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August 24, 2003
Review: Flawed calculations
THIS book co-authored by Pravin Sawhney and Lt Gen Sood on the ten months of military mobilization by India in 2001/02 is a better book than Sawhney’s earlier book on India’s security titled Demystifying Defence. Perhaps, it is the writing skills and experience of General Sood that contributed to the better quality of this research product.
Comprising seven chapters, the book looks at various issues such as regional politics post 9/11, the geo-political and geo-strategic context in which the operation by India was launched, New Delhi’s objectives, the role of the US during the conflict, the role of nuclear proliferation in affecting the outcome of the operation, and India and Pakistan’s comparative conventional capabilities.
The basic conclusion of this book is that Operation Parakram was an unsuccessful operation botched mainly due to the gap in the political and military vision in India. The authors are of the view that the conventional military balance was not pronounced to guarantee India a decisive victory. In addition, New Delhi’s nuclear deterrence posture was not of the scale that would ensure positive dividends in terms of impressing Pakistan.
In fact, there was a certain gap between India’s political and military objectives and the way it played its diplomatic game. At the end, New Delhi could not manage to convince the international community, especially the US, to bear maximum pressure on Islamabad to withdraw support to the militants fighting in Kashmir.
Thus, one of the conclusions is that the Indian leadership failed to see that the developments in 9/11 had made Musharraf much too precious to Washington. So, instead of Pakistan turning into a pariah state, it became the US’s strategic partner with American leadership becoming extremely conscious of the Pakistani general-turned-president’s importance for Washington’s war against terrorism. Unfortunately, as stated by the authors, New Delhi could not correctly fathom American sensitivity to the events of 9/11 or that India’s logic would not work.
In any case, as has been argued at several places in the book, one of the gaps was India’s US policy. Sawhney and Sood’s debate on India-US relations is in the same strain as Karnad’s, who is also of the view that India does not have the nerve to realize its dream of becoming a regional power. One of the arguments is that the new American engagement in India is almost a pre-planned American move aiming at neutralizing India’s nuclear power.
Sadly enough, India tends to get cold feet in the face of American diplomatic pressure. Therefore, to the authors, President Musharraf appears more politically suave because he managed to fathom the import of American mood better than the Indians, who thought that they could manage to link Pakistan’s aid to the militants with post 9/11 developments.
The conclusion in the first chapter, thus, is that New Delhi has a serious problem comprehending America’s strategic approach towards South Asia, particularly Washington’s ambition to keep the South Asian nuclear and ballistic missile development in check.
This statement is followed by an analysis of militancy in the region, particularly the picture after 9/11. However, some of the conclusions in the second chapter are problematic. For instance, the authors contend that Pakistan had no control over the Taliban despite these Afghan warriors being Islamabad’s creation.
Again, it is held that Pakistan’s ISI had no role in the hijacking of IC 184 that had resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar. In fact, this chapter betrays the authors’ lack of knowledge of Pakistan’s military establishment and the politics behind the support to the militants. However, one cannot disagree with the argument that the events of 9/11 and American reaction to it let Musharraf out of the tight corner where he found himself prior to 2001.
It was in this environment that Operation Parakram was launched. The plan, according to the authors was conceived by the northern command to be later accepted by India’s Army HQs. Sawhney and Sood highlight one of the biggest problems of the operation: the inability to integrate political objectives in the operational plans and to explain to the military that the idea was not just to initiate a war.
Incidentally, the authors make the same argument as the Pakistan Army in one of its explanations for Kargil. The new theory is that the Kargil plan was intended to be a smaller operation that just got out of control. Both arguments are not plausible. And if these are true then one needs to ask questions regarding the sanity of the policymakers.
Whatever the origin of the operation, the fact of the matter, and as pointed out by the authors, is that India failed to attain its objectives. It definitely failed to impress Islamabad. This was partly due to India’s apprehension that Islamabad might use its nuclear weapons if India initiated hostilities. Clearly, India was not in a position to dominate its adversary through conventional military means.
The problem, hence, was India’s inability to calculate its own reaction in a situation where its nuclear deterrence was flawed as has been pointed out in the sixth chapter. To have a strong nuclear deterrence New Delhi would have to develop a strategy and buildup its programme that it does not appear willing to do under immense American pressure that is both direct and indirect. So, despite the claims made by some Indian generals that it was four times that India was close to starting a war, the fact is that New Delhi had lost its initiative soon after it mobilized its forces.
Furthermore, the American pressure played a key role in keeping India in check. This leads to one of the conclusions in the book that the US has a role in South Asia. While this assertion might not be beneficial to both parties, the reality is that it is the continued pressure from Washington that might lead to Pakistan amending its rather problematic Kashmir policy.
Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished
By Lt Gen (Retd) V.K. Sood & Pravin Sawhney
Sage Publications, B-42, Panchsheel Enclave, Post Box 4109, New Delhi-110017, India. Tel: 91-11-2649 1290-7.
Email: marketing@indiasage.com Website:
www.indiasage.com
ISBN 0-7619-9793-8
205pp. Indian Rs280
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