Filtering out the pomp and sentiment, which unfortunately is found in abundance on both sides of the border, if we keep digging for substance, we will for sure come across writers on both sides of the divide who have the audacity and courage to separate facts from fiction. Among such writers, you will find a broad consensus on the sequence of events leading to the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict. Though there are many links in the chain of events leading to the 1965 war but the two pivotal ones are:
- Liberation of Goa by India from Portuguese rule in 1961.
- Sino-India war in 1962.
India became a republic on 26th January 1950. Only a few colonies in India were then left under foreign rule. The most important among them was the Portuguese colony of Goa.
Michael Brecher in his book ‘India and World Politics’ (University Press-Toronto 1968) states that Portugal kept on regarding Goa as her integral part. It also had the support of the US which kept alive the option of using Goa as a NATO base. Internal pressure on Nehru to liberate the coastal town finally gave way to ‘Operation Vijay’.
The battle for Goa commenced on 18th December 1961 with the Indian army entering Goa from three directions. There was hardly any resistance and within hours, Portuguese surrendered unconditionally on December 19th 1961.
It was this victory, which gave India a false sense of invincibility. Vice Admiral (retd) Mihir K Roy in his book ‘War in the Indian Ocean’ (Lancer Publishers, New Delhi-1995) describes the sequence of events, “There were several fallouts of Operation Vijay. USA and European powers looked askance at India’s military machine and assisted the military dictatorship of Pakistan to counter balance India’s strength. India on the other hand was content to bask in the success of a victory without any credible opposition and hence neglected the lessons learnt from Operation Vijay for which Delhi had to pay a heavy price both in the 1962 conflict with China and the succeeding Indo-Pak conflict in 1965.”
This victory which was the first link of the chain of events leading to 1965 Indo-Pak conflict perhaps gave Indians a high morale. However, what the Indians failed to appreciate was the fact that merely high morale without a corresponding investment in national security was nothing but an exercise in wishful thinking. For this illusion, they had to pay a high price.
Indian authors who have the audacity to look at events eyeball to eyeball make no bones about the complete Indian rout in 1962 Sino-Indian war. Vice Admiral Mihir K Roy in his book, ‘War in the Indian Ocean’ states categorically that the boast of Indian Defence Minister Krishna Menon that he could alone fight the Chinese single handed. Mihir further states that the Sino-Indian conflict confirmed the weakness in overall planning and direction of war which had been evident from the Goa Operation where the lopsided victory obliterated the weaknesses of India’s defence system. D.R. Mankekar in his book ‘Twenty Two Fateful Days’ (printed in 1966 by Manaktala and Sons (Pvt) Ltd.) defines the Chinese victory as follows:
“The 1962 humiliation ranked deep in the mind. The Indian Army smarted under it. The nation was going through a bout of mental depression almost amounting to self-flagellation. Self-depreciation was the keynote of the press comment and leaders speeches and statements.” Mankekar concludes that in the international arena India’s efforts for a breakthrough resembled those of a caged animal desperately trying to break out.
India was thus cut to size by the Chinese and had to pay a huge price for the euphoria created by the lopsided victory over Portuguese.
As they say there are two ways of rising in the world either by one’s own industry or profiting by the foolishness of others. Pakistan tried the latter. As so rightly stated by Ayaz Amir in one of his articles “the brightest minds then in the government and the army conceived the steps, which led to the 65’ war. The subcontinent’s only self appointed field marshal, opted for a limited adventure in Kashmir and for their pains saw the country sucked into a full fledged war with India.” Carried away by the Chinese victory, Ayub Khan’s highly inflated notions like ‘one Pakistani is equal to three Indians’ led to the border intrusion in the remote Rann of Kutch area in April 1965. This was maybe done by way of a probing test to gauge the mood and the capabilities of the Indian Army. It was the prelude of a more ambitious operation scheduled some four months later.
Finally Operation Grand Slam was launched by first inducting tribals into the valley of Kashmir followed by an armoured thrust across the international border in the Chamba Sector to capture Akhnoor in order to cut communications to prevent additional forces being rushed to Jammu and Kashmir.
Mao Tse-tung military dictum that ‘in strategy underestimate your enemy, but in tactics always overestimate him’ was completely misunderstood by Ayub Khan. The Indians did not limit the war front to Kashmir and that is where Ayub Khan underestimated his adversary in tactics.
Summarizing then, the million dollar question is ‘Who won the 1965 War?’ As stated by Mankekar in his book, in the last chapter “Neither country won the war. It was inevitably an inconclusive war. It was too short to be otherwise. But it is equally true that Pakistan lost the war, in that she failed to win her military objectives.” However there is no denying the fact that Pakistan achieved victory at some fronts due to the dedicted gallantry of mostly junior officers and jawans.
This fact is acknowledged by Indian authors as well. As an example Pakistan Navy’s bombardment of the port of Dwarka is praised by Mankekar who states in his subject book that Dwarka may not have been of much Naval importance but it must be conceded that ‘the Indian Navy was caught napping’
