November 02, 2008

 Reviewed By Sabih Mohsin
 

Americans believe themselves to be, economically and militarily, the most powerful nation in the world, and they are undoubtedly so. They think that they have a role to play in international politics and here, too, they are very right. They consider themselves to be the promoters and enforcers of liberal ideas such as democracy, self-determination and respect for other states’ sovereignty, but this is something one can hardly swallow.

Plentiful land and a wealth of natural and mineral resources make the US economy large and strong. With that kind of economy they can well afford a large military force equipped with the most sophisticated and technologically advanced weapons. These factors entitle them to play a significant role internationally.

However, their track record in respect of democracy, hardly justifies their claim. They have toppled elected governments such as those of Dr Mosaddaq in Iran and Salvador Allende in Chile, and patronised monarchs and dictators in different parts of the globe. As for self-determination and respect for other states’ sovereignty, we have our own experiences in Kashmir and in South Waziristan. Despite a UN resolution supporting the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris, India continues to occupy their land for more than half a century and the US has kept its eyes closed to that situation. In South Waziristan, US ground and air forces have been intruding into our sovereign territory in spite of protests.

In the book under review, Reluctant Crusaders, the author has analysed the foreign policies adopted by the US since the days of President Woodrow Wilson when, for the first time, Americans began to take part in international affairs. According to Colin Dueck, the author of the book, Americans consider themselves and their country ‘as morally and politically distinct from, and superior to, the Old World.’ They also believe that ideas like democracy, human rights and open markets are beneficial for the entire world and that it should be a ‘special mission’ for the US to promote and enforce them worldwide.

Further, the book tells us that though there is fairly wide agreement in the US over the principle of promoting a more liberal world order, there are differences on how to achieve this end. One group of opinion leaders, whom the author calls the ‘crusaders’, believes that the US must promote democracy and freedom abroad by force, if necessary. They argue that to protect and preserve the American liberal system at home, it is imperative to put an end to all despotic and undemocratic regimes, any where in the world. This group of opinion leaders was quite weak up to 1941, but has grown increasingly influential after that. It has especially made a great impact on American policy makers since 9/11.

Members of another school of thought, whom the author calls the ‘exemplarists’, believe that the US can best promote liberal ideas in other countries by setting an example at home. They want the US to remain aloof from the messiness of international politics. They maintain that the US should support freedom and democracy everywhere, but should not intervene militarily for this purpose. This school of thought had a dominating influence during the years prior to 1941, and keeps on emerging from time to time since the Vietnam War.

 

According to the author, Americans consider themselves and their country ‘as morally and politically distinct from, and superior to, the Old World.’ They also believe that ideas like democracy, human rights and open markets are beneficial for the entire world and that it should be a ‘special mission’ for the US to promote and enforce them worldwide.

 

Interestingly, the author mentions some ‘skeptics’ as well. They feel that though the US administration claims to promote democracy and other liberal ideas overseas, they actually follow a policy of protecting the strategic and economic interests of the US. The rhetoric about democracy is used only to build up domestic support for these policies.

The skeptics are in fact very close to the truth, because there are so many cases where highly idealistic objectives were claimed by the US administration for actions actually taken in their own national interest, or even in the interest of certain American industrial or commercial groups. To quote a recent example, the US invasion of Iraq was declared to have been undertaken to protect the region from weapons of mass destruction — later revealed to be non-existent — and to establish democracy in that country. However, now even some American scholars agree that the military action was actually taken to secure control of Iraqi oil.

The author admits that ‘there is no doubt that the US pursues liberal international goals in a manner that is often hypocritical, rhetorical, or self-serving.’ But he hastens to justify the conflict between the professed goals and the actual line of action followed by the US, by resorting to such excuses as ‘operational pragmatism’ and the requirements of an ‘effective conduct of national security policy.’

He points out that American concern for ‘limited liability’ is another important factor that has often affected the US foreign policy. In spite of their immense material power and capabilities, Americans have never been enthusiastic about military interventions abroad because of the costs and risks involved, particularly in terms of American casualties. Quoting examples from the Cold War era and subsequent developments, the author maintains that the US has always committed a much smaller liability in relation to its declared high foreign policy goals, and also relative to its actual material strength. Some recent examples are the half-hearted US interventions in Somalia and the Balkans.

The US was unwilling to risk the lives of its soldiers when it launched the war against Taliban in 2001. Northern Alliance forces were, therefore, used for all fighting on the ground, while American forces supported them with air strikes only. Though the Taliban were defeated, the US missed the opportunity to capture Osama, which was — allegedly — the basic objective of that war. The author believes that if, defying the tradition of limited liability, US troops had been involved in ground fighting, and the outcome would have been more rewarding.

He is correct in his assessment and, it may be added, had the top leadership of Al-Qaeda been captured in Afghanistan at that time, the US would not have faced, as it does today, the possibility of another dreadful war to be fought in South Waziristan. Such a war will not only be costly in terms of blood and money, but could also result in the loss of a very important ally in the war on terror, that is, Pakistan.

Analysing the Bush administration’s performance, the author says that initially it intended to follow a less interventionist policy, though they emphasised military preparedness. However, 9/11 changed all that as, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, it offered the US, an ‘opportunity to re-fashion the world’ — to their own liking, of course. Taking a much harder line after 9/11, Bush administration re-affirmed US supremacy, and expressed the determination to enforce democracy and other liberal ideas and to take up pre-emptive wars against what they called the ‘rogue states’. Two major actions taken under that policy, were the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The author is critical of both, not because he was opposed to them but since, in his opinion, these were not conducted in a proper manner.

He feels that adherence to limited liability in Afghanistan, not only prevented the real objective to be achieved but also resulted, in the absence of sufficient military and financial investment in postwar stability, in a government too weak to exercise any control outside Kabul.

In Iraq, the Bush administration realised that Saddam would not be overthrown unless US ground troops were involved. However, as the author points out, their calculations were too optimistic. They had expected that US forces would be welcomed by the Iraqis and it would be possible for them — after removing Saddam — to transfer power to a friendly (read puppet) interim government and withdraw quickly without sustaining many casualties.

But American soldiers had to face stiff resistance from the Iraqis. The removal of Saddam created a power vacuum and the invading army did not immediately move forward to fill the void. In the meantime there was looting and complete disorder which, the book tells us, ultimately took the form of an insurgency against the US forces. Although the Bush administration had not foreseen the need for a postwar nation building plan, ultimately they had to seek the approval of the Congress for a costly long term plan for reconstruction in Iraq. The author believes that, ‘it was an illusion to think that a stable, secure, and democratic Iraq could arise without a significant long term US investment of both blood and treasure.’

Some other factors affecting US foreign policy have also been mentioned, such as considerations necessitated by a desire to win elections, and also the quality of presidential leadership. However, one important factor affecting American strategies — the influence of oil and arms manufacturing industries — has been completely left out. This factor has gained considerable notoriety during the recent years, and deserves to be explored in detail.

 

Reluctant Crusaders
By Colin Dueck
Princeton University Press, New Jersey
Available with
Liberty Books, Karachi
ISBN 0-691-13625-7
224pp. Rs1,595