June 8, 2003

‘There are no winners in a nuclear war, and no cause great enough to justify fighting one,’ says Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy

DR Pervez Hoodbhoy believes that the possession of nuclear weapons has given Pakistan a false sense of confidence and security that encouraged it into adventurism, and may well do so again in the future.

Dr Hoodbhoy is a nuclear physicist who teaches at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. A recipient of several professional awards for scientific research, he has written and spoken extensively on topics ranging from science in Islam, to issues of education in Pakistan and nuclear disarmament.

In a recent interview with Dawn Magazine, Dr Hoodbhoy spoke of the dark side of nuclear weapons in the context of South Asia. The following are the excerpts:

Q. Have nuclear weapons brought more security to the region?

A. The evidence is unambiguous, as since the nuclear tests of 1998, we have witnessed two full-blown India-Pakistan confrontations. During the Kargil crisis in 1999, we now know, the Pakistan Army — without the knowledge of prime minister Nawaz Sharif — had mobilized its nuclear-tipped missile fleet. Presumably, the Indians were also in a high state of nuclear readiness.

Q. Do you think that the subcontinent would have been less violent without the nuclear arsenal?

A. Absolutely so. Bellicose, aggressive behaviour has increased sharply since 1998, with the Kargil war being just one consequence. In fact, this war will be recorded by historians as the first that was actually caused by nuclear weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons gave Pakistan a false sense of confidence and security, encouraging it into adventurism in Kashmir and initiating a war. Interestingly enough, the Indians shot themselves in the foot by forcing Pakistan to bring out its nuclear weapons into the open. Now they realize that their options in Kashmir are sharply limited, and the risk of mutual annihilation is a very real one.

Today, in spite of General Musharraf’s speech of January 12, 2002, there is little doubt that militant camps continue to take shelter under Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. They are a curse not only to India, but also for Pakistan and its civil society. If the September 11 event had not occurred, they would have been even stronger. Sectarian Islamic groups have slaughtered hundreds of innocents in the last two years, including over a hundred doctors in Karachi alone.

Q. You seem to agree that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have deterred India from attacking it?

A. There is little doubt that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stopped India from attacking it after the December 13 attack [by jehadists] on the Indian parliament. So in that sense I agree that deterrence did work. It also worked in 1999, and perhaps also in the crises of 1987 and 1990. But will it always work? Islamic jehadists — who must be considered a third force that now operates independent of the Pakistani state — crave for a full-scale war between the two countries. They could easily commit some huge atrocity that would turn India into a mad bull dashing blindly into a nuclear-armed Pakistan.

While Pakistani and Indian hawks, who pose as ‘strategic analysts’ and ‘experts’, loudly trumpet that deterrence has been proven to work, events since 1998 have completely falsified their predictions. Their published claims had been that overt nuclearization would create a stable ‘balance of terror’, making it impossible for either country even to think of attacking the other. They had also predicted smaller expenditures on defence since minimal deterrence had been established. But we have been on the brink of a war several times, and are in the middle of a full-blown arms race. Honesty should compel them to eat their words.

Q. One such analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, says Indians could still sleep in peace because if Pakistani fingers come anywhere near the nuclear button, the US Army will ‘disarm’ Pakistan’s nuclear facilities through surgical strikes. What do you think?

Q. It is dangerous, and complete nonsense. Pakistan, we all know, has once again become a client state of the US, but there are definite limits on the pressure that the US can exert upon Pakistan. It is highly unlikely that the US would even have the knowledge of where the Pakistani nukes are located at any given moment, much less have the will or capacity to destroy them. Remember that nukes mounted on missiles are on mobile launchers, and can be moved anywhere in times of crisis. Trying to destroy nukes is something no nation has ever attempted, and the chances of success are very poor.

Q. At a recent seminar, one participant said losing a conventional war was preferable to unleashing a nuclear holocaust. Do you agree?

A. This makes eminent sense because states can lose wars and re-emerge stronger. Japan and Germany, for instance, suffered greatly in the Second World War, but went on to become leading powers again. On the other hand, if India used nuclear weapons on Pakistan, or vice versa, it would take hundreds of years to recover. Remember, it won’t be just one or two bombs — as happened in Japan, — but dozens.

