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August 3, 2003
Patience pays, not force
Jamsheed Marker traces the ups and downs in the negotiations on East Timor
JUST outside the city of St Petersburg, Russia, at the famous Piskarevsky Cemetery, a million victims of the siege of Leningrad in the second world war lie buried amongst surroundings of sombre beauty. The War Memorial carries a poem by the Leningrad poet and diarist, Olga Bergolts, who had herself endured those dark days of war and siege. The poem ends with the words:
“Let no one forget;
Let nothing be forgotten...”
The Question of East Timor remained largely dormant on the agenda of the United Nations until Kofi Annan assumed the office of Secretary General in January 1997, and the course of the action that he then initiated forms the content of this account. Kofi’s personal initiative and involvement on East Timor was the Schwerpunkt and remains so throughout this saga, as it provides both constancy and momentum to the process.
The second momentum was provided by the events in Indonesia that led to the fall of President Suharto. This in turn led to the third factor, which was his successor, President Habibie’s dramatic announcement of the referendum, and the fourth and last was the implementation of that decision, with the complicated choices — moral, political, and pragmatic that emerged from this opportunity.
Thinking back on this sequence of events, I am reaffirmed in my conviction that without Kofi’s initial decision to activate a negotiating process on East Timor and to not only keep it alive but to vigorously push it at all times, the United Nations would not have been in a position to seize the opportunities offered by the devolution of political events in Indonesia. In other words, we kept the ball in our possession, and ran with it as soon as we got the chance.
A few personal thoughts in elaboration of this contention may be relevant. By January of 1999, we had an ongoing process of negotiations that was firmly in place, and which appeared to be quite promising. The unexpected Habibie announcement suddenly provided us with an exciting window of opportunity, which we were determined to seize, especially as our negotiating institution was now in such substantive form and position.
It also soon became clear to us that the Habibie initiative was largely personal, and that far from enjoying broadbased support, it was, in fact, opposed by powerful elements, both civilian as well as military, within Indonesia. Hence our acceptance of the difficult time constraints demanded by the Habibie administration, since we wished to do what we could to help it to prepare and present the package to the MPR for its August meeting.
The issue of security was, of course, a matter of major concern and consideration, and any fool could see that the ideal solution would have been to prepare and induct an international peace keeping force into East Timor. But the prevalent realities ruled out such a possibility, and rendered equally foolish any idea of the possibility of its implementation.
In the first place, the lack of time and the high improbability of obtaining troop contributors would have made it impossible to obtain an enabling Security Council resolution for this purpose. Secondly, the Government of Indonesia was profoundly, and quite rightly, jealous of guarding its sovereignty: it vehemently opposed the presence of peacekeeping forces in East Timor, which it regarded as Indonesian soil. In the third place, Foreign Minister Alatas, in his usual persuasive fashion, made the irrefutable argument that since the proposal for popular consultation, complete with an urgent timeframe, emanated from President Habibie himself, it was axiomatic that he would do everything to ensure its implementation in peace and good order.
These, then, were some of the major considerations on which we proceeded to the May 5 Agreements. But even so, we managed to insert a number of supplementary safeguards on security. It was quite clear, from my own assessment as well as those of the US, UK, Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese governments, that we had pushed the envelope as far as it could go. Any further insistence on the deployment of international peacekeepers would have been a deal breaker.
Alatas was frankly and publicly adamant on this issue: “We do not regard ourselves as an occupying power in East Timor, and we will never allow foreign troops in to oversee the vote.” He added, “For us, this is an absolute matter of national sovereignty.”
Our next critical and decisive moment came during the period of voter registration and campaigning. The security situation was far from satisfactory, but the modalities for the popular consultation were progressing in encouraging fashion, and UNAMET was carrying out its duties in enthusiastic and efficient fashion. We decided, therefore, that although there was no green light, we could carry out a carefully calibrated progress on a red and amber light basis, until we reached the time of registration.
And when registration day arrived, we faced our next critical moment. The magnitude and enthusiasm with which the brave citizens of East Timor responded to the registration process became for me the decisive factor. I was determined to go ahead with the ballot, doing in the meanwhile whatever we could, through pleas, pressures, threats, and imprecations to the Indonesian authorities, to minimize the fury of the militia.
It was clear to me that for the purposes of the campaign we were nowhere near the level playing field as decreed by the May 5 Agreements, but it was also equally clear to me that if we were to wait for this to happen, we would never reach the day for the ballot.
I put this situation frankly to Xanana Gusmao, and he fully concurred with our decision to stay on course, adding that the CNRT had been campaigning for twenty-five years and did not now need the formality of the level playing field arrangements envisaged in the Agreement.
