June 13, 2004

Mahmud Ali traces the downhill road that democracy took in Pakistan

After the assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, in October 1951 the seven years of infighting by the politicians constituted a wanton assault on democracy by the very people who were supposed to uphold and nourish it. This assault was aided, in fact, manipulated by a coterie of bureaucrats, and when politics had been completely debased, the very semblance of it was destroyed by the imposition of martial law. On October 7, 1958, in the darkness of the night President Iskander Mirza dismissed the cabinet of Malik Feroz Khan Noon, dissolved the National Assembly, abrogated the constitution, and appointed the army commander-in-chief, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, as the chief martial law administrator. In twenty days time Mirza himself was gone, leaving all powers with the General. The cat thus came out of the bag.

The 1958 martial law was the first to take the form of military rule. From the very outset, Ayub made it clear that he would stay in power, and put the entire blame for misrule, turmoil and economic ruination on the politicians. When Iskander Mirza was Interior Minister in the cabinet of Mohammad Ali (Bogra), he used the term ‘controlled democracy’, but it fell to the lot of Ayub Khan to actually put into effect this control. With him, therefore, started the second era of denial of democracy. It operated in two stages: the first was the period of martial law, and the second that of the constitution, which was thrust by Ayub Khan on the country on June 8, 1962.

To contain democracy, Ayub Khan took a number of decisions, but his most important step was the evolution of a new concept of democracy, which he called ‘basic democracy’. Through this system, he planned to pattern political and representative institutions on his design for centralized authority. He claimed that his concept of democracy was close to the genius of the people, and as such made it the basis of his constitution. The constitution entrenched him in power more firmly, because it legalized his concept of centralized authority. It reflected his philosophy more effectively than the martial law — wide administrative and financial powers vested in the chief executive, an indirectly elected National Assembly with no tangible control over the budget, and a set of guiding principles, instead of the fundamental rights.

A number of leaders attacked the constitution as authoritarian, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali being foremost because the 1956 constitution, which he had fathered, was abolished, when Ayub Khan stepped in. But the main opposition came from East Pakistan, where nine prominent leaders in a joint statement rejected the right of an individual to give a constitution to the country. Later this statement came to be known as the “nine leaders’ statement”. The nine leaders were: Nurul Amin, Hamidul Haq Choudhry, Ataur Rahman Khan, Abu Hussain Sarkar, Yousuf Ali Choudhry (Mohan Mian), Pir A.H. Mohsen Uddin (Dudu Mian), Syed Azizul Haq (Nanna Mian), Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Mahmud Ali. When, however, Ayub launched the constitution on June 8, 1962, he could not make any selection of his ministers from East Pakistan without conceding their right to be simultaneously members of the Assembly. To meet their demand he amended the constitution, presumably at the instance of Mohammad Ali (Bogra), who hoped to wrest more powers for the Assembly, and reduce those of the president.

This apparent victory of democratic forces was soon nullified, when some MNAs from East Pakistan unwittingly challenged the presidential amendment to the constitution in the Dhaka High Court. The court declared the amendment ultra vires of the constitution and unseated all the four ministers from that wing, including Mohammad Ali (Bogra). Ayub Khan had agreed to take ministers from the elected members of the Assembly in a situation, which he could not tackle otherwise.

But the Dhaka High Court judgment gave him an opportunity to revert to his original plan of running the government with persons who had no representative status. Thereafter he kept the MNAs under his thumb, because he did not find himself answerable to the Assembly, and enjoyed the powers, which he did not share with any elected body or individual.

After his re-election in 1965 which was soon followed by war with India, Ayub Khan seemed to realize that such complete authoritarianism would not help him stay in power for long, and he promised to the new opposition to resolve the constitutional problem, which was widening the gulf between the government and the people, and creating estrangement between the two wings of the country. He did not keep his promise, either because he did not want to share power with the Assembly, or his advisers were too crafty to allow this to happen.

He had restored fundamental rights in December 1963 when an amendment was made in the constitution. But the people were still denied adult franchise and their representatives had very little say in financial matters, and the budget of the country, even though he had promised this on the floor of the house in the Dhaka session in March 1966. This state of affairs continued till a stage came when it was no longer possible to deny the democratic aspirations of the people through fruitful dialogue with the liberal section of the popular leadership.

Democracy is not merely a representative system of government; it awakens the people to their need and responsibilities, and provides an opening for their fulfillment. And, their greatest need is the sense of participation and self-respect. Democracy is the only system of government, which ensures these. And when people are denied participation and their self-respect is injured, the government topples, and the authority of the ruler is undermined. This is what happened with Ayub. He realized this but could do nothing except to step out and leave the country in the lurch.