Q. What are the chances of a nuclear war in the region by accident?

A. In times of crisis, everybody gets nervous. This increases the possibility that wrong information, or deliberate misinformation, could lead to the release of either a missile or an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. These horrific possibilities become more likely as the level of tension rises and as the size of the two nuclear arsenals increases by the year. We should get rid of these terrible toys.

Q. Is India not responsible for the nuclearization of South Asia?

A. Yes, but the BJP and its Hindutva mentality alone is not responsible. The Indian nuclear programme goes back to the time of partition. Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister, and Homi Bhabha, the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, conceived making India a nuclear power. The China-India clash in 1962 gave the appropriate pretext, and we saw the results in 1974. But although India is clearly responsible for driving the nuclear rivalry, Pakistan’s aims have shifted considerably. To counter India’s nuclear weapons has become secondary. Instead, it seeks to use nuclear weapons to achieve foreign policy objectives. There is now the religious dimension, too, with the Islamic parties claiming that the bomb is for Islam.

Q. How can we move away from this nuclear madness?

A. First, we need to understand what nuclear weapons do. As we sit here in Islamabad at the Quaid-i-Azam University — just a mile away from the Presidency and Parliament — just think of what an Indian nuclear attack would mean for us. Fortunately, you and I shall have vapourized in a matter of moments. But people who are at a distance of a few miles from the centre of the explosion won’t be so lucky. They, too, will die, but slowly and painfully from physical injury, radiation sickness, poisoning, cancer or the other horrible ways by which atom bombs inflict death and destruction. The public in Pakistan and India need to be informed that there are no winners in a nuclear war, and no cause great enough to justify fighting one.

Q. Can Civil Defence be effective in the case of a nuclear attack?

A. It cannot reverse tragedy, but definitely can help reduce suffering. Therefore, it is absolutely irresponsible of governments not to make effective provision for Civil Defence. Imagine that a nuclear weapon has been dropped on a city. Is there any pre-planning about how that city’s wounded would be evacuated, and to where? How would the survivors be supplied with non-radioactive food and water? Civil Defence here is a complete joke. The total yearly funds earmarked for the Civil Defence Organization are worth two million rupees, and even that remain on paper. Like ostriches, we bury our head in the sand and think that the danger is not there!

Q. Making an atomic bomb is perceived in Pakistan as a miracle. Is it really a wonder in the world of science?

A. The first atomic bomb was really a tremendous scientific and technological achievement. It required the finest minds in the world to smash the atom and to get the energy out of it and to create a self-sustaining chain reaction. But no longer. Now you have all this information in books, in journals, and even on the Internet. So today, almost any country in the world, leave aside the likes of Somalia and Rwanda, can make bombs. The only thing that you need is money.

Q.. To what extent are our nuclear arsenals safe? Are we still vulnerable to a mishap like the Ojhri disaster?

A. An assembled nuclear weapon can detonate if there is a fire, accidental explosion, or a crash involving an airplane carrying the weapon. This nightmare scenario led US nuclear weapon designers to struggle for more than ten years to develop what are called ‘one-point safe’ nuclear weapons. Pakistani and Indian weapons are unlikely to have these very elaborate safety features, and so the danger of mishaps is non-negligible. Given how prone we are to accidents and sabotage — as evidenced in the Ojhri disaster or the Bhopal gas tragedy — I think there is a real reason for worry.

Q. As an individual, how difficult has it been for you to criticize the establishment despite being a government employee?

A. It is not easy at times, the pressure exists. But Pakistan is a more tolerant society than many people think. We still have a military regime, but it is not oppressive compared to the draconian regime of General Ziaul Haq. Our English-language press is probably just as free as the press in India. It is able to criticize Pakistani leaders very directly, without mincing words. This is a sign of optimism that Pakistan is not a hopeless case where all its people are brainwashed. But there is a dark side, too. Pakistan TV and the Urdu press, which reach many more people than English newspapers, unabashedly promote particular interests.

Q. You were chosen for the prestigious award, the Sitara-e-Imtiaz. Why did you refuse to accept it?

A. Because I do not consider the process by which awards are given as carrying legitimacy. If you give someone an award in a field of science, only a panel of scientists should decide whether that person deserves it or not. A bureaucrat should not have the right to decide that a person — A, B or C — is worthy of some award. The present procedure serves only to create a culture of sycophancy that rewards flatterers.

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