June 22, 2003

‘Pak-America relationship has been of benefit to us. There have been problems only when we have nurtured false expectations and tried to read more into what has been said to us,’ argues Najmuddin Shaikh

AS the first-ever Camp David summit between Pakistani and US heads of state approaches questions are being asked about the issues that will figure in the talks. What should be our realistic expectations about the outcome of the summit? What are the potential risks in this growing Pak-US relationship, and will it endure? What are the challenges and opportunities it offers? What will President Bush expect from President Musharraf, and what will President Musharraf be seeking from his US counterpart?

Answers to these and other key questions were sought in a recent interview with Najmuddin Shaikh, Pakistan’s former foreign secretary who has also served as the country’s ambassador in Washington.

A seasoned career diplomat involved in Pakistan’s foreign policy, Mr Shaikh has witnessed from close quarters the high and low points in Pakistan-US relationship. His contention is that it is a “mutually beneficial” relationship, strained only by “false expectations” in the past. He thinks there is now a “genuine and permanent” US interest in a stable and sovereign Pakistan, and emphasizes that there can be a great deal of commonality of interest created if Pakistan’s internal polity moves in the direction of moderation. The following are the excerpts:

Q. What do you think are the three top issues that will come up during the June 24 Bush-Musharraf summit, and will require specific moves by the US?

A. From Pakistan’s perspective, one of the first questions that is likely to arise is the question of its economic progress and what could the US do to facilitate economic growth in Pakistan. Gen Musharraf is likely to suggest that the remainder of the debt, which is worth about $1.8 billion, should be written-off.

Secondly, Gen Musharraf would probably want to talk about the situation in Afghanistan. He will probably welcome the fact that the US is now prepared to look at the extension of the function of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul, and will want to stress that this is an essential element if the provincial reconstruction teams that had been put in place in eight provinces are to work effectively.

Also, I think he will want that even in those areas where the hunt against the Taliban is continuing — and those areas tend to be on our borders — there should be ISAF presence to allow reconstruction work to proceed in a manner that will help to dampen the prospects for sanctuaries being found by Al Qaeda or Taliban operators in that area. As Pakistan sees it, until reconstruction is undertaken and until people start developing more of a stake in the process, they may continue to provide shelter to Al Qaeda and Taliban operators.

The third element, and perhaps in one sense the most important one, is going to be the recent thaw in Pakistan-India relations, the very slow pace at which things are moving, and the role the Americans can play to facilitate the dialogue. Gen Musharraf would want to brief President Bush on the fact that Pakistan wants to approach this dialogue with India with total sincerity.

President Bush is likely to be reminded that we had an agreement in Agra, and future discussions should proceed on that basis. That if the Indians choose a step-by-step approach, we will be prepared to go along, provided it is step-by-step simultaneously on all those subjects that are included in the composite dialogue.

President Bush is likely to bring up the question of Pakistani contingent for the stabilization force in Iraq. There will also be a discussion most likely to be initiated by President Bush regarding the American concerns on Iran and its nuclear programme. In addition, the efforts that President Bush is seeking to make in the Middle East are likely to figure in the talks.

Q. What is the one single most important action that the US expects from President Musharraf?

A. This may not appear publicly, but I think there is a considerable degree of anxiety in the United States with regard to the direction in which Pakistan’s internal polity is moving. On the one hand they may be reassured by the speeches President Musharraf has made recently about the fact that he would not tolerate Talibanization and that every effort will be made to prevent such a situation.

However, at the same time there will be a question in President Bush’s mind, which I think he will put fairly bluntly, as to how this problem is to be resolved when the MMA seems firm on its stand. I have no doubts that President Bush will seek to emphasize the degree of concern that is felt.

Also adding to that concern will be events at Afghan-Pakistan border. Pakistan has protested quite rightly and we have called upon the Afghans successfully to take back the bodies they had dumped at the border, but this is indicative of the information President Bush will be receiving on this particular episode.

While there will be an expression of gratitude for everything that Pakistan has done so far in apprehending alleged Al Qaeda operatives and handing them over to the US for interrogation, there will also be requests for greater effort.

Q. Will the US take a pragmatic view of the political situation in Pakistan rather than a view that is supportive of democracy per se?

A. In this context I would recall Section 508 of the US Foreign Aid Bill under which aid as well as economic cooperation and assistance is forbidden to a country in which there has been a military takeover. President Bush has secured from Congress the authority to waive that particular section of the law, and he has used that authority, and he has used it again a couple of months ago on the ground that progress towards democracy is being made. He has not, as section 508 requires him to do if he wants to set it aside, certified that democracy has been restored in Pakistan.

I would suggest that this is reflective of pragmatism that waives it, but still stays within the letter of the law. So if a drastic action becomes necessary in the NWFP, I do not think the Americans would publicly applaud this, but they will perhaps attribute it to the development of a political situation in which action, though regrettable, was needed.

