November 28, 2004

THIS recently published book by Hassan Abbas is Pakistan’s Tom Clancey. Written in a flowing prose, this is a narrative about the link between the mullah, the military and America and the manner in which it shapes Pakistan’s politics. More importantly, it tells tales from the inner circles of power, especially the military that one would not get to hear otherwise. The book is full of anecdotes about a lot of people starting from Ayub Khan to Musharraf that would keep a reader awake. The style is certainly journalistic rather than academic.

The book has eleven chapters out of which the first five are historical. These refer to a period starting from independence to Ziaul Haq in which the author struggles with establishing the link between the religious right and the military establishment. Tracing the roots of Islam in the region dating back to Mohammad bin Qasim, the author points out how the religious parties opposed the creation of Pakistan. But once the country was established in 1947, they managed to take advantage and establish themselves. For the mullah the anti-Ahmadi riots of 1953 were the entry point into coercive politics. Then on, the religious parties systematically opposed the secular parties or any move to secularize the country.

This stand of the religious parties helped establish the army in politics. The army’s foothold in decision-making eroded accountability which was required to review its blunders like the one made in 1965. For instance, the author raises questions regarding the change of guard in the army during Operation Gibraltar that took Pakistan even closer to not achieving its military objective. The suggestion is that Yahya changed the tactical planning resulting in the disaster of 1965.

Yahya, according to Abbas, made other tactical errors as well. The poor handling of East Pakistan and ordering the carnage of innocent Bengali citizens occured under Yahya’s watch. In the end, even Nixon, despite his concern for Pakistan, could not help the country. The poverty of leadership was a major cause of the debacle of 1971. Yahya was more interested in listening to Nur Jahan sing to him over the telephone than directing his troops.

The change of guard, however, did not help improve political conditions. Soon after taking power Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to impose himself on the military, a move resisted by General Gul Hassan that led to his eventual removal. This and other blunders were resented by the army resulting in a group trying to stage a coup against Bhutto. It was the court martial proceedings of this case that brought Ziaul Haq into the limelight. The general’s ability of making his political superior happy resulted in his promotion. This was part of a number of blunders that Bhutto made. He miscalculated Zia’s intent and provoked the general to punishing Bhutto severely. Abbas’s argument is that ultimately Zia perceived Bhutto’s assassination as an issue of his own life and death. The passage describing Bhutto’s last hours should dispel many of the myths surrounding the end of Pakistan’s first elected prime minister:

Earlier, when Bhutto was told that he would be hanged on the morrow, at first he did not believe it. Only when his wife and daughter were allowed their farewell visit to him did the gravity and imminence of the situation finally begin to sink into him. He then told his wife to file a mercy petition on his behalf with Zia. He would still not beg for clemency himself. But a while later he asked for his shaving kit — he said he wanted to look good when dead. Soon it was time to go. It was suggested to him that since he was weak, it would be best if he embarked on his last journey on a stretcher. He refused and walked until he could no more. There he addressed the jail warden and said he was sorry that on occasion he had caused him unnecessary problems.

His last words were that the handcuffs were uncomfortably tight, and he asked if someone could loosen them. By then Tara Masih, the official hangman, had pulled the lever and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had passed into the ages. The Economist aptly wrote, ‘The quality of the evidence was highly questionable. The prosecution witnesses were a shady bunch. But the task set for the justices by the soldiers who have ruled Pakistan since last July’s coup was quite clear: Mr Bhutto must be removed.’

It is Zia, who then changed the face of socio-politics. He outmanoeuvred any opposition to his views in the army and put the country on a more religious, ideological course. The Americans, however, were with him in doing so because of the Afghan jihad. Some assume that it was his religious inclinations that made the Americans suspicious of Zia and his removal in 1988. But the author refutes all such claims.

While the dynamics of the mullah-military alignment changed in the ensuing years, the political chaos did not abate. In fact, the chapter on the years of democratic governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and the military-led dispensation of Musharraf are full of anecdotes highlighting the political confusion and contradictions, and tension between the military and political forces. The creation of the IJI and the MQM by the ISI are interesting stories as is the section on the Musharraf-Sharif tussle on Kargil. Abbas’s standpoint is that Sharif did not have a full idea of the plan. Considering Nawaz Sharif’s limited understanding of issues, one can sympathize with the argument.

The most interesting sections of the book deal with the story of what transpired amongst the army’s top leadership at the time of the plane hijacking and eventual take over by Musharraf in October 1999, General Mehmood’s reaction when confronted by the Bush administration after 9/11, and the working of the national accountability bureau (NAB). One is, for instance, amazed to know that Mehmood readily agreed to cooperate with the US and it was Musharraf who took a relatively longer while than his head of ISI to take a decision on the turn around.

Abbas reaches the conclusion that Musharraf would not be able to deliver. This assessment is based on the author’s experience of the general’s backtracking on corruption cases and handling of religious extremism in the country.

There are many who would be inclined to read this as an anti-army book which it definitely is not. In fact, Abbas has been fair in his assessment of the army. The sin for which he might not be forgiven by those in power is telling stories from the army’s inner circles. These are stories that the army’s discipline does not allow its officers to tell openly. The narrative in some case is so intimate that one wonders if the author was part of the military. This book definitely tells the tale that many a professional and honest officer might want to tell.

At certain places the author’s bias is also apparent, like in the discussion of Asif Zardari and Benazir Bhutto. Despite his affinity with Zardari, the author does not devote a lot of space discussing the politics and tactics of Bhutto’s husband. Similarly, Abbas dedicates a lot of precious time on the early years without any major contribution to the reader’s knowledge. But that is really a matter of a necessity for building his argument. From an academic standpoint, there are other substantive weaknesses as well such as lack of citation and sources in the book. In fact, the research methodology is questionable. However, as Abbas confesses himself: the book is not academic but tells a story. From that perspective, Abbas emerges as a powerful storyteller.

Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror
By Hassan Abbas
M.E. Sharpe. Available with Mr Books, 10-D Super Market, Islamabad
Tel: 051-2278843-5
Email: mrbooks@isb.comsats.net.pk
Website: www.mrbooks.com.pk
ISBN 0-7656-1497-9
275pp. Rs1,795

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