In the year 1968, particularly in the closing months, there were signs that a sudden change was imminent. Ayub Khan must have sensed the foreboding but he lingered on and did not show any desire for a dialogue with the politicians. While the democratic elements were denied every opportunity to function, power hungry slogan-mongers were whipping up mob frenzy in both the wings.

The much delayed efforts of Ayub Khan to patch up with the politicians and replace the so called presidential with the parliamentary form of government once again, proved to be of no avail. Demonstrations against him, which were generated as a result of a long period of suffocation, swept both wings of the country, when he invited the leaders of the opposition parties to a roundtable conference in February 1969.

Things would have taken a different shape if he had initiated contact with the opposition four or five months earlier. But in February some elements were planning the capture of power instead of restoration of democracy. And, therefore, they did not want the roundtable conference to take place at all. Some of the politicians, though wanting constitutional change, immediately started evaluating possibilities of realignments, so as to capture a majority of the seats in the National Assembly.

It was in this situation that Mumtaz Daultana tried to project himself as the strongest supporter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was facing trial in the Agartala conspiracy treason case. Even though a date had been fixed in the third week of February for a session of the roundtable conference, Daultana insisted on the presence of Mujib. He almost walked out of the Democratic Action Committee meeting when some of the Awami Leaguers present there suggested that the roundtable conference should take place even if Mujib could not be released. The situation further deteriorated when the possibility of the roundtable conference became dim; Ayub Khan made another retreat and agreed to release Mujib on parole.

Again someone bungled, and though Mujib had agreed to come on parole, an announcement on the radio about it altered the situation. The radio quoted Maulvi Farid Ahmed while disclosing the news of the release of Mujib on parole for his participation in the Rawalpindi talks, but when the people heard the news, they swarmed around Mujib at Kurmitola Cantonment to prevent his coming to Rawalpindi and demanded his unconditional release. Ayub Khan did so after a few days, and soon everybody found that Mujib had a different line to propose.

What happened in the roundtable conference is common knowledge, but at the very start it was feared that the chances of constitutional changes were receding, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, even though he asked for an invitation, did not attend the conference, and Maulana Bhashani worked against it, perturbed perhaps, that he was outmanoeuvred by Mujib.

Mujibur Rahman himself made things difficult and brought about a new set of proposals, which were beyond the demands of the Democratic Action Committee that had already been accepted by Ayub Khan, even before the round table conference met at Rawalpindi. The remaining two, namely, a change to parliamentary government and the introduction of adult franchise, were conceded at the roundtable conference. It was a real achievement but within a few days the country was seen heading towards another crisis, deeper than the previous one.

The roundtable conference parleys ended on March 13 when Ayub Khan announced his acceptance of the Democratic Action Committee demands. Mujib did not seem happy and three hours after the conference he announced his withdrawal from the Democratic Action Committee. At the same time, Asghar Khan formed a party of his own and named it Justice Party. This happened in Rawalpindi.

Maulana Bhashani threatened that the MNAs who would attend the Assembly session to be held for carrying out the necessary amendments to accommodate the decisions of the roundtable conference would be annihilated. Bhutto stepped up his own agitation, and normal transfer of power to the people became more difficult.

Mujib, too, was in a hurry and sent his own draft bill for the amendment of the constitution. Ayub Khan lost control of the situation and was taking decisions, which were only attempts to catch at a straw. On March 15, he appointed Yusuf Haroon as governor of West Pakistan, presumably to placate Mujib. A week later, the East Pakistan governor was also changed, and Dr N.M. Huda was nominated to replace Monem Khan. Huda was sworn in on March 23.

One day after Huda was sworn in, and two days after the receipt of the draft bill from Mujib, Ayub Khan handed over the reins of government to the army chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan “to perform his constitutional duties”. He did this despite the provision in the constitution given by himself that for any reason if the president is unable to perform his duties the speaker of the National Assembly shall perform the duties of the president.

Ayub’s fall, which came after a long drawn out struggle when he had agreed to the demands of adult franchise and a parliamentary form of government, brought democratic forces face to face with another wall. The country was again in the grip of martial law and without a constitution. Twenty-two years after its creation, Pakistan, the struggle for which was based on democracy, was still far away from it. Eleven years of authoritarian rule ended in a new phase of dictatorship, which proved to be a death-knell for the country. It cut Pakistan into two halves and our enemy succeeded in its long cherished design to do so, because the absence of democracy had blurred the vision of the nation and put its destination out of view.

Excerpted with permission from
Pakistan’s Experiment on Parliamentary Democracy
(Revised Edition of What Then Must We Do?)
By Mahmud Ali
Self-published. Available with The Concept Publications Trust (Regd), Flat # 3, 1st Floor, Crystal Arcade, F-8 Markaz, Islamabad. Tel: 051-2250926
48pp. Rs50

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