The MMA is ruling the public as well as parliament. At a time when the country is going through such a painful period of uncertainty, and where the public is on the verge of political fatigue, a strategy of political confusion can help hide the gnawing gaps in their threadbare manifesto
THESE are troubled times, and, characteristically, there are questions agitating the minds of many. Are Islam and fundamentalism synonymous? Are Islam and terrorism synonymous? Indeed, are MMA and fundamentalism synonymous? These and such other questions are mostly answered defensively and rather nebulously.
The West seems to find its own theoretical framework in trying to correlate Islam with terrorism and fundamentalism, and use this framework to orchestrate demonic plans of destroying these politically imploding forces.
The East uses it as a platform to create a patriotic fever in the economically repressed and frustrated individuals who see the West as a bunch of rich robber-barons who have a history of looting the poor countries, and are now bent upon raiding their resources, and, more than that, invading their religious dignity and beliefs.
As these opposing perceptions continue to divide the East and the West, it is time to reflect on the sustainability of these perceptions and their impact on the political future of Pakistan.
The last elections were stunning due to the amazing rise of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal as a political entity challenging the duopoly of the Muslim League and the Peoples Party. To many eyes, their victory was understandable in view of the strong anti-US sentiment in the region. They cleverly seized on such sentiments, especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan, and have managed to create enough uproar post elections to make their presence felt in and outside Parliament.
There was, and remains, another school of thought which believes that electoral performance was largely manufactured by the establishment to underline its own importance in the eyes of the US and to have a few more chips on the bargaining table.
There are others who theorize that the MMA was, in fact, a creation of the military establishment. The religious parties, they argue, have always had a special relationship with the military. After all, it was the cadre of the religious parties that sustained the Afghan and Kashmir policies of the Pakistan Army. Days after the general election, former ISI chief Hamid Gul went on record saying the military and the religious parties were “natural allies”. It was only after Gen Pervez Musharraf began to oblige one American request after another that a crack appeared between the right-wingers and the military.
Regardless of whether it was an orchestrated victory or an encashment of anti-US sentiments, the question is, will this victory give them enough voter credibility to make them win another election? History somehow does not answer in the affirmative.
Ever since the creation of Pakistan, the religious Right has been struggling to establish a foothold in the country’s mainstream politics. The liberals of various hues used to claim that the Right had never been able to muster double-digit figures in terms of seats or vote percentage. But that, of course, has changed now.
Jamaat-i-Islami is the senior-most partner in the MMA coalition, and a quick look at its electoral history will reflect on the way the Right, as a whole, has fared. It has undergone some changes in the past decade, especially under its present Amir, Qazi Husain Ahmed. As long as it remained an ideological party and observed strict rules for membership, it found little support among the masses. Once it transformed itself into a mass-based party, its electoral fortunes changed.
It is clear that the Jamaat is no longer the party its founder, the late Maulana Maudoodi, had established on August 26, 1941. Then, it was purely an ideological party whose programme was not confined to any specific territory, because Islam, as a universal religion, is applicable to all places and at all times.
Between 1941 and 1957, the Jamaat confined itself to propagating the message of Islam and training the manpower that was expected to transform the nation-state of Pakistan into an Islamic state. Maulana Maudoodi was adamant that the masses had no role in electing the leader of the Islamic state, the task being the exclusive domain of the ahl al-hal wal’aqd, or the enlightened elite.
The Jamaat’s first electoral contest was fought in an alliance of several political parties in 1964 under the umbrella of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP), to try to remove a military dictator, the self-styled Field Marshal Ayub Khan. The COP candidate was Miss Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the Quaid-i-Azam, whom Maulana Maudoodi had described as a secular man.
The Jamaat’s next experience at elections — organized by another military dictator, General Yahya Khan, in October 1970 ended in disaster for both the party and the country. Just before the elections, Maulana Maudoodi had claimed that the Jamaat would sweep the polls. It won only four of the 300 National Assembly seats, and one seat each in the provincial assemblies.
Since 1970, the Jamaat has contested only one election on its own; in 1993 when it formed a new group called the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF), and fielded 103 candidates for the 217-member National Assembly. Operating under the new label, it also freed itself from the strict membership rules that applied to the Jamaat, and resorted to the kind of gimmicks — party songs, noisy rallies et all — that had thus far been denounced by the Jamaat as unbecoming of an Islamic party. Despite putting on a new face, the Jamaat won only three seats. Before the elections there had been much media hype that it would emerge as a major force, but that was not to be. Stung by the experience, the Jamaat boycotted the elections in 1997. But 2002 changed it all after the Jamaat joined hands with other religious parties.
There is little doubt that the emergence of the alliance of religious parties as the third force in national politics is yet another outcome of the September 11, 2001 terrorist strike in the United States and its aftermath. Even optimists in the alliance had not dreamed that they would actually rule the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan which together account for over 60 per cent of the country in geographical terms.
This was a first of its kind in the political history of Pakistan when six traditionally fratricidal religious parties forgot their past and united on the electoral platform on the basis of a common anti-US agenda. The MMA was born only weeks before the elections. Its surprise victory — bagging 45 seats in the 272-member National Assembly and ruling majorities in the NWFP and Baluchistan — has set in motion intense analysis and speculation.
