June 22, 2003

As has been the case with others who have walked down the perilous path of alliance with the US, the biggest peril for Musharraf lies in the fact that he has failed to take the people along with him on the promenade he has embarked on with Washington

PERHAPS at no other time in the recent history of Pakistan have government policy and public perception differed so sharply on the United States. As President Pervez Musharraf prepares for the scheduled Camp David tete-a-tete with George Bush, he will be fully aware of this reality — and the fact that given the situation, he must pin his future hopes on keeping his as-yet-smooth working relationship with the US intact.

Certainly, support for the increasingly beleaguered Musharraf from quarters within the country is flagging. His stance against a hostile political opposition appears to be hardening; the recent resignation of all 24 mayors in the NWFP makes the possibility of a compromise with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal distinctly more arduous; press reports continue to suggest that Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali does not see eye-to-eye on all issues with the man he calls his ‘boss’.

Perhaps the most worrying factor for Musharraf is the indication that within the armed forces a growing number wishes to see the army return to the barracks, and for Musharraf to discard his uniform. This would, in the eyes of some within the military establishment, avert a further tarnishing of the image of the men in khaki.

At the same time, the stepping down of Musharraf from the coveted post of the army chief would open up the path for a series of promotions that at present remain blocked.

Against this backdrop, and with Musharraf so far adamant that he will retain his uniform, it is clear that his most important support base lies far away from home, in Washington. As the past history of the country has shown, distance does not dilute the degree of influence exerted by US administrations on various affairs in this country.

This is truer today than ever before, given the present global scenario, with the US at present evidently eager to utilize its expanded role as the world’s sole superpower to orchestrate regional events. Many observers are, as such, convinced that the relative thaw in relations between Pakistan and India has come as the direct result of pressure exerted on both New Delhi and Islamabad by Washington.

It would also appear that such pressure is likely to continue to come into play in the near future, as the US attempts to establish greater harmony in a region that has attracted increased attention and concern since the testing of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan some four years ago.

With Musharraf having safely seen off the post-9/11 scenario in the country, it would also seem that the US administration is willing to continue to place their considerable weight behind him. During the events that followed the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, Musharraf, in fact, opened up the way for the present close ties with the US, in the process placing all his eggs in the basket held out by Washington. To his credit, he admitted with honesty rare among Pakistani leaders that his decision was based more on pragmatism rather than ideology.

The rewards for the choice he made have come in the shape of lessened US pressure on him to restore anything resembling genuine democracy. It is also evident that Washington, given the uncertainty of the political situation in the country, would, in fact, like to see Musharraf retain as much power as possible.

This would also explain why Washington has apparently given a quiet nod for the Legal Framework Order to be left in place. In turn, the fact that such a nod was apparently seen as necessary, illustrates the degree to which US power has since the 1950s worked its way insidiously into the political system of the country.

But while perks to governments, in the form of loans, aid and equipment, may have helped win official backing for the US over the past five decades or so, the same inroads have not been made into the more complex arena of public perception.

This, of course, is true of the US in most parts of the world where, for strategic reasons linked to the protection of its own interests, it has deemed it fit to intervene. In these nations, as indeed has been the case with Pakistan, it has based its policies mainly around the ‘buying up’ of persons in influential positions, or those with the potential to acquire such posts, and backing for a candidate, in most cases a dictator or autocrat, who Washington sees as the most likely candidate to serve its interests.

This explains why men such as Saddam Hussain of Iraq, Raza Shah Pahlavi of Iran, Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Hosni Mobarak of Egypt, Ziaul Haq of Pakistan and other unsavoury dictators have, in times past and present, all served as key US allies.

It is no secret that at present this role in the country is being played by General Pervez Musharraf — a man seen by the US, and indeed by his supporters within the country, as more moderate, but not necessarily less loyal, than the dictators listed above.

As has been the case for others who have walked down the somewhat perilous path of alliance with the US, the biggest peril for Musharraf may, however, lie in the fact that he has failed to take the people of Pakistan along with him on the hand-in-hand promenade he has embarked on with Washington.

His difficulties in enjoying this stroll are further aggravated by the fact that his partner has the power, and the inclination, to painfully twist his arm from time to time, and ensure that no attempt is made to stray even a few metres away from the path mapped out by Washington.

With the majority in the country now walking along an entirely different road, it is also true that the policies followed by the administration do not have public backing. While this may be a matter of limited concern to Washington, which has shown its willingness to over-ride popular opinion across the world in pursuing its strategies of war and conquest, most recently in Iraq, it is certainly a factor that has caused a degree of anxiety in Islamabad.

