CHAPTERS FROM HISTORY: The indomitable Sardar Patel
By Prof Sharif al Mujahid
IF the Indian National Congress had turned out to be so formidable and impregnable in terms of its organization and discipline during the 1930s and 1940s, it was due to one man - Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1975). Often called “the iron man” of the Congress, he was most powerful within the party, the ruthless party boss. Although Gandhi chose Nehru as heir-apparent, the rightist Sardar was closer to Gandhi. No wonder, for about three decades (1920s-1950) he served as a counterpoise to the leftist Nehru, and was a serious rival on several occasions. A stern and no-nonsense man, Patel alone could have accomplished the almost impossible task of integrating the motley crowd of over 500 princely states of all sizes and all sorts within the Indian Union, within a short span of 13 months. How ruthless he was, what bluff, bluster and bludgeon he had most non-challantly resorted to - are, however, beside, the point.
His unmatched organization abilities, his eye for detail and discipline, was squarely reflected in, among others, how doggedly and how efficiently the 70-year old Sardar organized the Congress campaign during the critical 1945-46 elections, from his sick-bed in Poona, especially in the Muslim constituencies, on which hinged the demand for Pakistan. The indefatigable Patel spent a good deal of time, and carried on a heavy load of correspondence with, besides Maulana Azad and the Congress leaders in the provinces, to keep himself abreast about what was happening in the Muslim constituencies. He inquired of Asaf Ali, the Congress stalwart (October 5, 1945), as to what happened in Delhi in the meeting of Nationalist Muslim organizations on September 8, 1945, followed by the setting up of a Central Azad Board and an Azad Muslim Parliamentary Board. He asked Pandit Vallabhabhai Pant (U.P.)(October 21), “What is going to happen about the Muslim seats of the Central Assembly in your province?” He wrote to Hare Krishna Mahtab (Orissa) (November 11), “I hope you are contesting all the seats, including the Muslim and special constituencies?” He asked Babu Rajendra Prasad (Bihar) (October 15), ‘whether the Congress is going to contest any (Muslim) seat? Are there any independent Muslims contesting?’ Ten weeks later, he reminded him (December 29), “I am awaiting a report from you about the results of your discussion with the various Muslim groups in your province.” Six weeks later, he told Prasad (February 6 1946), that he had ‘not heard anything about your provincial election particularly the Muslim constituencies’. He cautioned Sarat Bose (Bengal) (December 25) ‘to be more careful in selecting the Muslim candidates’ for the provincial polls in Bengal. He asked Azad (January 8, 1946) to go to the N.W.F.P. ‘in order to contract whatever mischief that may have been done by Mr. Jinnah’s visit there’, early in November. He inquired of Choithram Gidwani (President, Sind Provincial Congress Committee) (November 6), “What about Muslim seat in the Centre? Is the position of the League serious and has the opponent (Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi) any chance of success?” He told Vazirani (Sindh) (December 20), “Hope you all will now be able to work in cooperation for the Muslim constituencies contest”. After G.M. Sayed’s rebellion in late December Patel hoped (January 8, 1946) that ‘with the consolidation of our forces, the question of defeating the League will be much easier’. He asked Bhim Sen Sachar (Punjab) (December 23), “What is the position and strength... of the Unionist Party and what is your estimate about the strength of the League? How may independent Muslims will be returned and how many Congress Muslims...?” He reminded Sachar (December 30), “The Punjab is a prosperous and key province of Pakistan”; indeed, “The Punjab holds the key to the future of India,” he warned Sachar (January 8, 1946). Hence, he asked Sarat Bose (December 30) to send him ‘a full report of your impressions about our position of the Unionists vis-a-vis the League, and more particularly, as to ‘how many seats the Congress or the independent Muslims will get from the Muslim will get from the Muslim constituencies’, in the Punjab.
Since the Sardar also controlled the election chest, he personally attended to the Congress’s candidates’ financial needs, trying to get every rupee pay in terms of results. For instance, when Azad reported that ‘the Ahrars, are... in great need of help’, Patel responded by sending a cheque for Rs.50,000/- making it clear to Azad and the Punjab leadership that he ‘was expected to help them only in the matter of Muslim constituencies’.
All financial requests met his careful scrutiny. Thus, he told Maulana Daud Ghaznavi (President, Punjab Congress Committee) (January 8, 1946) that his demand for Rs. 600,000 was a little too exorbitant, adding that Sachar had demanded only Rs. 500,000, while ‘Maulvi Ghani of Ludhiana has assured 51 seats if only Rs.200,000 are granted.’
On a request from Azad, Patel sent, first, Rs. 100,000, and then another Rs. 50,000 to Bengal (January 1 and 8, 1946). For Sind, Patel reminded Jairam Daulatram (December 26) ‘about the estimates you gave me at Calcutta in consultation with Khan Abdus Samad Khan’. Patel also assured Azad (October 26) about meeting the NWFP and Assam ‘requirements’, adding “I have advised them to contest all the Muslim seats. They had at first decided not to contest a large number of Muslim seats for fear of financial difficulties.”
Clearly, Patel gave utmost attention to Bengal and Punjab since they mattered the most in deciding the Pakistan issue one way or the other. He also made it clear that the funds allocated by him were for Muslim candidates and Muslim constituencies only. And, above all, it was the unmatched, indefatigable Sardar who, more than anyone else, had helped to coordinate and organize the scattered, lumpen anti-League forces into a formidable front, to give a deadly fight to the Muslim League at the hustings in the 1945-46 elections.