Analysts believe it was “mainly the Jamaat’s brain and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam’s (JUI) brawn that led to the surprise victory”, and that Mansura, the well-organized and well-equipped headquarters of the Jamaat, “played its usual magic to run the MMA campaign in an effective manner”.
Though anti-Americanism did work in their favour, an equal role was played by the fact that the alliance had brought together a spectrum of religious thought. The Deobandis were represented by the Fazl and Sami factions of JUI, the Barelvis were there under Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, the Jamiat Ahle Hadith was there, while the Shia community was represented by the Tehrik Millat-e-Islami Pakistan. This naturally had a positive impact on the voter.
But differences do exist among the leaders. For instance, the two JUI factions openly support the Taliban’s worldview, while the Jamaat is more tactful on the issue. However, all the six are unanimous in their opposition to the government’s decision to join the so-called War Against Terror. This is what is sustaining them for the time being.
Having reached thus far, religious parties are faced with a dilemma of their own creation. Having committed themselves to the electoral process, they cannot now think of alternatives to the system. Though the MMA secured a significant number of seats, the divergent outlook of the various components leaves them open to exploitation by the establishment.
Electoral defeat may create temporary despondency, but then soul-searching ensures the same mistakes are not repeated in the future. Electoral victory, however, brings pressures of a different kind: to keep electoral promises made to the electorate. This can only be done if one has power and authority. Without the resources of a state at their disposal, MMA supporters may feel disappointed. Power is only available at the pleasure of the establishment, which, in Pakistan’s case, is represented by the military-bureaucratic-feudal alliance, that, in turn, must please the US.
To hope for any real breakthrough in such an environment is a grand delusion. They have done well in the NWFP and Baluchistan, the two provinces that border Afghanistan, but, given the reality of the US military presence in Pakistan, the MMA will never be allowed anywhere near the actual levers of power. How would, then, they fulfil their pledge to banish American forces from Pakistan?
Their hands may be tied on this vital issue, but there are other equally important concerns on which they have to do a lot of explaining to convince the nation of their potential to provide a true and effective alternative to the existing setup. Let us have a look at some of their own contradictions.
DEMOCRACY Vs AUTOCRACY: Traditionally, the behaviour of political parties before and after elections is highly contradictory. Every party comes in with an ambitious agenda of socio-economic reforms, which it fails to fulfil. The MMA encashed the anti-American sentiment, but have gone silent on the issue for reasons already mentioned. They have since changed tracks, making noise now against the military.
Their post-election theme is to restore democracy and ensure constitutional sanctity. Their insistence on the removal of the President’s military uniform is ironic considering that they had such a cozy relationship with the uniformed Ziaul Haq during and after the overthrow of the Bhutto regime. At that time it was a movement against a democratic set up, while the same lot is now raising the slogan of ‘complete’ democracy.
EQUALITY AND DISPARITY: The MMA has been very vocal in denying its ideological resemblance to the Taliban. Every other day there are statements claiming that they do not believe in gender discrimination. They have also proclaimed that women will have equal opportunity in the socio-economic milieu. And then one hears about posters featuring women being torn down. This, of course, is just one example of the gap between their words and deeds.
Their interpretation of the Sharia and its implementation in the NWFP further belies their claims of moderation. With most partners in the alliance having a history of supporting gender discrimination and thriving on religious and sectarian disparities, it seems highly unlikely that given the opportunity to come to the federal locus of control, they will not spread the menace across the country, thus promoting a culture of division and isolation.
WELFARE OR WARFARE: The MMA has claimed to be at war against all anti-Islamic forces, especially the US, and they have also promised to restore power to the masses. How do they intend to do that? Is it by arming them with guns and creating a mini-Afghanistan in the North, or by providing them with basic social services and livelihood to increase their ability to improve their lives?
Despite some initial slogans on education, they seem to have shed all pretence about how they plan to provide health, employment and education to the masses in the two provinces where they have a direct responsibility. Their manifesto is strangely silent on such issues.
Besides, if they are planning to boycott everything American, how do they plan to cope with the economic repercussions of such a stance? How are they planning to service the astronomical debt? How are they planning to stabilize the national economy? How are they planning to finance projects of social and economic development? The list of such practical queries, indeed, is endless.
Without answers to these questions, no entity can claim to have a vision for the stability and progress of the country. The absence of such policies and plans will inevitably lead the nation on a track of poverty, isolation, frustration and terrorism, thus perpetuating the vicious circle of de-development.
CONCLUSION: For the first time in the political history of Pakistan, a party without any social or economic agenda worth its name has won such a high votebank. There was the anti-American sentiment, alright, but the voters were also disillusioned with the other political parties that they had been voting for. It was as much a case of voting against them, as it was that of voting in favour of the MMA. Besides, the establishment had its own vested interest in the matter.
So far, the MMA, beyond doubt, is ruling both the parliament and the public. Their strategy till date has been to create political disturbance. And it appears to be a well thought out strategy. At a time when the country is going through such a painful period of unrest, and where the public is on the verge of political fatigue, a strategy of political confusion can help hide the gnawing gaps in their threadbare manifesto.
The big question is, how long will it take the public to realize their consistently inconsistent stance, rhetoric and behaviour pattern?