Q. What are the real risks and benefits for Pakistan in this relationship?

A. I think the risk can flow from the US expectations with regard to what needs to be done internally in Pakistan, and our ability to move in that direction without upsetting too much the applecart in the country. But this is really in my view something that we have to decide internally for ourselves. What is the kind of Pakistan we are looking for? Is this an aberration that we hope will be corrected by the political process in time to come, or by some other process? Indeed, does it need to be corrected at all?

So the risk is that if we believe the people want Shariah law and the Americans tell us that the relationship is going to be attenuated by any development in that direction, things may get a little murky. Otherwise, I do not see any risk. It is a relationship that has endured. It is a relationship that has been of benefit to us. There have been problems in our relationship with the US only when we have nurtured false expectations and tried to read more into what has been said to us. We’ve done this frequently, and I hope that we are now adopting a more realistic attitude.

The interest that we have in common now flows from the US-led campaign against terrorism. There can be other common interests created if our internal polity seems to be moving in the right direction. Then the Americans will be talking once again about Pakistan and the value of Pakistan as a voice of moderation in Islamic forums. Today, I’m not sure they are prepared to see it in that light.

Q. How would you describe the Pak-US relationship — strategic; issue-based; tactical; transient — and what are the contents in the relationship that make you describe it the way you do?

A. Currently it looks as though it is a relationship based on a single issue. That issue from the American perspective is that Pakistan is an invaluable ally in the battle against terrorism. From Pakistan’s perspective, it is that of having a connection with the world’s only superpower and having its sympathies and blessings for economic development programmes.

So Pakistan is, in a sense, seeking economic and political advantage from this relationship. But on a larger plane, the Americans have made it clear that only a moderate, stable, strong Pakistan capable of holding its own and capable of maintaining its position in South Asia is of value to the US. And it is of value because, like every other superpower, the US wishes to have alternatives available.

A South Asia entirely dominated by one country is not in the interest of the US because it would wish to see that there is some balance, some degree of an offsetting force available.

Similarly, with regard to the relationship that can develop, you need to go back and look to earlier periods when again initially the entire emphasis was on the fact that Pakistan was looking for security against India and the US was looking for partners for creating a cordon around the Soviet Union’s soft underbelly in Central Asia and elsewhere.

But even at that time there was a concept of the role that Pakistan, as one of the largest Islamic countries, could play in articulating the concerns of the Muslim World, but doing so in a manner that blunted the sharp edges and that made a dialogue more possible. That Pakistan could be a source of stability for the Gulf, is a possibility we should look at again in the context of how the US sees its own position in the Gulf.

Pakistan is a nuclear power now, and the nuclear issue is an issue of enormous importance in America’s security calculus and in the minds of its security analysts. They have talked about the prospects of our nuclear assets falling into the wrong hands. There is an acceptance in the American mind of the fact that South Asia has been nuclearized. Now the concern on the nuclear issue, if there are no added factors such as instability, is only how to maintain this at a stable level and how to persuade both the countries to take the necessary measures to ensure against accidents, to ensure against the sort of problems that existed in the US-Soviet relationship.

Q. What will be the yardstick of measuring ‘genuine’ US support to Pakistan as the Bush-Musharraf summit takes place?

A. First, symbolism is important. It has always been important, but it has certainly acquired an added dimension ever since the US acquired the status of the sole superpower. That superpower has the option of treating its friends and allies to a working lunch in the White House, or a meeting at Camp David. The symbolism of Camp David is important from that perspective.

However, I think far more important is going to be an American commitment to an enduring relationship. An enduring interest in Pakistan’s well-being, and to doing what the US sees as feasible and Pakistan regards as important in terms of its needs. It would help if the US conveys to Pakistan that it has an interest in ensuring that tensions between Pakistan and India remain at a low level and that it would press India to proceed towards a substantive dialogue for resolution of all problems.

Q. What should be our realistic expectations from the US on the India front, and what concrete steps can the US take on that front to address our concerns?

A. Prior to Prime Minister Vajpayee’s peace offer to Pakistan, US Secretary of State Colin Powell had talked about exploring whether there were some steps in the economic field that could jump-start the talks. So, in a sense you can see the American position as being that ‘commence the dialogue, let agreements be reached wherever they are possible’.

I think they will go one step further and agree with us that dialogue should be on all issues, but that dialogue should make varying degrees of progress on various issues and the progress on one should not be dependent on progress on the other. To that extent, the American position is in a way more in accord with the Indian than the Pakistani position.

However, at the same time there are ways of looking at it as being the pragmatic approach that may woo us closer to a resolution of what we regard as the principal dispute. The major contribution that the Americans can make is to convince the Indians that there are to be no further conditionalities and that the dialogue must commence under these circumstances. I think this is a realistic expectation and once the dialogue commences, the Americans should see to it that the level is progressively raised even while it remains a step-by-step approach.

Please Visit our Sponsor (Ads open in separate window)