Advisors to Musharraf have asked him to moderate public statements backing the US line of action, and the rather cowardly refusal of the Pakistan administration to take any line on the war in Iraq, or the vote in the UN Security Council ahead of it, was quite evidently a reflection of this line of reasoning.

With anger against the US also having found its way into the more liberal elements within society, as the extreme right and the remnants of the left united in protests against the Iraq war, it is clear that public sentiment will have a role to play in the future.

Leaders emerging through the political process cannot afford to completely ignore such feelings in the longer run. The fact that they have so far failed to adequately address public concerns explains in part the reasons for the dramatic upsurge of the MMA in the NWFP.

There are also indications, coming mainly from opinion surveys carried out by several non-government organizations, that a similar wave favouring the parties of the religious right that have so far remained non-players on Pakistan’s electoral scene, may be in place in the Punjab — and that groups such as the Jamaat-i-Islami would in any poll held in the near future benefit considerably from this swing in opinion.

However, while it would seem the simmering anger from the events in Iraq are responsible for producing such findings, it is also true that there are other factors that in the longer run have the most significant impact in moulding public opinion against the US.

With unemployment and inflation consistently ranking as the two biggest problems on any list prepared by ordinary citizens, the perception that the US is ‘behind’ policies drafted by the International Monetary Fund or World Bank, or that it is ‘against poor people’ plays a significant part in shaping public sentiment.

While the realities of international economics may be somewhat more complex, the fact remains that socio-economic realities, being aggravated by the policies imposed by outside agents rooted in the first world and mainly in the US, clearly play a huge part in determining patterns of public thinking. With no immediate prospects of an improvement in the economic fortunes of the country, there can be little expectation of dramatic changes in public opinion in the near future.

Other aspects of government policy, such as the bungled campaign against militancy, the random ‘picking up’ of people and the total lack of transparency surrounding such operations, also act to harden lines against the US and its supporters within the country. The sprawling bases established by the US in several locations in the country add to the perception that Pakistan is today little more than a puppet state, reacting to strings pulled by officials based in Washington.

Though tabloid newspapers have made much of reports suggesting that Pakistan could figure on a list of countries that the US has targeted for strikes against militants in the future, this seems an unlikely scenario to most detached observers. Pakistan has consistently proved itself to be the staunchest US ally in the region, events since 9/11 have strengthened this conviction and despite what US think-tanks may report, the prospects of US jets flying bombing raids over Pakistani territory remain extremely remote.

What seems more likely is that such reports are intended to keep the pressure valves turned up high on Pakistan, and limit deviation from approved lines of action.

As far as the broader picture is concerned, the fact remains that Musharraf is more isolated from his people than ever before on the issue of relations with the US. His efforts to take a middle-of-the-road stand on some issues, such as tackling terrorism or dealing with the wide range of militant groups that operate in the country, mean that he has not even succeeded in winning over those opposed to religious extremism.

As such, the man who many saw as promising a better future for the country when he announced his seven-point mission in October, 1999, speaking with a quiet sincerity that has since sadly faded away, has largely succeeded in losing what support existed for him three years ago.

Along the way, he has made a growing number of enemies, and this increased domestic isolation, of course, means that he must place himself firmly in the American camp. He must also hope that Washington does not pull away the scaffolding supporting him as ruthlessly and as swiftly as it has done in the case of allies in the past, both in Pakistan and in other countries around the world.

For the present at least, it is clear that the US still sees Musharraf as a key partner. Pakistan, as has unfortunately been the case for most of its history, remains a country still willing to serve as one of the most loyal allies of the US in the region. The extent to which this unequal and undignified relationship has damaged its own interests and those of its people is all too obvious.

In the immediate future, as Musharraf desperately attempts to untangle the web of domestic problems he faces, dominated by the political stalemate, issues such as the battle against militancy at home and a continuation of the peace process with India will remain high up on the agenda for talks at Camp David. So too will the matter of Kashmir and the insurgency across the Line of Control that India still accuses Pakistan of.

Indeed, how far Washington is able and willing to go to promote improved ties with India may determine the precise nature of its relations with Pakistan in the months ahead. It seems obvious that the situation in the region will play a dominant part in the upcoming talks, as policy-makers in the US speak of the need to encourage Pakistan to look towards South Asia to the East, rather that to the Arab world to the West.

This holds particularly true at a time when the US is looking to play a bigger role in the South Asian region, and appears eager to settle various unresolved issues as per a plan that some insist has already been drawn up and a date set for its implementation.

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