May 30, 2004

VETERAN Indian diplomat J.N. Dixit’s book India and Regional Developments provides a good insight into current Indian thinking about Pakistan-related issues. Dixit served as the Indian Foreign Secretary and also Ambassador to Pakistan and can, therefore, speak authoritatively on these issues. This book is a compilation of a series of his articles written for newspapers during the last three years. In general, he comes across as a sober observer of the subcontinental scene. Policymakers in Pakistan should take note of such writings in order to get a closer idea of Indian perceptions and motivations.

Dixit joined the Congress Party some time ago and is critical of some of the more communal-minded policies of the ruling BJP. But it is clear from his writings that when it comes to Pakistan and other national issues, Indian strategists tend to close ranks.

For instance, he squarely blames President Musharraf for the failure of the Agra summit, alleging that Musharraf “had decided in advance that it should fail if India does not accept his demands in toto”. Dixit ignores the positive impact that Musharraf had made on Indian public opinion on the first two days of his visit and the optimistic signals about progress at Agra, till the summit got derailed at the last moment. In fact, at one point in the book, Dixit admits that “the aborted Agra declaration in the drafting of which former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh got unnecessarily involved made the territorial solution of the Kashmir issue top item on the agenda without any reference to cross-border terrorism”. Instead, he accuses Musharraf of having come to the summit “with a narrow agenda and the single aim” namely, either to make India accept that Jammu and Kashmir was “the only and most important item of discussion” or to proclaim to the world that despite the special effort he had made to come to India, New Delhi “remained obstinate and unreasonable”.

Dixit thinks that a solution to the Kashmir problem “could be sought with some adjustment in the delineation of the Line of Control combined with a political package for the people of Jammu and Kashmir responsive to their concerns and aspirations.” He says that “the bottom line is: no territorial alienation of Jammu and Kashmir, which is a part of India, to any country. But rest, there are options available.” Dixit believes that if “somehow” a solution could be found to the Kashmir issue, there can be normal relations with Pakistan in a period of 10-20 years.

Dixit repeatedly accuses Pakistan of carrying out “cross-border terrorism” in Kashmir and asserts that Musharraf was “mendacious” in his denials on this issue. At one point of time, Dixit even advocated limited “pre-emptive strikes” against Pakistan to stop this alleged terrorism. “I am an advocate for structured responses where it is necessary. If within a week or ten days of attack on the Indian parliament we had done a strike across the line of control — this is my considered opinion — nobody could/would have questioned us. I do not think Pakistan would have resorted to the nuclear option.” He disagreed with the BJP government’s approach to the issue. “You do not talk in advance about pre-emptive strikes, especially when you are in the government. Advani says we will exercise the right of hot pursuit. You don’t say in advance. You do it and then say this is why we did it.”

All of this makes rather chilling reading for Pakistanis. It seems that not only the extremists in the BJP, but also the more sober elements from other parties, are equally capable of contemplating the most dangerous adventurous policies towards Pakistan, disregarding Pakistan’s warnings that this could lead to a nuclear confrontation.

On the other hand, Dixit takes a more balanced position by criticizing those in India who have not reconciled to the creation of Pakistan. “While we in formalistic political statements say that partition is a fact and India has no desire to undo it etc., we talk of Akhand Bharat whenever we can. Even in the nationalistic, secularistic lexicon, we still articulate the view that the partition of India was an aberration.” He adds, “I am clear in my mind that Akhand Bharat is not the solution.”

Dixit is critical of the massing of Indian troops on the border in 2002 and says that “coercive diplomacy” produced only marginal success. This “cosmetic military posture resulted in high political pressure being exerted on us to remain restrained”. Taking note of reports that the Indian military establishment was poised to launch operations against Pakistan in mid-January 2002 and then again in mid-June, Dixit says that “pressure from the United States and its allies compelled us to remain inactive”. His “inescapable conclusion is that neither our diplomacy nor our military posture served our interests in any meaningful way”. Still, he argues that “India should do something pre-emptive on the ground to stress this message that the world should not expect India to remain restrained. At some point, Musharraf’s bluff would have to be called. That point may not be too far because at certain thresholds in political affairs, reason has to be replaced by use of a structured force as the final arbiter of resolving issues.”

Regarding the peace overtures since Vajpayee extended a hand of friendship in April 2003, Dixit strikes a note of caution. He reaffirms that a solution to the Kashmir issue “should in no way compromise India’s territorial unity and integrity”. The dialogue should be carefully structured and the “Agra fiasco should not be repeated”. Interestingly he goes on to predict that within two to five years, “the US will suggest a solution to India and Pakistan basically rooted in the present territorial dispensation of Jammu and Kashmir”. Dixit agrees that the most important question that both sides would have to answer is whether they want the Kashmir issue to hold the well being of the nearly 1.3 billion people of India and Pakistan hostage? Yet, he insists, “So far as India is concerned, the bottomline is that there cannot be further partitions of the Indian Republic.”

As serious negotiations between India and Pakistan are expected to start later this year, there is a need for clear-headed thinking on both sides. Those circles in Pakistan who are building up too many expectations need to pause and reflect on the kind of mindset in India illustrated by people even like Dixit, who cannot be just dismissed as an extremist. In fact, he is generally rational and analytical.

One thinks of policymakers in Pakistan as being obsessed with India but Dixit’s book suggests that Indian thinkers are no less obsessed with Pakistan. It seems that whatever he has to say in this book ends up with the Pakistan factor. His book suffers also from some poor editing. The various articles are reproduced without mention of the year of authorship and one is left to wonder which April or June he is talking about. The reader is even more vexed that some of the articles, which he had already read in the earlier portion of the book, are reproduced in toto in a latter part of the same book. Surely this was avoidable.

 

India and Regional Developments — Through the Prism of Indo-Pak Relations

By J.N. Dixit

Gyan Publishing House Available with Indus Publications, 25 Fareed Chambers, Abdullah Haroon Road, Karachi

Tel: 021-5660242, 4801429

ISBN 81-212-0785-1

334pp. Indian Rs540

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