March 28, 2004

Political reconstruction in Afghanistan after the Bonn conference in 2001 has not been easy. J. Alexander Thier highlights the problems

THE emergency Loya Jirga held on June 10-21, 2002, in Kabul was a small but critical step in Afghanistan’s political development. It was an opportunity to accord national legitimacy to the peace process initiated in Bonn, but it produced mixed results. From a narrow perspective, it was a success. Representatives from across Afghanistan came together to elect, or rather anoint, a head of state, and the major armed factions kept their hats in the political ring rather than resorting to armed violence. Given the last three decades of war and turmoil, this is significant. However, the Loya Jirga failed in important respects as well. The opportunity to assert civilian leadership, promote democratic expression, and draw authority away from the warlords was squandered. An all-consuming concern for short-term stability prompted key Afghan and international decision-makers to bow to undemocratic sectarian demands.

The Loya Jirga is an Afghan tradition with an august but vague history. The concept was extrapolated from the model of the tribal jirga or shura, an ad hoc, village-based institution that allows broad representation and, nominally, consensual decision-making. A Loya Jirga is intended to be a national manifestation of community decision making. The Loya Jirga has been used on average every twenty years to confirm the succession of monarchs, to pass constitutions, and to approve government policy. The last Loya Jirga deemed broadly legitimate was held in 1964 to approve a new reformist constitution.

The greatest success of the Loya Jirga may have been the selection process for the delegates. Although subject to significant intimidation in certain areas, the overall exercise brought together communities to discuss issues and peacefully choose representatives. A two-phase local indirect election system combining consensus-based selection of local leaders with a secret ballot in the second round chose 1051 representatives from up to 390 electoral districts in 32 provinces. An additional 500 delegates were appointed by the independent Loya Jirga commission in consultation with various organizations, civil society groups, nomads, and refugees.

The overall delegate selection process was intended to create balance: on a regional and rural/urban basis by allowing at least one representative for each administrative district (uluswali); on an ethnic basis primarily by relying upon geographic concentrations; on a gender basis by reserving 160 appointed seats for women; and on a social-cultural basis by providing seats for religious figures, refugees, nomads, and traders. The geographical, ethnic, and ideological diversity under the tent was a testament to the success of the system — and critical to the ability of Afghans to choose representatives.

Just before the Loya Jirga, however, a crack in the facade of fair selection of representatives appeared, when up to one hundred extra “political” delegates were summarily added to the rolls. These delegates, mostly provincial governors and other political-military figures unwilling or unable to stand for election, constituted a blanket of intimidation upon the delegates. Although able to act independently in the “Kabul-free-zone” under the watchful eyes of ISAF and the international media, the delegates and their families would have to deal with local power brokers once they arrived back home.

The key expectation for the Loya Jirga on the part of the assembled delegates, most Afghans, and the international community was that it would correct the ethnic/factional imbalance produced at the Bonn conference. No matter how fair the selection process for delegates was, the legitimacy of the Loya Jirga would ultimately rely on the names and positions that emerged. In the end, although the delegate selection process went better than expected, the opportunity for real participation and reconciliation at the Loya Jirga was squandered.

The Loya Jirga was mandated to choose the head of state, the structure of the transitional authority, and its key personnel. Many delegates came armed with plans and speeches outlining the powers and functions of a new parliament, cabinet ministries, and independent commissions. Ultimately, delegates were given little opportunity to address any of these tasks seriously. This was largely due to behind-the-scenes orchestration, exacerbated by procedural confusion and poor chairmanship. The exact substance of decisions to be made had been vague since Bonn, most likely because many of the power struggles that were evident at that conference were still unresolved. This lack of clarity was exploited by those wanting to expand or contract the agenda to suit their needs. The result was several agenda-less days, chaotic speakers’ lists, and delegates frustrated at not knowing what, when, or how they were to decide issues.
 

King unmaker

One day before the Loya Jirga began, Zahir Shah’s nomination for consideration for the position of head of state was withdrawn, apparently under significant pressure from the Shura-i-Nazar and the United States. The US special envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan by birth, played a direct, visible role as “king unmaker”. On the eve of the Loya Jirga, Khalilzad called a press conference at the US embassy to announce that the king would not seek office at the Loya Jirga. In a staged press conference two hours later, the king sat impassively flanked by Khalilzad and Foreign Minister Abdullah as a statement to the same effect was read on his behalf. This overt orchestration set a cynical tone for the gathering, and significant Pakhtoon discontent erupted at the outright exclusion of Zahir Shah.

Once the Loya Jirga began, another crucial error was made in allowing the National Security Directorate, Kabul’s Panjshiri-controlled secret police, into the Loya Jirga grounds. With the combination of warlords and governors occupying the front rows while National Security Directorate agents scurried around the adjacent consultation tents, an air of repression and intimidation filled the Loya Jirga tent. Many delegates complained of threatening phone calls and the minister of defence, General Fahim, threatened the husband of Masooda Jalal, the female candidate for president, in front of a large group. The discontent among delegates was compounded by the failure to redistribute the power of the key security ministries of defence, interior, and foreign affairs away from the Shura-i-Nazar.

To many delegates who had come great distances from inside and outside the country to participate in the selection of their government for the first time in decades, the last-minute deal-making outside the tent was disappointing. There were no illusions inside the tent that the Loya Jirga could be a fully democratic process. Compromise between and with those still prepared to use force to achieve their political ends remains unavoidable in today’s Afghanistan. However, the orchestration of outcomes throughout the process set a heavy-handed and disappointing tone.
 