The post ballot violence obviously provoked a great deal of international outrage at the time. Not surprisingly, it also evoked considerable Monday morning quarter backing and, equally without surprise, it was once again open season on the United Nations. But even in those dark, hectic days I knew that we had done the right thing. It was clear to me that the people of East Timor, even though they knew that they were likely to be the victims of intimidation and violence, wanted the ballot to go ahead, and participated in it with courage and determination.
Xanana Gusmao was also quite clear on this issue, although he later confided to me that he had underestimated the scale and nature of the pro-integration reaction. From the political aspect, a postponement or delay of the ballot would have had disastrous and unpredictable consequences for the consultation process, and thrown into jeopardy the May 5 Agreements.
And the people of East Timor, who had so courageously conducted themselves and placed such implicit trust in the United Nations, would have found themselves facing an uncertain future, abandoned at the last critical moment, in the most cruel and unconscionable fashion. Lastly, all the evidence strongly suggests that violence and killings would have increased, and not decreased, if the ballot had been postponed.
It is my firm conviction, profoundly reinforced after the registration results that the United Nations had to stay on course for the rest of the consultation process. There is also one final matter for speculation: as subsequent events would shortly reveal, President Habibie, who was the strongest proponent in Jakarta for an East Timor referendum, soon found himself out of office. Would his bold East Timor policy not have also followed him into the wilderness?
The member states who were most closely involved in the East Timor negotiations — Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States — always remained fully convinced that the United Nations should proceed with the consultation process and the ballot. It is this conviction that motivated the political pressure that each brought to bear, at the highest level, on Jakarta, and which finally persuaded Habibie to accept an international peacekeeping force in East Timor.
The final sterling contribution of this group of Friends of the Secretary-General was the rapid and efficient deployment of the peacekeeping force, which arrived at unprecedented speed, a mere sixteen days after the ballot, and effectively contained the widespread deaths that would have occurred.
The last word must rest, as always, with the East Timorese people. When Secretary-General Kofi Annan made his first visit to East Timor on February 17, 2000, he was accorded a vast, spontaneous greeting that was both emotional and overwhelming. He received, of course, the profuse and deeply felt thanks of the leaders, such as Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos Horta, and Bishops Belo and Nasciemento.
But more than that he received the thanks, the blessings, and the embraces of thousands of enthusiastic East Timorese citizens. And he was told by these same people, in words, in tears, in joyous gestures, and roaring accolades, that they would always be grateful to him for what the United Nations had done in East Timor. Many of them told him this even as they showed him their destroyed homesteads and the graves of their loved ones.
East Timor had endured three centuries of colonialism, followed by a quarter century of occupation. Now, the United Nations had negotiated, and I stress the word negotiated, its long awaited freedom and independence. In a conflict that has lasted as long as the one in East Timor, there are always many heroes and a not inconsiderable number of villains. But there are many whose motives and motivations have been unexceptionable, even though their actions may be questionable.
This applies, in particular, to a large number of Indonesians whose attitude toward East Timor was founded on considerations of patriotism and national unity, and not on aggrandizement or oppression. It is a tribute, therefore, to their moral integrity that they willingly entered into negotiations to ascertain the will of the East Timorese people, and an even greater tribute to their moral courage when, overcoming a quarter century of emotional attachment, they accepted the outcome of the referendum. This applies, of course, to the overwhelming mass of the Indonesian people, and not the brutal few militia (most of whom were East Timorese, anyway) who committed the outrageous acts of violence in the post-referendum period.
Above all, the problem of East Timor was solved through a process of negotiations in which the United Nations was constantly and intimately involved at all stages, from initiation to completion. Prince von Bulow once defined diplomacy as “a first class stall seat at the theatre of life,” and it was my privilege and good fortune to have occupied one such seat as the saga of East Timor was played out.
What it revealed was the extent and nature of the crucial role played by three great statesmen — Kofi Annan, All Alatas, and Jaime Gama. Guided by principles and motivations of the highest moral and humanitarian nature, Alatas and Gama overcame the difficulties and obstacles posed by narrow personality interests or domestic political compulsions. They worked with the wise Kofi, as he quietly encouraged, prodded, persuaded, and suggested ways to move out of a dilemma and into progress.
Concessions were made by both Alatas and Gama for the purpose of securing overall progress, and this, in its own fashion, led to an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding. For the United Nations, East Timor is a success story which was brought about by three wise men, who negotiated and worked on the basis of Edmund Burke’s profound exhortation, “our patience will achieve more than our force”.
Excerpted with permission from
East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Independence © 2003
By Jamsheed Marker
McFarland & Co. Inc. Publishers, Box 611, Jefferson, North Carolina-28640, USA
Website: www.mcfarlandpub.com
ISBN 0-7864-1571-1
220pp. Price not listed
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