In response to the demand of Pakistan, Congress put forward the Rajaji Formula which formed the basis of Jinnah-Gandhi talks in 1944. They parleyed for 18 days, but to no avail
THE first Congress’s official reference to the Pakistan demand came in its Working Committee’s resolution on the Cripps’ proposals on April 11, 1942. Inter alia, it said, “...Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break of that unity especially in the modern world ... would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will....”
Surprisingly though, former Madras Congress Premier C. Rajagopalachari’s (1879-1972) (popularly known as Rajaji) resolution on Pakistan in the AICC on May 2, 1942, which in essence rephrased the above resolution was rejected by 120 to 15 votes. The operative part of C.R’s resolution read as follows:
“... inasmuch as the Muslim League has insisted on the recognition of the right of separation of certain areas from united India upon the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of such areas, as condition precedent for united national action at this moment of grave national danger, the A.I.C.C. is of opinion that to sacrifice the chances of the formation of a National Government at this grave crisis for the doubtful advantage of maintaining a controversy over the unity of India is a most unwise policy and that it has become necessary to choose the lesser evil and acknowledge the Muslim League’s claim for separation, should the same be persisted in when the time comes for framing a constitution for India,...”
On the same day the AICC passed by 92 to 17 votes a counter resolution, since known after Jagat Narayan Lal, the mover. It said,
“... that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component state or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people.... and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal.”
Clearly, this resolution was at variance with the Working Committee’s earlier resolution of April 11. This variance was noted by Rajagopalchari in his August 16, 1942 statement: “I have tried hard to get from the Congress an explicit settlement of this question and admit that I have failed so far. But what has been denied in the terms I wanted is practically conceded in other terms...”
In any case, the Congress’s resolution of April 11 and May 2, 1942 (Jagat Narayan Lal resolution) formed the base for all its subsequent pronouncements on the Pakistan demand. The Congress’s stance was that they would consider conceding the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan, provided (i) a common centre was maintained, (ii) the territorial unit or part thereof expressed itself for secession through its “declared and established will”; and (iii) the non-Muslim majority areas in Assam, Bengal and the Punjab were not to be compelled to join Pakistan.
The Gandhi-blessed Rajaji formula (1944) put forward similar conditions for a settlement between the Congress and Muslim League. It stipulated, among other things, the following: (i) “a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held the basis of adult franchise or other practicable franchise” in “contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority... shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan”; (ii) border districts to be given “the right... to choose to join either state”; (iii) “mutual agreements... for safeguarding defence, and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes”; and (iv) these terms would be binding after complete transfer of power to Indian hands.
Jinnah’s counter-terms were: (i) plebiscite of only the Muslims in the Pakistan areas since they demand Pakistan on the premise that they constituted a nation by themselves, and were entitled to the right of self-determination; (ii) the six existing provinces, with minor alternations, to form the new state; (iii) it should be sovereign; and (iv) the division must precede, and not follow, the transfer of power to Indian hands. Jinnah also objected to the plethora of pre-conditions, which rendered the Rajaji Formula almost unfeasible and unworkable.
The Formula was, however, accepted as the basis of prolonged Jinnah-Gandhi talks in September 1944. They parleyed for 18 days (9-27 September) at Jinnah’s residence in Bombay, but to no avail. The talks failed because Gandhi would not budge from his previous stance; in fact, he would concede nothing. While himself aspiring to the leadership of India’s four hundred million, he would yet stoutly refuse to consider the League as the sole political spokesman of India Muslims. Nor would Gandhi recognize the Musalmans’ right to separate nationhood. Instead, he would assign them a status no better than that of a “body of coverts”.
In response to the demand of Pakistan, Congress put forward the Rajaji Formula which formed the basis of Jinnah-Gandhi talks in 1944. They parleyed for 18 days, but to no avail 