Transitional administration

The Kabul government has become increasingly split between two facets. On the security side, the government remains divided, itself a factional entity among factions, unable to rise above the field. On the administrative side, however, President Karzai, with the backing of the international donor community, has managed to insert a small but powerful band of technocrats into positions of authority. This cabal of talented, forward-looking, and, above all, politically unaffiliated Afghans are working on extending the authority and capacity of the Kabul government to the provinces. Their mission is to provide an alternative to warlordism — a responsive and representative government that provides services and respects human rights.

This is a relatively new concept for Afghanistan. Although the centralized state did manage to reach into most parts of the country after nearly a century of state-building that began in the 1880s, the state was never particularly representative or focused on rights protection and service delivery. The remnants of the Afghan civil service remain in the provinces and are surprisingly functional despite more than two decades of state collapse. Rather than disappear, the administrative units simply stopped reporting to Kabul and instead survived under local and regional political arrangements. Now this cadre of civil servants, still loyal to the concept of a centralized state, is being reinvigorated and reintegrated in the effort to re-nationalize the government. Tying the government bureaucracy back into the centre is a key means of undermining the capacity and attractiveness of alternative sources of power. It will be increasingly difficult for the regional power brokers to maintain loyalty with the centre providing salaries, programme resources, and a compelling vision of the future.
 

Peace and democratization?

Despite considerable uncertainty and the continuing domination of Afghan politics by the tofangdar, or gun-holders, there are signs that some political actors, warlords among them, are preparing for a transition from rule of the gun to the rule of law. Although by the end of 2002 there were no formal preparations for eventual elections, and work on the constitutional process had only barely begun, some political actors had started organizing for a political future off the battlefield. Apart from the Loya Jirga, the sanctioned means for pursuing political agendas have been through government commissions, especially the constitutional commission, the judicial-reform commission, the human rights commission, and the national assembly commission, as well as through semi-sanctioned political party development.

The constitutional commission was to be appointed within two months after the emergency Loya Jirga. Political concerns delayed its creation and only a drafting committee was appointed in November 2002, with the full thirty-five-member commission finally appointed April 26, 2003, just five months before the constitutional Loya Jirga was scheduled to begin. No presidential decree was issued assigning the duties or time line of the commission, and thus in practice nothing was accomplished in the first year after the Bonn consultation.

Several civil society groups, however, made early preparations to ensure that they would have input into the constitutional development process. Their early organization came in response to fears that the constitutional process, like the emergency Loya Jirga, would be undermined by backroom deals among unrepresentative power brokers. There were also broader fears that enormous pressure and expectations would be placed on the constitutional process to sort out the underlying issues around which the potential for conflict still loomed large.

The human rights, judicial, and national assembly commissions all started with significant mandates for change, but all have been bogged down due to lack of funding, lack of operational capacity, and political infighting. The judicial commission, first formed in June 2002, was disbanded in September, having accomplished nothing; it was not reconstituted until November 2002. The national assembly commission, an unwanted stepchild of the government agreed to at the emergency Loya Jirga, remained hampered by uncertain membership and mandate. Finally, the human rights commission, given the enormous mandate of human rights policy, investigation, education, and transitional justice, struggled to prioritize its work and to deal with the very real security threats facing its members. Its capacity to work throughout the country has been very limited, and capacity building support, as with all the commissions, has been slow.

One area of more rapid, albeit unregulated development has been in the area of political parties. Although Afghanistan has no law allowing for the creation or regulation of parties, such political entities are emerging in a variety of ways. Key power brokers, such as Younus Qanooni, the powerful former interior minister, Wali Massoud, the brother of assassinated leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Karim Khalili, the Hazara leader who heads the Hezb-i-Wahadat party, have been working aggressively to create strong party structures. Although there is no formal party, a religious coalition of conservative mujahedin leaders such as former president Rabbani and Rasool Sayyaf also seems imminent.
 

Budding movement

There is also a budding democratic movement, boosted by the formation of a coalition of small groups, called the National Council of Peace and Democracy of Afghanistan. It comprises students, university professors, liberal republicans, and Afghan NGO workers. This coalition has put forward a basic democratic platform and is in the early stages of organization. Although not very powerful in the current Afghan context, there were numerous sympathetic delegates at the Loya Jirga.

Development of a party system in Afghanistan will be needed both for civic participation in the political process and for elections. Support for development of democratic institutions and parties in the next few years must be a top priority of the government and the international community.

Demobilization and reconstruction programmes, even if successful, will be slow and incomplete. There is a pressing need to wrest control of the fruits of the warlord economy — opium production, smuggling, and illicit taxation of trade — away from the regional power brokers, while at the same time producing the economic incentives of stability. The ultimate safeguard against a return to conflict in Afghanistan, however, will be political stability. Afghanistan’s future lies in the ability of its people to forge a political community that resolves disputes pacifically and democratically.
 

Excerpted with permission from

Nation-Building Unravelled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan

Edited by Antonio Donini, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester

Kumarian Press, 1294 Blue Hills Avenue, Bloomfield

CT 06002, USA

Tel: 800-289-2664

Fax: 860-243-2867

Website: www.kbooks.com

ISBN 1-56549-180-7

236pp. Price not listed

Please Visit our Sponsor (Ads open in separate window)