THE recent incidents in Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq are clear indications of the trigger-happy mentality that seems to have gripped the American troops in that country. With the ‘liberated’ Iraqis not showing any real respect to the American troops on the ground, who were assured by their high command of a warm reception, the ordinary foot soldier apparently has had enough of it, and doesn’t feel the need to think twice before applying pressure on the trigger.
After each incident, the US high command issues a routine release that wants the world to believe that the Americans shot down Iraqi people in retaliatory fire. They are not bothered by gaping holes in that stance. For instance, how would they explain the fact that if the fire always comes from the protesting Iraqi masses, as they claim, no US troop has ever been hurt in such street clashes? But superpowers being superpowers, their acts of omission and commission are not accountable.
The avowed US effort to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, however, loses whatever little momentum it gains every time its troops indulge in instant, on-the-spot justice that they are distributing these days. Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet, for instance, published photos of armed US soldiers forcing a group of Iraqi men to walk naked through a park. On the chests of the men had been scrawled an Arabic phrase that translated as ‘Ali Baba — Thief’.
They were summarily found guilty of theft, forced at gunpoint to strip, had a racist phrase written on their bodies, and then made to walk naked in public. No doubt the world, especially the Muslim part of it, is quite impressed by this display of ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘due process’, and ‘no cruel or unusual punishment’ by the Americans.
As narrated a couple of days later by Daily Mirror’s Chris Haris, the group was paraded in front of a jeering Baghdad crowd. One of the men, 20-year-old Zain Djumma, told Chris later that he and his friends had entered the park, used by Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard for weapons storage, to search for one of their young brothers.
But the Americans said the men were carrying a bag with spare parts for weapons. The trooper allegedly responsible was also defiant. First Lieutenant Eric Canaday of Delta Squadron’s 10th Engineer Corps, said: “I don’t think this kind of action is excessive. We have done it once before to another man we found looting, and it worked perfectly.”
As newspaper accounts go, the fearful suspects were shoved at gunpoint into a tent where they were stripped. With the help of a Muslim soldier in the unit, they were then daubed with insults and forced into the street to brave the crowd.
“It was horrendous,” said Zain, adding that all he wanted now was “to find a hand grenade and throw it at the soldiers. I hate them for this.” Another came even closer to echoing the popular sentiment in Iraq these days when he said: “... If this is US democracy, they can keep it. It is just another way of keeping people in their place.”
Amnesty International immediately took notice of the incident, saying it was an “appalling way to treat prisoners”, and that “such degrading treatment is a clear violation of US responsibilities.”
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention clearly states that, “protected persons are entitled in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manner and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity”. But the thing is that the Americans, citizens of the world’s sole hyperpower that they are, don’t believe in global charters, conventions and institutions.
Though the New York Post did quote an official from the US Central Command as saying that it was looking into reports of the incident, nothing much is expected out of such in-house inquiries. One wonders why the US Army did not apply this street-smart dispensation of naked justice on its soldiers who stole $13.1 million in Iraq.
As described by David Zucchino in the Boston Globe, US Army commanders conceded that military personnel had taken $13.1 million from huge caches of foreign currency that were found by fellow soldiers in an exclusive Baghdad neighbourhood.
A soldier with knowledge of the missing money had pangs of guilt and told the investigators where to find the cash. That soldier has been cleared, but five others were still under investigation. Notably, the five have not been charged even though their identities were known to the commanders. The commanders simply said the five faced charges ranging from a letter of reprimand to a full court martial, which could include prison time. But no ‘naked’ justice, you see.
With each such incident — and, of course, like the ones in Fallujah — the American battle to win the minds and hearts of Iraqi people suffer a serious setback, but since they have kept taking place with disturbing frequency, it is practical to assume that the mind-and-heart slogan is little more than a political facade behind which the ‘liberator’ has little concern for the life and honour of the ‘liberated’.
This brings us to an interesting piece of journalism that tries to explain why the ‘liberator’ should not expect the ‘liberated’ to be grateful. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, writing for the Times of India, has drawn a few parallells between the American campaign in Iraq and the Indian experience with Bengalis in 1971. Sounds interesting, isn’t it? Let’s see.
“When the Iraq war began, some drew parallells with the Vietnam war, some with the Afghanistan war of 2001, some with the Gulf War of 1991. In fact, the best parallel is with the 1971 Indo-Pak war. That, in turn, provides some sobering clues to the US on the likely post-war outcome,” writes Swaminathan, arguing rightly that the US sought regime change in Iraq in 2003, while India had similar intentions in 1971, “converting East Pakistan into an independent Bangladesh”.
On both occasions, he recalls, the United Nations was opposed to the idea of war. Besides, “most countries saw India’s invasion as an excuse for a quite different political agenda, the break-up of Pakistan”.
In 2003, the US is also widely accused of using Saddam’s supposed non-compliance with a UN resolution to achieve a different political agenda. “There is much truth in both accusations,” concedes a truthful Swaminathan.
Some of the parallells he has drawn in a build-up to his main argument are worth having a look at, and here they are:
* The Indian triumph in 1971 made it the dominant power in South Asia. The US is now the dominant power in the Middle East.
* In 1971, Pakistani forces fortified cities en route to the capital, but Indian forces bypassed these and went straight for Dhaka. The US did the same in going straight for Baghdad.
* In both cases, many Muslim countries talked of ‘brave’ Muslim soldiers teaching the invader a lesson, but in both cases the war ended with little resistance within three weeks.
* India defended its invasion as being liberation of an oppressed people. The US is defending its invasion on the same ground.
Going on a slight tangent, Swaminathan says many may think that the 1971 war was started by Pakistan, not India. On December 3, 1971, Pakistani bombers attacked Indian military targets, and Indian mass media declared that this started the war. “In fact, Indian troops had invaded East Pakistan two weeks earlier, on November 21. The Indian invasion was widely reported in the global press, but suppressed by the tame Indian press, which toed the official Indian line that its troops had not crossed the border.”
Returning to the parallells, he says the list can go on and on, and there are lessons to be learnt by the US from the Indian experience. Though the Indian case in 1971 was “surely stronger”, and the Indian troops “surely got a warmer welcome in Bangladesh than the US did in Iraq”, the initial welcome and goodwill India had in Bangladesh evaporated “fairly quickly”. India believed it could look forward to friendly governments in Dhaka, but soon found strongly anti-Indian governments in power. Strong anti-Indian rhetoric was voiced in every Bangladeshi election. “Something similar will surely happen in Iraq, too.”
The Indian press declared in 1971 that the earlier hostility with Pakistan was due substantially to military dictatorship, and that the emergence of democracy in Bangladesh would replace hostility with friendship. “This turned out to be rubbish, yet similar predictions are being made in the American press about Iraq”.
He goes on: “After 1971, the liberator (to its hurt astonishment) was constantly accused by the liberated of imperial ambitions, of wanting to govern by proxy. The very fact that the liberator was so large, and the liberated country so small, made suspicion inevitable. Nor was the suspicion 100 per cent unwarranted.” Ditto for the US and Iraq.
After 1971, trade relations between India and Bangladesh grew fast, but produced more friction than goodwill. Bangladeshis accused Indian traders and businessmen of exploiting their dominant position, “of being cheats and hoisting sub-standard goods at high prices on captive customers,” writes Swaminathan, expecting “similar accusations from Iraqis against US businessmen”.
The bottom line, according to him, is clear. “Never expect ‘liberated’ people to be grateful to powerful ‘liberators’ who, using military might, are actually fulfilling private agendas.” There is little, if anything, that could be added to it. False accusations, military might and private agendas. Yes, that’s the crux of it all.