate a stable and friendly northern neighbour.

Pakistan backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the civil war that followed the ouster of the Soviets, in the hope that he would rule over a pro-Pakistan Afghanistan. But when Hekmatyar failed to assert himself over rival ex-Mujahideen commanders, Pakistan switched horses and backed the emergent Taliban.

Much has been made of Pakistan’s role in the formation of the Taliban — many commentators ascribing the development to Naseerullah Babar. In actual fact, Pakistani involvement was more akin to its involvement in the Kashmir freedom movement that started in 1989.

Both the Taliban and Kashmiri armed separatism began indigenously, but were later supported by Pakistan. The Taliban emerged in the Kandahar region as a reaction to the immense anarchy in the country. Their Islamist nature and their links with seminaries in the NWFP gave Pakistan confidence that they would help it achieve its Afghan goals.

Islamabad supported the Taliban. It was one of only three countries — the others being Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to recognize the Taliban government. But in return it did not receive the dividends it had hoped for. The Taliban’s harsh orthodoxy alienated world opinion and deprived Afghanistan of international aid. Within the country, the Taliban continued to face armed opposition from the Northern Alliance — backed by Iran, India and Russia. International sanctions, on-going conflict and a mediaeval mindset combined to thwart Pakistani ambitions in Afghanistan.

Not only that: Islamabad suffered because of its association with the Taliban. It came under international pressure to moderate the behaviour of the Taliban — something it was unable to do. Towards the end of the Taliban’s rule other sources of difference emerged between Pakistan and its erstwhile favourites; for instance, the latter’s refusal to hand over Pakistani sectarian killers hiding in Afghanistan. After 9/11, Pakistan had no choice but to ditch the Taliban, but there are many who feel this step should have been taken long before.

The 9/11 incident brought a huge change in the region, and in the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The American assault on Afghanistan ousted the Taliban from power. In their place came an interim administration headed by a Pukhtun, but dominated by the Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance. President Pervez Musharraf was quick to offer the hand of friendship to the post-Taliban government, but the legacy of hostility between Islamabad and the Northern Alliance has persisted.

Afghans remain deeply suspicious of Pakistani motives, and wary of what they see as a tradition of Pakistani ‘interference’ in their internal affairs. There have also been allegations by Kabul that former Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters have fled to Pakistan’s tribal belt and are being sheltered there. In fact, during the recent visit to Pakistan, Karzai gave his Pakistani counterpart a list of alleged fugitives hiding in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s concerns and dissatisfaction with post-Taliban Afghanistan, not surprisingly, are far greater. To begin with, Islamabad has had to adjust to the new reality of a hostile (covertly, if not overtly) government in Afghanistan. One that, to boot, is developing a very close relationship with old rival India. This scenario implies not just the failure by Pakistan to realize its security and economic goals, but a new source of threat to Pakistan.

India was one of the first countries to establish a presence in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Trade and security links between Kabul and New Delhi are growing. Even more alarming, the Indians have just opened a consulate in Kandahar and a sub-office in Spin Boldak, virtually on the Pak-Afghan border. Islamabad is justifiably skeptical about the diplomatic necessity for these offices. It is concerned that they will be used to support disgruntled elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan, wishing to promote destabilization in the latter. The recent Shia massacre in Quetta, mind you, was attributed to ‘foreign’ (i.e. Indo-Afghan) hands.

While Pakistan was helping in the Afghan jihad, and later while it backed the Taliban, border disputes were pushed onto the back burner. But the emergence of a hostile government in Kabul has revived this contentious issue. With forces of both countries patrolling the border region to find Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, clashes over alleged border violations are becoming more frequent.

The mob assault on the Pakistan embassy in Kabul was motivated in part by on-going border clashes between Pakistani and Afghan soldiers. Kabul accuses the Pakistanis of violating its territory — a claim strongly refuted by Islamabad. The other main spark for the embassy assault was remarks by President Musharraf during his tour of Europe.

Speaking to reporters, the President expressed doubts over whether the writ of Karzai government extended throughout the country, and implicitly criticized what he saw as its failure to adequately represent all ethnic groups. Musharraf’s Afghan counterparts took great offence at these comments which — even if true — could hardly be expected to go down well in Kabul. Hamid Karzai described Musharraf’s remarks as a ‘source of regret and sadness’ and added the warning that Afghanistan does not interfere in anyone’s affairs and “neither does it want others to interfere in its affairs.”

The attack on the embassy bore all the hallmarks of official connivance. The 500-strong mob came prepared with anti-Pakistan placards, and even a truck full of stones to throw. Afghan security guards at the embassy offered no resistance — in view of the fact that there had been demonstrations against Pakistan for a few days, they should have been prepared for some such incident. Many analysts see the attack as a ‘slap on the hand’ for Pakistan, albeit most probably administered by NA Defence Minister Muhammed Fahim rather than Karzai himself.

President Musharraf’s assessment of Afghanistan, while insensitive, did reflect both the reality in that country, and a source of concern for Pakistan. As outlined above, Pakistan has a stake in ensuring there is stability in Afghanistan: bitter past experience has shown that Pakistan shares the fallout of instability with the Afghan people.

Hamid Karzai is the President of Afghanistan and head of its interim government. But his power on paper is not matched on the ground. Far from extending across the whole country, his writ barely extends to Kabul. There, too, it is dependent on troops of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Tribal leaders in the rest of the country pay lip-service to the administration in Kabul, but in actual fact run their regions like mini-fiefdoms. They derive their strength from the armed men under their command.

Warlords like Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan are making full use of their new autonomy (after the ouster of the Taliban, who did control the areas they held) to engage in the old profiteering practices of extortion, smuggling and opium production. Crime is rampant in Afghanistan: no one can challenge those ruling by the gun. In the south, there are reports that Taliban and Al Qaeda forces are regrouping.

This bleak situation is so different from the rosy picture painted by Washington and the rest of the international community when they were preparing to oust the Taliban. Afghanistan was promised massive international assistance for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Afghans were assured that, this time, the international community would not forget them. A year-and-a-half down the line, these increasingly sound like hollow promises.

All analysts agree that the first thing Afghanistan needs is security: law and order. After the Taliban, and with no Afghan army to run things, this should logically have been the responsibility of the Americans and other forces who conquered the country. But apart from ISAF, Washington has made no commitment to ‘peacekeeping’. ISAF only operates in the capital Kabul and, despite repeated pleas by Hamid Karzai for its deployment to be expanded, this has not happened. Warlords have filled the authority vacuum outside the capital.

Without security, getting humanitarian assistance into the country becomes extremely difficult. The international community made huge pledges to Afghanistan at the reconstruction conference held in Tokyo in January 2002, but few of those have been fulfilled. The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remains dire.

Bad as things are in Afghanistan, they look set to get worse. Washington’s attention has shifted to its next war zone, Iraq, and from there looks set to move to Iran. Some American troops remain in Afghanistan to continue the (so far largely fruitless) hunt for senior Al Qaeda and Taliban figures, notably Osama bin Laden. But all the signs are that abandonment is on the cards. One need not go far back in time to see what happens when the international community leaves Afghanistan to its own devices.

Pakistan stands to suffer if Afghanistan fails to attain stability. It is very much in Pakistan’s interest to strive to improve the situation inside Afghanistan and to improve its own relations with the country. As a land-locked country, Afghanistan too cannot manage without its southern neighbour. In short, both Pakistan and Afghanistan have much to gain from a cooperative relationship, and much to lose from an antagonistic one.

But in the absence of international interest, and with Afghanistan heading back to the bad old days of warlordism, the chances of a cooperative Pak-Afghan relationship remain minimal.